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Preface
This thesis was written while I was a student in the European Doctoral
Program ENTER, with my roots at the CentER for Economic Research,
Tilburg University. I started in May 1992, and spent the academic year
1993-1994 at GREMAQ, Université de Toulouse I.
Five essays in the theory of industrial organization and manage-
ment strategy constitute the body of this dissertation. It is obvious
that strategic behavior of firms and the internal organization of firms
are important issues. It is also obvious that managers should master
practical aspects of strategy and organization. Now one may ask: why
do we need theory? One answer is that it helps to ask the right ques-
tions in a complex world. Understanding how things work can help
managers cope with complexity and uncertainty.
I have acquired faith in the raw power of stripping away distracting
details from real-life problems. Although strategies are often gradu-
ally (and sometimes implicitly) developed by crafting, re-crafting, and
adapting to changing circumstances, I believe that there are gains from
combining the intuitive and adaptive aspects of strategy with logic and
rigor.
Organization of the thesis
The essays in this dissertation are in the same field, but not on the
same topic (except chapters 4 and 5, which are more closely related).
Chapter 1, the introduction, is meant for a wide audience. It gives a
flavor of industrial organization, game theory, and management strat-
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egy. Since the main part of this book may be bewildering to non-
specialists, I have tried to make the main ideas clear and accessible to
people with a broad interest in strategy and organization. To do this,
chapter 1 presents the essays as fictitious cases.
Chapter 2, "Moral Hazard and Noisy Information Disclosure," was
the first project for my dissertation. Chapter 3, "Entry Deterrence and
5ígnaling in Markets for Search Goods," was also initiated during 1992.
A previous version of this paper was selected winner of the 1994 Young
Economists' Essay Competition Award of the European Association
for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE). It has been accepted
for publication in the International Journal of Industrial Organization.
The main research for chapter 4, "Delegation of Responsibility in Or-
ganizations," and chapter 5, "Strategic Delegation of Responsibility in
Competing Firms," was done during my stay in Toulouse. When I came
back to Tilburg in the summer of 1994, I started to work on chapter 6,
"Aftermarkets: The Monopoly Case." A summary in Dutch concludes.
Thank-yous
No man is an island. The research that led to this dissertation has
benefited tremendously from the help of many people.
I had the privilege of being supervised by Helmut Bester, Eric van
Damme, and Jean Tirole. They did not only teach me economics, but
also how important it is to be critical and pose the right questions. As
an illustration I recall what one of them asked me after having listened
to some of my rash ideas for the umpteenth time: "Quelles sont les
bonnes questions?". It is a great pleasure to express my gratitude to
them.
Besides my supervisors, I wish to thank the other members of the
PhD Committee: Patrick Bolton, Sytse Douma, Chaim Fershtman,
and George Hendrikse. Thanks are also due to my former teachers at
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Sanjeev Goyal and Dan Kovenock, for
introducing me to research in industrial organization. Jacques Crémer,
xiv
for whom my name turned out to be the ultimate tongue-twister, was
extremely kind and helpful in organizing my stay in Toulouse.
Many other people have been very kind to discuss my work with
me. Thanks are due to all of them. Among these people are (I am
sure that the following list is incomplete): Philippe Aghion, Andreas
Blume, Jan Bouckaert, Juan Carrillo, Jai Pil Choi, Charles Corbett, Xi-
angzhu Han, In Ho Lee, Sjaak Hurkens, Jos Jansen, Christopher Kilby,
Peter Klibanoff, Boris Maurer, Bert Meijboom, Erik van de Poel, Jean-
Charles Rochet, Joris Scheepens, Roland Strausz, Frank Verboven, Ce-
leste Wilderom, and several participants of the CEPR European Sum-
mer 5ymposium in Economic Theory 1995 at Gerzensee, Switzerland.
More formal discussions about my research took place during pre-
sentations and also via the refereeing processes of academic journals. I
wish to thank seminar participants at CentER, GREMAQ and IDEI at
Université de Toulouse I, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Universiteit
van Amsterdam; conference participants of the AIO Presentatiedag '94
at Tilburg, the EARIE'93 Conference at Tel Aviv (Israel), the EARIE'94
Conference at Chania (Greece), the ENTER Jamboree '94 at Laden-
burg (Germany), the ESEM '94 Congress at Maastricht, the 7th World
Congress of the Econometric Society at Tokyo (Japan); Raymond De
Bondt and Joseph Harrington, Jr. as editors; Harold Houba and Michael
Waterson as discussants; and anonymous referees of various journals.
Of course, I am grateful to all the people at CentER, GREMAQ, and
IDEI for creating stimulating and very pleasant research environments.
Their support has been crucial in many ways. Since les joies de la vie
are so pronouncedly present in Toulouse and its surroundings, I would
almost go so far as to thank the mayor of Toulouse as well, but I do
not think that he will ever read this.
In order to visit conferences, one has to find ways to finance lo-
gistic services provided by airlines, railway companies, and hotels. I
gratefully acknowledge financial support by CentER, CEPR, EARIE,
Econometric Society, ENTER, the Erasmus Programme, NWO, and
xv
Shell Nederland B.V.
Among my friends, some hardly had a clue about what I was doing,
while some of those who did, pretended that they didn't. Henk-Arnold
Sijnja, I am still wondering to which category he belongs, used to ad-
dress my (former) employer as the Center for Economic Surgery...
Anyway, my friends, and also my brother Roel and his wife Birgit,
were always interested in my wanderings. This is also a good place to
express my appreciation to Alexander Ramselaar and Roel for accept-
ing the task of supporting me as parani~rtfen during the PhD defence.
I extend special thanks to my mother. Together with my father,
she provided an invaluable and solid foundation that enabled me to
pursue my studies. Despite the illness of my father, both of them
encouraged me to grasp the opportunity to do research in Toulouse. I
have always been convinced that it was the right thing to do - although
the beginning was difficult.






The aim of this chapter is to present the research that I carried out to
a wide audience. It also offers those trained in theoretical industrial
organization an alternative entry to the essays.
This book has its roots in theoretical industrial organization. The
theory of industrial organization makes heavy use of techniques devel-
oped in game theory. In each essay, I use a game-theoretic model to
analyze a specific, well-defined problem. Section 1.2 explains briefly
what game theory and industrial organization are about, and argues
why these fields may be interesting for management strategy and vice
versa. Sections 1.3-1.7 informally present the essays that constitute this
dissertation. Inspired by the management literature, I use fictitious
cases that illustrate the strategic interactions and the basic tradeoffs.
Section 1.8 concludes by discussing strengths and weaknesses of game-
theoretic models in general.
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2 Chapter 1
1.2 About the Research
Game theory studies strategic or competitive interaction by using
mathematical models.' "Strategic" refers to skilful planning, and the
"interaction" is usually among firms in a market or individuals in an
organization. A game model specifies the players in a game, the in-
formation they have (or don't have), the actions they can choose, the
timing of these actions, the payoffs for each player that result from
the actions that are chosen, and the preferences of the players over the
payoffs (utility functions). In such a model, each player is supposed to
choose actions that maximize his payoffs, given his information and his
expectations about his rivals' actions.
In addition to this description of game theory, it is useful to stress
the crucial perspectives of game theory on interaction. In my view,
these are
The two I's:
1. Incentives are the driving force behind a player's actions. Pre-
dicting or explaining behavior becomes easier by figuring out
"what makes someone tick."
2. Insight in a strategic situation (the ability to envisage various
scenarios and to form expectations about other players' actions
and reactions) helps a player to make smart choices. Game theory
assumes that players have insight in their situation.
The perspective of the two I's enables one to anticipate reactions of
rivals to a move and then to include those reactions into one's actual
decision. Like in the game of chess, one explicitly thinks several moves
ahead.
1The basic ideas of game theory without advanced mathematics can be found in,
e.g., Thinking Strategically by Dixit and Nalebuff (1991), Games, Strategies, and
Managers by McMillan ( 1992), or an article in the Harvard Business Review by
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1995).
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The (so-called) new theory of industrial organization makes heavy
use of game-theoretic models. Roughly speaking, industrial organiza-
tion studies the behavior of firms and its implications for the function-
ing and structure of markets. The field as such initially was empirical
in nature, resulting in the "structure-conduct-performance" paradigm:
market structure (number of firms, product differentiation, and so on)
determines behavior (prices, investment in R 8i D, advertising, and so
on), which in turn results in performance (e.g. profits).2 This empirical
work resulted in descriptive statistics and correlations among industry
variables. Because the early literature did not focus on causal relation-
ships, it did not give much insight into the "mechanics" of markets.
Since the 1970s, industrial organization has complemented (and in
some cases turned upside down) the idea that conduct comes after
structure. For instance, think of firms that form a cartel in order to
make it difficult for other firms to enter the market. Clearly, the cartel
behavior (conduct) may determine the structure of the industry.3 A
more recent development in research in industrial organization concerns
the way firms are depicted. Whereas the more traditional models view
firms as profit-maximizing "black boxes," recent work develops new
insights by explicitly taking into account the internal organization of
firms.
Several insights of the theory of industrial organization may be im-
portant for strategic management, the research field that directly ad-
dresses problems faced by managers and often aims to offer practical
advice to managers.9 A loose definition of management strategy is the
following: it is the study of the "direction of organizations, and most
often, business firms. It includes those subjects of primary concern to
senior management, or to anyone seeking reasons for success and fail-
ure among organizations.i5 Alternatively, management strategy is "a
ZSee e.g. Bain (1956).
3For a survey of the modern theory of industrial organization, see Tirole (1988).
4For a survey, see Spulber (1994).
SRumelt, Schendel and Teece (1994), p. 9.
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subset of the field of management that combines ideas about compe-
tition and organizations with lessons learned from practical business
experience. It focuses on the manager's formulation of a plan of ac-
tion to maximize the firm's expected profit by obtaining a sustainable
competitive advantage for the firm.i6
Since management strategy is not rooted in economics, but in ac-
counting, corporate planning, and marketing, discussion between re-
searchers in the two fields can be very fruitful in my view. On the
one hand, some researchers in management strategy feel that it lacks
a rigorous "backbone" that allows for formal analysis and unifying,
empirical testing. Rumelt, 5chendel, and Teece (1994) discuss the fu-
ture of management strategy and call for a substantial increase in its
(analytical) rigor. On the other hand, I believe that the insights of
management strategy can help researchers in industrial organization to
recognize problems that are relevant and important for business prac-
tice.
The following five sections present the fictitious cases. The discus-
sion above, about the research fields to which the underlying models
relate, is hopefully helpful to place the underlying research.
1.3 Moral Hazard and Noisy Information
Disclosure
C1earCopy is a firm that produces copiers. With its present technology,
production results in environmental pollution. C1earCopy's manager
has to decide whether to invest in equipment that reduces pollution.
The government is an important client of the firm. Mr Jones, the
civil servant who purchases copiers for governmental use, has received
orders to be more favorable towards suppliers that take better care of
the environment. This policy is meant to stimulate "green" behavior
6Spulber (1994), p. 355, emphasis in otiginal.
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by private companies.
In the past, ClearCopy considered investments to reduce pollution
too costly. Recently, however, Jones wrote to C1earCopy about the new
policy of the government. If C1earCopy invests, Jones will seriously
consider to buy copiers from the firm. If the firm doesn't invest, Jones
will start looking for alternative, "greener" suppliers. Jones's letter also
said that before deciding how many copiers to buy, Jones would like to
receive by mail any proofs of investment in the form of bills, so that he
has "hard" (i.e., verifiable) information about C1earCopy's investments
(if any).
The game is as follows. C1earCopy decides whether to invest in
green production, and whether to inform Jones when it invests. The
firm's investment decision cannot be observed by the government; it is
a hidden action. If the firm sends information to the government, it
is not certain that it will be received; noise hampers the transmission
of information. Based on his information (either hard information or
nothing), Jones decides whether to buy from C1earCopy. Because of
time pressure, he will not give C1earCopy a second chance if he receives
no evidence.
A possible source of the noise is that bureaucracy may postpone the
delivery of mail. Alternatively, letters may get stuck or even lost in the
mail system. Another interpretation of the noise is that due to work
overload, Jones can pay attention to only a fraction of the information
he receives.
A crucial assumption in this example is that there are comple-
mentarities. If the government learns that C1earCopy invested, it will
adopt a favorable purchasing policy towards C1earCopy. Both the gov-
ernment (which is assumed to value a clean environment) and the firm
are then better off.
It is instructive to look briefly at two extreme cases.
~ Communication impossible: Assume that Jones cannot re-
ceive any mail and has to rely on his expectations about Clear-
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Copy's investment. Then the firm does not have an incentive
to invest in a cleaner production process. To see this, notice
that ClearCopy's investment decision cannot be communicated
to Jones. Therefore, Jones's purchase decision does not depend
on the firm's actual behavior, but on expectations about behavior.
ClearCopy can then just as well not invest. If Jones foresees this
he will directly look for alternative suppliers.
~ Perfect communication: Now suppose that mail always reaches
Jones so that there are no obstacles in informing the govern-
ment. Investing, which is now profitable with certainty, will take
place. Jones receives the evidence and will be eager to buy from
C1earCopy.
With the outcomes of these extreme cases in mind, let's move to
the intermediate case of noisy communication. Both C1earCopy and
Jones are aware that any evidence that is sent to the government might
get lost. Jones, if he does not receive anything, still believes that the
firm may have invested. Because of this uncertainty, Jones can view
C1earCopy's decision as if the firm chooses randomly between
1. investing and sending evidence to the government,
2. not investing and remaining silent.
In game theory, choosing randomly among several actions is called
using a mixed strategy. From an equilibrium point of view one can
derive that C1earCopy will act randomly. The reason is twofold. First,
since investing is advantegeous, it is not optimal for C1earCopy to com-
pletely forgo this opportunity. Second, if it invests with certainty and
Jones foresees this, Jones will be favorable towards C1earCopy also if
he receives no evidence. But then the firm can deviate by not investing
and remaining silent.
How does Jones's decision depend on the information he receives?
If he receives information that C1earCopy invested, he is eager to buy
Introduction 7
from C1earCopy. If Jones does not receive information, he realizes that
ClearCopy might not have invested. Jones is then less keen on buying
from the firm.
If C1earCopy's manager foresees Jones's reasoning about the mixed
strategy, he becomes less enthusiastic to invest compared to the case of
perfect communication. This explains the title of the essay: because of
the noise, there is a moral hazard, that is, C1earCopy's incentives to
invest decrease. The reason is that if it invests and sends information to
the government, it cannot be sure that Jones receives the information.
If the noise is severe, the chance that the government is eager to buy
will be small, even if C1earCopy invests.
Compared to the extreme case of perfect communication, the noise
hurts both C1earCopy and the government. Without noise, the firm
would certainly make the environmental-friendly investment and in-
form the government. Jones would buy and both would be better off.
Consequently, both C1earCopy and Jones have an incentive to decrease
or even eliminate the noise. Ways to do this are to personally deliver
mail or to check whether Jones receives it. I expect that in reality this
would happen if the stakes are high. Still, it may be prohibitively costly
to completely eliminate noise.
The moral hazard problem is even worse when informing the gov-
ernment is costly. This may be the case if it takes time and effort to
prepare a dossier that can be sent to Jones. Because of the involved
costs, C1earCopy's incentives to inform Jones decrease further.
The main insight of thís example is that noise, hindering the trans-
mission of information, creates a moral hazard. The incentives of the
first-mover (ClearCopy's manager) to commit himself to high effort
decrease as it becomes less likely that information about his commit-
ment will reach the second-mover (Jones). This was expressed by
C1earCopy's strategy to choose randomly between on the one hand
committing itself and informing Jones, and on the other hand shirking
and remaining silent.
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1.4 Entry Deterrence and Signaling in
Markets for Search Goods
There is a variety of goods that are called search goods by economists.
This means that they have quality as a search-characteristic. Fruit ven-
dors often allow consumers to inspect fruit before buying. Stores selling
audio and video equipment provide demonstrations. Automobile sell-
ers allow consumers to perform test drives so that an assessment of
quality can be made. The goods sold by the players in this fictitious
case, namely cameras, can be considered as search goods. Obviously,
cameras are not pure search goods. However, to avoid unnecessary
complications, I abstract from the possibility that cameras may be ex-
perience goods, that is, goods of which quality is only experienced after
purchase.
The fictitious case of this section considers two producers of high-
tech goods. In the market for digital cameras, only SuperCam is active
at present. Its cameras are of low quality, which is known by consumers.
However, as long as SuperCam is a monopolist, it can ask a relatively
high price (as high as consumers' willingness to pay for a digital camera
of the given quality).
Another producer of digital cameras, Digit, has set up a store and
plans to compete with SuperCam. Digit still has a market share of zero.
Consumers do not know whether Digit's cameras are actually better or
not than SuperCam's. One can view the quality of Digit's cameras
as fixed in the short run; the quality of a camera for sale cannot be
changed.'
To find out the quality of a Digit camera, a consumer has to visit
Digit's store and try one. Imagine a consumer who is trying a Digit
camera in the shop. If it is of low quality, he may not want to buy but
visit SuperCam instead. However, SuperCam's store may be located
~A consumer may view the quality of Digit's cameras as having been determined
randomly.
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ín another city, so that switching to SuperCam takes considerable time
and effort. In that case there are non-negligable visit costs.8 If visit
costs are high, a consumer who finds out that Digit sells low quality
may still prefer to buy from Digit even when he deplores not having
visited SuperCam in the first place.
In reality, íf a firm sells high quality then consumers will eventually
find this out in the long run. For instance, firms can heavily advertise,
attract consumers with presents, or slowly build up a reputation when
consumers spread the word. Let us assume that these possibilities are
ruled out, except for one possibility: a short-term price strategy.
The game is then as follows. Digit and SuperCam compete by simul-
taneously choosing once-and-for-all prices. Consumers observe these
prices (e.g. the firms advertise), and decide which store to visit. By
visiting Digit, a consumer can assess the quality of its cameras, and
then decide whether to buy or visit SuperCam instead. Alternatively,
by directly visiting SuperCam he will not find out Digit's quality. If the
firms are interested in short-term profits, what price strategies should
they choose?
Suppose that Digit's cameras are of high quality. Digit knows this,
but consumers still have to find out. Can Digit convince consumers
of high quality even before they visit its store? The answer is yes. A
price strategy that does the job is to charge a high price. This works
as follows. If Digit's price is high enough, consumers know that they
will never buy a low-quality camera at that price. If they find out that
Digit sells low quality cameras, they will prefer to visit 5uperCam (if
visit costs are not too high). Notice that Digit has an incentive to set a
high price only if its cameras are of high quality. In case of low quality,
Digit would charge a low price.
Summarizing, Digit can charge a high price in case of high quality,
and a low price in case of low quality. This is an informative price
8In chapter 3, visit costs are called "search costs," in accordance with the con-
vention in the economic literature.
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strategy. By understanding Digit's incentives, consumers can tell by
the price they observe what the quality of Digit's cameras is without
having to visit its shop.
A disadvantage of the high-price strategy is that Digit cameras be-
come expensive, which makes SuperCam cameras relatively more at-
tractive despite their lower quality. Therefore, such a strategy is effec-
tive only if the price needed to convince consumers of high quality is
not too high. Moreover, the higher the visit cost, the less likely it be-
comes that consumers will switch to SuperCam when they find out that
Digit sells low quality. Therefore, higher visit costs result in a higher
price needed to signal high quality to consumers. Thus the high-price
strategy works only if visit costs are not too high. This is for instance
the case if Digit's shop is located in the same town as SuperCam's,
because then it is easy to switch.
Digit could possibly circumvent the problems associated with the
high-price strategy by trying to decrease consumers' visit costs. This
could for instance be done by locating near SuperCam's shop. By doing
so, the price needed to convince consumers of high quality becomes
smaller.
Charging a high price or locating close to a rival store do not per-
haps seem to be smart moves. In general, consumers do not like high
prices, and we expect shops close to each other to compete aggressively.
However, locating close to a rival and charging a high price may be a
credible signal to consumers. It tells them:
"Digit cameras ~nust be good. Visit me, with my high price
and SuperCam nearby, you can easily switch to SuperCam
if my cameras are of bad quality."
Now consider a twíst in the example, namely that SuperCam knows
the quality of Digit cameras before the firms compete in prices. More-
over, we will assume that consumers know that SuperCam is informed,
and Digit knows that consumers know this. Such a situation is realistic
in certain cases. For instance, SuperCam has tried Digit cameras at a
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trade fair, or firms have more expertise than consumers (as is often the
case in markets for technically complicated products).
Again, suppose Digit sells high-quality cameras. Accordingly, Su-
perCam and Digit know this, but consumers are uncertain as long as
they haven't visited Digit's shop. Can SuperCam use its information
to keep Digit out of the market? Instead of deriving what can hap-
pen in this situation, let's assume that SuperCam uses its information
and keeps Digit out of the market, to see whether this is a plausible
situation.
Because the firms compete in prices, SuperCam can only use its
information by choosing an informative price strategy. Thus, Super-
Cam's price if Digit sells low quality is different from its price if Digit
sells high quality.
By our assumption, Digit does not attract consumers in this situ-
ation. This means that a high-price strategy does not help Digit to
convince consumers that it sells high quality while at the same time
attracting them to its store. As argued above, the reason must be that
visit costs are relatively high, so that the high price Digit has to charge
to convince consumers of high quality is too high to be attractive. Digit,
however, if it foresees SuperCam's informative price strategy, can make
a move to outdo SuperCam. To see this, note that if SuperCam uses an
informative price strategy, Digit does not have to charge a high price
to convince consumers of high quality! Because consumers can deduce
the quality of Digit's cameras from SuperCam's price, Digit can grasp
the opportunity to cut its price to a competitive level. The crucial ob-
servation is that SuperCam, if it wants to keep a high-quality entrant
such as Digit out of the market, should not use an informative price
strategy. Intuitively, SuperCam should keep Digit's informational dis-
advantage (recall that consumers know SuperCam's quality, but do not
know Digit's quality) as large as possible.
Accordingly, SuperCam cannot use information about the quality
of Digit's cameras to deter entry. To arrive at this conclusion, however,
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it was used that consumers know that SuperCam is informed, and that
Digit knows that consumers know this.
This example demonstrates how an entrant (Digit) can choose a
one-shot price strategy to convince consumers that he sells high-quality
goods. Given the assumptions, however, the optimal informative price
strategy (a hígh price in case of high quality and a low price otherwise)
is effective only if consumers' visit costs are not too high. Another
insight is that if an already established firm (SuperCam) is informed
about the quality of an entrant's product whereas consumers are still
uncertain, it cannot use this information to deter entry. The reason is
that by using information about the entrant, the established firm may
help the entrant to overcome its problem of convincing consumers of
high quality.
1.5 Delegation of Responsibility in Or-
ganizations
In the literature on organization and management, it is well known
that employees may care a lot about non-pecuniary incentives, such
as job satisfaction. For instance, Dessler (1986) argues: "Few rewards
are as powerful as the sense of accomplishment and achievement that
come from doing a job that one genuinely wants to do [. ..]" (p. 254).
Actually, there is a debate going on in the management literature in
which performance-related pay is under heavy fire.9 One of the basic
objections is that "[. ..] workers are much more influenced by [. ..]
the intrinsic interest of their work than by crass material rewards." lo
Besides that payment schemes may be costly to implement, it is put
forward that they may demotivate employees.
This section is based on the assumption that a superior cannot use
payment schemes to motivate his subordinate. Instead, he can appeal
9See e.g. Kohn (1993) and the references therein.
loThe Economist (1994a), p. 69.
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to the subordinate's private benefits, such as job satisfaction and the
acquisition of professional experience. This can be done by delegation
of responsibility.
We will see that empowering a subordinate requires commitment on
behalf of the superior. In particular, it is important that the manager
communicates the seriousness of his intent and curbs a tendency to
overcontrol the detail, that is, it is important not to oversupervise.ll In
other words, delegation works only if management is willing to delegate
and live with the results.12
TechInvent, a firm that invents new products, is the setting of the
fictitious case of this section. Mr Boss, TechInvent's manager, is respon-
sible for deciding which invention the firm should pursue. Mr Maple,
the researcher, tries to invent the suggested product. When an innova-
tion succeeds, Boss takes care of the associated commercial activities,
such as obtaining a patent and selling the patent to firms who want to
produce the invention.
Maple is a researcher with a background in engineering. He is
mainly motivated by private benefits. He is challenged by figuring out
how to "make things work." His salary is fixed and does not therefore
depend on the success of an invention.
TechInvent has to choose among three projects, called 1, 2, and
3. For a given level of effort exerted by Maple, project 1 is the most
profitable, project 2 the second-best, and project 3 the least. However,
the harder Maple works, the higher is the chance of success, and the
higher are the expected profits. If he would work hard on project 2,
and not very hard on project 1, then 2 would be more profitable than
1. Project 3 always yields less profits than project 1, regardless of the
effort exerted by Maple.
By definition, Boss has formal authority. He may, however, wish
to delegate responsibility to Maple, because Maple can be induced to
11See also Managers Magazine (1992) and McConalogue (1993).
12See also Horton (1992).
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work harder by giving him influence (as we will see below). Therefore,
although Boss has formal authority, it may be a good idea to give
Maple some real authority. The question, how should Boss motivate
Maple, is illustrated by the following quote:13
"The issue [. ..] is where to draw the line around responsi-
bilities and [. ..] freedom. I agree that it's important to del-
egate responsibility and empower people throughout the or-
ganization, but you also have to communicate clearly what
the boundaries are around their jobs."
Boss can try to motivate his researcher by asking Maple to make
a proposal for a project. Boss then only has to decide among which
projects Maple is allowed to choose. He can tell Maple in advance
which proposals will be accepted and which ones will be turned down.
If a proposal is turned down, Maple has to work on project 1(Boss's
favorite project).
Based on experience, Boss and Maple know that there is a probabil-
ity of roughly 33~o that a project yields high private benefits to Maple.
So on average there is one project that can trigger high effort by Maple.
initially, however, it is not known which project this is. By investing
a certain amount of time and effort, Maple can find out the projects'
private gains at once. For instance, even though the descriptions of the
projects may be clear, Maple still has to figure out in which direction
he wants to develop his skílls and expertise. Only by figuring this out
it becomes clear which project he prefers.
If Boss imposes a project, Maple may try to figure out his private
benefits, but the odds are he will not like the project. Suppose that
Maple finds it worthwile to figure out in advance what his gains are
only if Boss gives him the freedom to choose among all three projects.
This assumption will be crucial in the analysis.
13Norm Poole, Executive Vice President, Chief Operating Officer, and a Director
of L.L. Bean of Freeport, a leading U.S. mail-order firm that sells equipment for
outdoor activities (Continental Bank (1993), p. 50).
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Accordingly, Maple proposes a project if he knows his personal
gains. His proposal will then be his preferred project. Therefore, Boss
learns Maple's preferences only after a proposal.
The provisional conclusion is that Boss faces a choice among:14
~ Imposing project 1(Boss's favorite project). Maple will not take
initiative to get informed about his private benefits.
~ Letting Maple choose among 1 and 2. Maple will not take initia-
tive to get informed about his private benefits. He then has to
implement project 1.
~ Letting Maple choose among 1, 2, and 3. Maple is motivated to
find out his personal gains and will make a proposal.
Notice that too little freedom for Maple (letting him choose among
1 and 2) is the same as no freedom (imposing 1). This is due to the
assumption that Maple needs three projects to become interested to
figure out what he wants to do.
Boss faces the following tradeoff. On the one hand, imposing pro-
ject 1 does not trigger initiative. Maple has no incentive to learn his
private benefits and make a proposal. Boss's favorite project will be
implemented, but expectedly Maple will not work hard. Accordingly,
authoritive management demotivates Maple, but keeps Boss in con-
trol. On the other hand, enough freedom in project choice results in
initiative: Maple will learn his private benefits and recommend his pre-
ferred project. This may not be Boss's favorite project, but Maple will
work hard. Thus, hands-off management, that is, empowering Maple,
triggers interest and initiative but decreases Boss's real authority.
A problem may arise, however, if Boss gives Maple complete freedom
but cannot stick to his promise. If Maple proposes 3, it is optimal
for Boss to impose 1 instead (recall the assumption that 1 with low
14The possibilities of letting Maple choose among 2 and 3, or among 1 and 3, can
safely be ignored because giving him a choice among 1 and 2 is at least as good for
Boss.
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effort is more profitable than 3 with high effort), although this would
imply breaking his promise to Maple. One may ask: why wouldn't
Boss then let Maple choose among only 1 and 2? He doesn't because
he knows that Maple will get informed and recommend his preferred
project only if he can choose among all the projects. Although giving
Maple complete responsibility is risky because he might propose 3, it
is the only way to motivate him to take initiative.
The situation in which one wishes to change an action after a certain
event is called time-inconsistency. A perhaps easier way to explain
this is the following. Suppose I ask you to participate in a gamble. I
will toss a coin. If it comes up "heads," I give you 50 guilders, and if it
comes up "tails," you pay me 5 guilders. Let's say that you participiate
and the coin comes up tails. I guess you wish that you could turn back
the clock and refuse to participate. The time-inconsistency is that you
are willing to play, but if you do and you lose, you wish that you had
refused.
Back to TechInvent. If Boss cannot credibly promise not to reject
a proposal for 3, Maple will not find it worthwile to make a proposal
in the first place. How can Boss commit himself to a promise? If Boss
and Maple have to work together at TechInvent in the future, Boss
has incentives to keep promises. By breaking promises easily, he would
perhaps not only demotivate Maple, but he would also lose credibility
- an event with a backlash that would seriously damage TechInvent's
corporate culture. Another way to gain credibility for Boss is to change
his own incentives by contracting with a third party, such as an outside
investor. By paying an investor a larger payoff if 1 is realized than if
3 is realized, Boss (who now cares about profits minus the payoffs to
the investor) can manipulate his own incentives such that he will not
break his promise to Maple.
This example highlights two issues. First, it demonstrates an im-
portant tradeoff a manager may face when he delegates responsibility
to a subordinate. Too little responsibility does not trigger initiative
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by the subordinate. Enough responsibility makes it attractive for the
subordinate to figure out how he can realize private benefits, so that he
will work hard. The manager, however, then loses influence. Second,
depending on the manager's incentives, delegation of responsibility only
works if the manager can be expected not to break his promise to his
subordinate.
1.6 Strategic Delegation of Responsibil-
ity in Competing Firms
There are several real-world examples of managers at lower levels who
have a say in their firm's strategy. For instance in the car industry:ls
"Honda developed its Civic car by giving a group of young middle
managers broad guidelines (make it youth-friendly and fuel-efficient)
and letting them get on with the job." The freedom of Honda's middle
managers may not only have been an important motivator that trig-
gered initiative, it should also be viewed as a decision about where to
position the car. Another example is the following: "Motorola's mid-
dle managers have had a large say in designing its Iridium satellite
project." Belasco (1992) presents a case study of a firm that proceeded
with international expansion plans by maximizing employee empow-
erment. An important insight of his study is that empowerment is a
powerful competitive weapon.
Without knowing the details of the Honda and Motorola cases, one
can argue that considerations about motivating employees while at the
same time formulating a market strategy may have played a role. These
examples were presented in The Economist (1995) to illustrate the
claim that firms which give middle managers a say in determining strat-
egy perform better. To investigate linkages between organization and
market strategy, I will apply the main idea of section 1.5 to a setting
1sThe next two quotes are taken from The Economist (1995), p. 70.
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with competing firms.
The main players in this fictitious case are a product manager and
a middle manager of Tattler, a beer brewery competing with a small
number of other breweries. Price competition is intense. In order to
enjoy higher profits, Tattler has an incentive to position its brand in a
market niche.
Consumers have different preferences for different beer varieties (such
as lager beer, beer without alcohol, "white" beer, and so on). For a
given beer type, consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality.
Tattler has a simple internal organization (see figure 1). It consists
of a product manager, mr Boss, and a middle manager, mr Gibbs, who
represents the engineers. Boss has to decide which beer type Tattler
will sell and at what price. Gibbs takes care of development and pro-
duction. Product quality is determined by the effort exerted by Gibbs.
For instance, Gibbs' effort to motivate the people of his department
determines how hard they will work at developing a new beer type.
Boss can be considered as the market player; he competes with
the rival breweries by deciding on price, quality, and product position.
However, in order to produce high quality, Boss will have to motivate












Figure 1: Competition and interna] organization
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Boss wants to maximize the firm's profits, whereas Gibbs cares
about private benefits. For instance, because of career concerns he
finds the acquisition of professional experience important. Alterna-
tively, he is challenged by technical innovativeness of beer types (think
e.g. of beer without alcohol). Since developing and producing dif-
ferent beer types requires different know-how (e.g. about inputs such
as barley and hop, and about production processes such as filtration,
lagering and brewing), these private benefits will typically vary over
different beer types.
For expositional purposes, I assume that the possible brand loca-
tions vary from the market niche that Boss would like to aim at, to a
location relatively close to the brands of the major competitors. This
assumption will create a tension between Boss's wishes and Gibbs' pref-
erences, which in turn will result in a tension between locating the brand
in a niche and producing a premium brand.
Gibbs has to reflect on how to develop and produce beer types, and
in which direction he wants to develop his own skills and expertise,
before he can assess his personal gains. He has to invest time and
effort to figure this out. Boss does not know Gibbs' preferences over
the possible product varieties.
Boss can either impose which beer type the firm will sell (e.g. impose
light beer), or give Gibbs a say in in the choice of a variety by letting
him choose in a range of types. If this range is large enough, Gibbs
will take initiative, that is, get informed about his private benefits and
make a recommendation. If Boss adopts this proposal, Gibbs can gain
large private benefits and will therefore work hard. By assumption,
high quality will then result.
A crucial observation can be made by taking a closer look at Boss's
tradeoff. Suppose that he delegates more responsibility. Gibbs gets
more eager to make investigations about his personal gains and make a
recommendation. Following up Gibbs' proposal will result in high qual-
ity beer (a premium brand). A drawback of empowering Gibbs is that
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Boss loses influence. Indeed, it becomes more likely that Gibbs comes
up with a proposal for a beer type that will not be very differentiated
from rival brands. Intense price competition will then reduce profits.
Conversely, suppose that Boss delegates less responsibility. He is
then better able to position Tattler's brand in the market niche, which
is good for profits. However, it becomes less likely that Gibbs sees
ways to realize private benefits; he becomes less enthusiastic to take
initiative and work hard. It is then likely that Tattler's beer will be of
low quality.
Summarizing, the optimal degree of freedom for Gibbs is determined
by finding a balance between:
1. creating an organization that fosters initiative and quality,
2. positioning the brand in a market niche.
Which way the balance goes depends on different factors. The larger
the impact of high quality on profits compared to the impact of product
differentiation, the more freedom Gibbs will get. Also, the optimal level
of discretion for Gibbs will be an optimal reaction to choices made in
rival breweries. Boss will take into account what the other breweries
in the market do, or, if he can imperfectly observe the actions of rival
firms, he must form expectations of the behavior of his rivals.
Delegation of responsibility may serve various strategic purposes.
For instance, it may help Tattler to become a tough, competitor. If Boss
gives Gibbs a large say in brand positioning, then high effort by Gibbs
is more easily triggered so that a premium brand can be realized. At
the same time it becomes more likely that there will be little product
differentiation among the rival brands, so that price competition will
be fierce.
Empowerment of Gibbs may also be a way to deter entry of potential
rival firms. Consider a situation in which Tattler faces a potential
entrant. Since delegation makes Tattler a tough competitor, an optimal
entry deterrence strategy is empowerment of Gibbs. An optimal entry
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accomodation strategy (which may be optimal if deterring entry is too
costly) should soften competition, and therefore entails little freedom
for Gibbs.
As we have seen above, an authoritarian leadership style with regard
to Gibbs (Gibbs has little responsibility) corresponds to a soft stance
on the product market (i.e., with regard to rival firms). Similarly,
"hands-off" management corresponds to an aggressive market stance.
Therefore, leadership styles may be perceived quite differently inside
and outside an organization. In the context of this example, statements
like "Boss is a tough manager" have little meaning if one does not
specify with regard to whom.
One should be aware that the results on strategic effects of empow-
erment and the perception of management style depend crucially on
the set-up of this example. Applications of these results will not be
justifiable in certain cases. Still, by understanding how diverging in-
centives inside an organization affect strategy, one can go through the
arguments in different set-ups and see what comes out.
The main point of this example is to show that delegation of re-
sponsibility may afiect a firm's strategy. The example demonstrates in
detail how, under specific assumptions, a manager can make his firm
compete more or less aggressively by giving his subordinate a smaller
or larger say in the choice of positioning a product. Motivating employ-
ees and designing strategy are often viewed as separate activities for a
manager. I want to stress that these activities may be intertwined.
1.7 Aftermarkets: The P~Ionopoly Case
After-sales repair services and replacement parts are of major economic
importance in many industries. Consider, for instance, the car industry,
in which estimations of the market for parts and services vary between
114 and 125 billion USD per year:ls "A typical dealership earns most
1sSee Emond ( 1993) and Taylor (1993).
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money from servicing and parts; only 15010 of its profits come from new
car sales."17 Perhaps this is due to the fact that prices of repair services
and replacement parts often tend to be relatively high. For example, in
the United States, constructing a car by buying all the necessary parts
from retailers, ignoring assembly costs, costs three to eight times the
price of a fully assembled car.ls
There are some illustrations that in the information technology in-
dustry, firms experience ineffiiciencies due to high aftermarket prices:
"The drive to reduce costs [. ..] has been taken up, too, by manufactur-
ers, suppliers and specialist vendors keen to distance themselves from a
possible user backlash."19 Perhaps this can be explained by inefficient
situations of high aftermarket prices. Also, some firms consider ways
to get out of this undesirable situation. For instance, it was recently
mentioned in the Financial Times that equipment sellers such as Com-
paq Computer and IBM try to design their systems to cut maintenance
costs, whereas other firms contract out technical support.2o
By abstracting from competition among manufacturers, and by giv-
ing a manufacturer the possibility to introduce competition in the re-
pair market, this section provides a partial explanation for these casual
observations.
The main player in the ficitious example is Read-It, a manufac-
turer of computers that perform a very specific operation: transforming
handwritten text into a computer text file. It is the only supplier of
these computers. Therefore, it can behave as a monopolist.
The production process at Read-It is imperfect. A small fraction of
the computers breaks down after the use of a certain period. Read-It
carries out the repair services; the cost to the firm of repairing is negliga-
ble. Because the service manuals of Read-It computers are copyrighted,
the firm can make sure that no one else can repair its computers.
17The Economist (1994b), p. 72.
18See Voortman (1993).
19Taylor (1995), p. 1.
ZoTaylor (1995).
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Repair services are sold after the purchase of the computer. There-
fore, the market for repair services will be called an aftermarket.
Aftermarkets arise if prices for repair services or replacement parts are
not pinned down in a contract at the time of purchase of equipment. In
this sense, the initial contract or transaction is called an incomplete
contract.21
The game is simple. In a given period, Read-It sells computers and
may also have to carry out repairs for customers who bought in the
past. The question is what prices the firm should charge.
Since potential buyers of Read-It computers foresee that they may
need repair services in the future, they do not base their purchase de-
cisions only on the price of a computer, but also on the price they will
have to pay for repairs. How can they know these prices? Of course,
they can never know them for sure. However, customers can form be-
liefs based on Read-It's current prices, such as the repair price they
observe at the time they buy a computer. A reasonable guess of the
future repair price is the current repair price. Let's assume that the
future repair price expected by customers is the repair price they ob-
serve at the time when they buy a computer. These "adaptive" beliefs
are correct in situations in which market conditions are constant and
Read-It does not have to adapt its prices. Therefore, we will consider
prices that are once-and-for-all optimal.
If Read-It foresees how customers form beliefs, it can directly influ-
ence their beliefs by varying the repair price. For instance, by choosing
a low repair price, the firm instantaneously establishes a reputation for
being a low-cost repair service provider. This mechanism will be called
the reputation mechanism.
Since Read-It is a monopolist, it can choose its prices as high as cus-
tomers' willingness to pay for computers and repair services. Customers
are willing to pay a higher price for a computer if they expect a lower
Z1Even when "complete" maintenance contracts are possible, they often prove
to be worthless for consumers; see a report by the European Consumer Law
Group (1988).
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risk of breakdown or a lower repair price. Accordingly, Read-It can
charge higher prices for computers if consumers expect less problems
in thefuture.
In a given period, Read-It has to choose a computer price for new
customers, and a repair price for clients who bought in the past. Be-
cause of the assumptions about customers' beliefs and the reputation
mechanism, Read-It's tradeoff is fairly straightforward. Roughly, it can
either sell computers at a high price and choose a low repair price, or
sell at a low price and charge a high repair price. If both prices are
high, new customers find price and future maintenance costs too high
to be interested to buy.
Let us assume that customers are risk-averse, that is, they do not
like to incur risk of breakdown (e.g. they are hit hard by computer
breakdowns). Read-It has a deep financial pocket that can absorb
shocks and is not risk-averse. These assumptions have the following
consequence. Suppose Read-It decreases the repair price. Because of
the reputation mechanism, consumers who observe this price expect
lower repair prices in the future, so that their willingness to pay for
computers becomes larger. For Read-It, this increase in customer' will-
ingness to pay more than o~sets the decrease in future returns from
repairs.
Because customers are risk-averse, Read-It would want to promise
that repairs will be carried out for free. The only way to commit to
a low future repair price is to use the reputation mechanism. One
would therefore expect that the repair price should be low. However,
this would only be optimal when Read-It wouldn't have locked-in cus-
tomers, that is, customers with Read-It computers. Since Read-It does
have locked-in customers, some of the computers sold in the past will
break down. The owners of these computers are "stuck" and can be
"exploited" by charging a high repair price. The conclusion is that
because Read-It has locked-in consumers, it will choose a relatively
high repair price. The price of a computer can then be chosen as high
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as customers' willingness to pay given their expectations about future
maintenance costs.
How high the optimal repair price should be depends, among others,
on the quality of its computers. To see this, suppose that the quality
of its computers gets worse. Then a larger fraction of its computers
will break down. Consequently, more locked-in customers in need of
repairs can be exploited. Since the value of a"low maintenance costs"
reputation remains constant (as long as the size of the market remains
the same), it becomes more tempting to exploit locked-in customers.
For this reason a deterioration of the quality of Read-It's computers
will result in a higher repair price.
It is interesting to consider what would happen if maintenance con-
tracts would be possible (recall that these were assumed to be im-
possible). Consider contracts that specify, at the time of purchase of
a computer, the future repair price. If a computer breaks down, its
owner can have it repaired at the price stated in the contract. Since
customers are risk-averse, the optimal contract specifies that repairs
are carried out for free. Effectively, such a contract insures consumer
against the risk of breakdown. This outcome is in contrast with the
inefficient aftermarket situation, in which the repair price is high and
customers bear risk. Therefore, if long-term contracts were possible,
Read-It would use them to commit itself to low repair prices.
Thus, under the absence of maintenance contracts, Read-It's incen-
tive to exploit locked-in clients results in an inefficiently high repair
price. Can the firm do something about this? A possible way to com-
mit itself to low repair prices is "second sourcing" in the repair market,
that is, inviting a competitor. Competition to carry out repairs will
drive down repair prices to a level close to the repair cost. As a result,
the risk incurred by customers is reduced.
An alternative way to reduce the aftermarket inefficiency is to lease
computers instead of selling them. It is not difficult to see why this
works. If lease periods are short, customers can return defective com-
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puters to Read-It when a lease period expires, and get a new or repaired
one in the next period. Since customers do hardly incur risk in this sit-
uation, their willingness to pay increases.
This example demonstrates that a monopolistic manufacturer of a
good that can break down, charges an inef~iciently high repair price
to risk-averse consumers if maintenance contracts cannot be written.
The inefficiency is due to the presence of locked-in consumers, which
can be exploited by choosing a high repair price. Optimal maintenance
contracts would "insure" buyers against the risk of breakdown by fixing
the future repair price at zero. This would result in an increase of
buyers' willingness to pay for the good. The manufacturer, however,
has ways to improve upon the situation. Inviting a competitor (second
sourcing) in the repair market is beneficial because it results in lower
repair prices. An alternative solution is leasing the good instead of
selling. In that case the firm instead of customers bears the risk of
breakdown.
1.8 Concluding Remarks
The examples in sections 1.3-1.7 included assumptions on which the
outcomes were based. It is important to be aware that, in general, the
outcomes will change if one changes the assumptions. Moreover, the
assumptions simplified the real world perhaps too much. As a conse-
quence, one cannot directly apply the results to practical situations.
Does this mean that the models and examples are irrelevant?
The answer is no. One should not literally interpret the models
in this thesis. Instead, the insights are important (since they were
summarized at the end of the preceding sections, I will not repeat them
here). Understanding tradeoffs and mechanics of interaction may lead
to a better understanding of real-world problems.
Saloner (1994) gives reasons why game-theoretic models can be
powerful in general. First, they provide a detailed logic (an "audit
Introduction 27
trail" ) that can support claims about strategic behavior. For instance
in the cases that were presented in this chapter, which are in fact ver-
bal versions of the mathematical models, all the claims about optimal
strategies can be supported by logical arguments. Second, models can
generate novel insights, possibly unforeseen or surprising. Examples of
results that I did not foresee initially include the limited strategic value
of SuperCam's information about the quality of Digit's cameras (sec-
tion 1.4), and the possibility that perceptions of a management style
can diverge inside and outside an organization (section 1.6). Third,
formal modeling provides a common language or unifying framework,
allowing to compare related results and to understand empirical find-
ings.
As noted above, if one changes the ingredients of a game-theoretic
model (such as the number of players, the actions they can choose,
or the timing of events), the outcomes may change as well. Some
economists judge this sensitivity as a weakness of game theory. My
view is that it only reflects reality; because of the complexity and va-
garies of the real world, one cannot expect that models have broad
applicability and give robust results. As Saloner (1994) argues, the
enormous scope of the settings and decisions that managers must con-
front requires richly textured theory.
Game theory's potential promise for business practice is formulated
by Camerer (1994, p. 198): "[...] I ask whether game theory provides
sound advice for managers. It does not, but it answers questions man-
agers should want to know the answers to, and it should be part of a
sensible package of advice." Note that I wrote potentia! promise - I am
optimistic, but we have to wait and see.
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Chapter 2
Moral Hazard and Noisy
Information Disclosure
2.1 Introduction
The choice of an unobservable action by an agent may strongly be
affected by the possibility to inform others about the actual choice of
action. For instance, a seller who chooses the quality of the product he
offers for sale, can decide whether or not to advertise product quality.
In this chapter I investigate strategic disclosure of verifiable information
in a noisy environment.l
In the model, messages that contain information about a hidden
action of an agent called the sender, are costly to send. A message may
not reach another agent, the receiver, because of noise. The noise is
such that a message reaches the receiver with some probability smaller
than one. Also, disclosed information is costlessly verifiable ex post,
so that only thruthful messages are sent.2 This assumption is justified
1Starting point of this chapter is work by Bester (1994), showing that when noise
interferes with advertising, a monopolistic seller will necessarily choose a random
advertising strategy.
ZGrossman (1981) provides examples of sellers who can make verifiable disclo-
sures about quality. In advertisements, a diamond seller can specify the weight of
a diamond, and a fruit vendor can state how many oranges a box contains.
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when, for example, the sender incurs legal liability if he lies (as in some
countries in the case of misleading advertising). However, the sender
does not have to inform the receiver; he can also remain silent. Finally,
depending on whether or not he received a message, and if so, on its
informational content, the receiver responds with an action.
The noise in the model exhibits properties of a mail system: a
message may get completely lost, but if it is received, the information
is not distorted. For instance, if a seller advertises in a newspaper,
consumers might not receive it. Alternative interpretations of the noise
are that a consumer may overlook an advertisement, or, that an agent
(e.g. a manager) can only pay attention to a fraction of the information
he receives, due to work overload.
I assume that the sender dislikes exerting effort, but wants the re-
ceiver to choose a"high action," for instance, to work as hard as pos-
sible. Due to complementarities, the receiver is willing to choose a
high effort level if he knows or believes that the sender exerted high
effort. The model encompasses several interpretations; applications are
discussed formally.
Intuitively, the agents effectively play a simultaneous-move game if
the amount of noise and disclosure cost are prohibitively high. In the
more interesting case of sufficiently low noise and disclosure cost, there
exists a unique equilibrium in which the sender randomizes between
(i) exerting minimal effort and remaining silent, and (ii) exerting high
effort and informing the receiver. This high effort level, however, is
lower than the effort level that would be selected if there was no noise.
What is the intuition behind the sender's randomizing behavior?
First, the sender will not exert minimum effort with certainty, because
selecting and revealing a high effort level results (expectedly) in a more
beneficial response by the receiver; commitment is advantegeous. 5ec-
ond, suppose that the sender selects and reveals some high effort level
with probability one. Then, in equilibrium, the receiver plays his best
response to the sender's action, also if he receives no message (which
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may occur because of the noise). But then the sender can deviate by
exerting minimal effort and remaining silent, a contradiction.
If the noise disappears, the equilibrium outcome converges to the
regular Stackelberg outcome. Consequently, the presence of a little
amount of noise affects the benefit of commitment only to a small
extent. This convergence result, which also holds if signals are ex-
ogenously sent, complements recent work by Bagwell (1995).3 Bagwell
argues that predictions from commitment models are valid only if there
is perfect observation of the committed action. This claim is supported
by a model in which two players move sequentially. The second-mover
receives a signal that may consist of any element of the first-mover's set
of actions, that is, the signal is randomly garbled according to a distri-
bution with non-moving support. Then, with even a small probability
that a signal is garbled, the outcome of the associated simultaneous-
move game is obtained.4 5 When the noise is such that certain sig-
nals can only be generated after certain actions (as in my model: a
high signal after a high action), then commitment can be obtained in
equilibrium.s The reason is that then the sender has some ability to
inform the receiver of his action.
Another result is that if the disclosure cost tends to zero, the sender's
equilibrium strategy does not converge to a pure strategy. Hence, the
noise - not the disclosure cost - gives the sender an incentive to keep
the receiverin the dark.
Seminal work on disclosure of information is Grossman (1981), in
which the product quality of a monopolist is determined by nature. The
monopolist knows the quality and can disclose this information at zero
cost to a potential buyer. The highest-quality type has an incentive to
3See also Chakravorti and Spiegel (1993) and Van Damme and Hurkens (1995).
4Bagwell testricts to pure strategies to obtain this observation; implicitly he
needs an equilibrium selection criterion.
5In Bagwell (1995), signals are exogenously sent; this is not crucial for his result.
sThis is also true if signals are sent exogenously. Then the sender will not
randomize; see section 2.4.
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disclose his private information since he does not want to be mistaken
for a lower-quality type. Once the seller with the highest quality iden-
tifies himself by disclosing his type, the next-highest quality seller also
wants to separate himself from the lower-quality types. Repeating this
argument yields that the seller always announces his quality because
buyers will assume the worst if they receive no information.
In Verrecchia (1983), disclosure is costly. A manager decides to re-
veal or withhold information about the liquidating value of a risky asset.
Asset traders who receive no information are unsure about whether the
withheld information represented bad news or the disclosure cost was
prohibitively high. The result is that the manager will only disclose
information that represents a value above some threshold level.'
Two features of my model constitute important diffences with the
literature on information disclosure, and lead to quite different results.
First, in my model the sender takes a hidden action. This feature allows
one to address the interdependence of commitment and disclosure. The
next difference is the presence of noise in my model, which has inter-
esting implications on moral hazard and the ability to commit. Since
the receiver does not know whether a message was sent or not when
he does not receive one, there is a moral hazard problem that does not
arise in the existing literature, although it may be important in several
situations.
The model is a departure from signaling and cheap talk games, in
which there is no noise. Furthermore, in signaling games, (see e.g.
Spence (1973) and Cho and Kreps (1987)), signals provide no hard in-
formation except that they may allow some types to distinguish them-
selves. Due to the fact that different types have different preferences
(or incur different costs) about signals, observable actions or outcomes
(e.g. profits) can be used to ínfer the sender's type. In my model it is
7Also on disclosure, Jovanovic (1982) addresses the question of whether market
incentives are sufl'icient to induce disclosure of the quality of a commodity. In
particular, Jovanovic studies public policies concerning voluntary versus mandatory
disclosure when quality is a random event.
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crucial that "disclosure" is the provision of hard, truthful information.8
In cheap talk games (see e.g. Crawford and Sobel (1982)), signals are
costless, unverifiable and non-binding. Moreover, a standard assump-
tion in the literature on signaling and cheap talk is that the sender is
privately informed about his type, selected randomly by nature. In my
model, private information concerns a hidden action.9
The model, some applications, and equilibrium notion are presented
in section 2.2. Section 2.3 derives the equilibra. In section 2.4, com-
parative statics are derived and the results are discussed. Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 The Disclosure Game
Consider a game with two agents: a sender, called S, and a receiver,
called R. S chooses a hidden action t E T-[t, t] C R, together with a
decision whether to send a message stating "I have sedected action t."lo
So S can choose to remain silent. The choice of action is described by
a probability distribution function F: T-; [0, 1]. The probability of
sending a message when action t is chosen, is denoted by r(t) E [0,1].
Let supp F denote the support of F(.).
Signals can be costlessly verified, so that S cannot lie. Revealing
his action is costly for S: he has to pay a cost c) 0 when he informs
R.11 Nature may prevent R from receiving information, that is, inde-
sAs Leland (1981) points out, a signaling game can incorporate a disclosure
game. In a signaling game, truth-telling will occur in equilibrium if the cost of
lying is prohibitively high, and disclosing no information can be viewed as sending
a particular signal.
9De Groote (1990) analyzes cheap talk in a moral hazard setting. Austen-
Smith (1994) investigates cheap talk when the sender has to incur a cost to observe
the state of nature.
loOne can show that if Nature chooses t according to a random distribution, then
S informs R of his type if and only if t is above some critical level; see Verrec-
chia (1983).
11 For instance, c represents the cost of an advertisement or the price of a
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pendently of t, R receives a signal with probability .~ E(0,1). The
value of 1- a will be called the level of noise. The values of c and
.~ are common knowledge. If R observes a signal, he chooses action
a(t) E A- [a,á] C R. Otherwise, he selects some action ao E A.
The payoff functions of S and R are US(t, a) and UR(t, a), respec-
tively. Each function is twice continuously differentiable in t and a.
Assumption 1 US(t, a) is (i) strictly increasing in a for all t; ~ii~
strictly decreasing in t for all a; and (iii~ strictly concave in ( t, a).12
An interpretation of assumption 1 is that S dislikes exerting effort so
that he wants to shirk, but he wants R to exert a maximum level of
effort.
Assumption 2 UR(t, a) (i~ is strictly concave in a for all t; and (ii~
satisfies ázUR(t, a)~(8t8a) ~ 0.
By assumption 2, for each action of S, R has a unique payoff-maximizing
response. Moreover, the best response of an informed receiver will be
increasing in the sender's action (see section 2.3).
Example 1: Quality selection and advertising
This example draws on Grossman's (1981) disclosure model. Consider
a monopolist (S) who can choose the quality t of the product that he
offers for sale. The price of the good is the same for all qualities (this
rules out the possibility that the price is informative). A potential
buyer (R) receives an advertisement only with probability .~. He pur-
chases the good with probability a(t) if he observes an advertisement,
and with probability ao otherwise. S's profit function is decreasing in
quality (high quality is costly to produce), and increasing in a. For
instance, US(t, a) - a(r - C(t)) ~- (1 - a)(-C(t)) - ar - C(t), where
C(t) is the unit cost of producing quality t, C'(t) ~ 0, and r denotes
stamp. Alternatively, S dialikes taking the effort of informing R.
12A11 the results except uniqueness of the disclosure equilibrium (see proposi-
tion 1) also hold when Us(t, a) is concave in (t, a).
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the price of the good. R's net benefits are increasing in quality. For
instance, UR(t, a) - a(t - r).13
Example 2: Government procurement and environmental policy
Consider a firm (S) with a pollutive production process, and a govern-
ment agency (R) that has to decide on a procurement contract with
the firm. S selects an investment level t in equipment that reduces
pollution. Subsequently, S can send evidence of these environment-
friendly expenditures (a dossier that consists of brochures and bills)
to R. Suppose that R, while choosing the expenditure level a, takes
S's environmental effort into account. A possible reason is that the
government wants to stimulate "green" behavior. Accordingly, UR(t, a)
is increasing in t. Because of government bureaucracy, with positive
probability S's dossier gets lost. Since S may not care about pollution,
profits US(t, a) are decreasing in t, the money spent on equipment for
pollution reduction. S's profits are increasing in a.
Example 3: Efforts in a cooperative
Suppose that there are two workers in a cooperative, S and R. S
chooses an effort level t, and R an effort level a. The efforts are in-
puts in a production process that is described by a production function
F(t, a). S's effort is preparatory; for instance, he has to fine-tune equip-
ment. After observing t, R chooses an effort level a(t), otherwise some
ao. When R remains uninformed about t, either S did not inform him or
the message got lost. By assumption 2(ii), the effort of R depends pos-
itively on the preparatory effort. The workers share the output F(t, a)
according to a given distribution (~, 1- cr). The payoff of a worker is
his part of the output minus his effort, that is, US(t, a) - aF(t, a) - t
and UR(t, a) -(1 - a)F(t,a) - a. Assumption 2(ii), equivalent to
ó2F(t, a)~(8t8a) ~ 0, reflects complementarity of the production pro-
13The fact that UR(t, a) is not strictly concave in a causes no problems, because it




The notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium of Fudenberg and Ti-
role (1991) is used to solve the game. In an equilibrium:
(i) Given a`(t) and aó, S optimally chooses F(.) and r(t) for all t in the
support of F.
(ii) If R does not receive a message, he has beliefs about which action
S has chosen. These beliefs are determined by Bayes' rule.
(iii) If R does not receive a message, he optimally chooses ao given his
beliefs. If he does receive a message t, he optimally chooses a(t).
If S selects some t', that is, t' is an element of the support of F(.),
then for given (ao, a(t)), t` and r`(t') jointly maximize
r(t)~~Us(t, a(t)) f(1 -~)Us(t, ao) - c] f( 1 - r(t))Us(t, ao) -
r(t)~~Us(t, a(t)) -~Us(t, ao) - c] ~ Us(t, ao).
R's best-response function if he learns that S has chosen t is
(1)
a`(t) - arg max UR(t, a) (2)a
In an interior optimum for R we have that óUR(t, a`(t))~aa - 0. Dif-
ferentiating this condition with respect to t, and using assumption 2,
it follows that a'(t) is strictly increasing in t. By the Theorem of the
Maximum, a'(t) is a continuous function.
According to Bayes' rule, R's beliefs if he does not receive a message
are described by the probability distribution function
t 1 - r(t')a
( ~) (3)G(t) - f fT(1 - r(T)a)dF(T)dF
t.
R's best response if he remains uninformed is
aó - arg max JT UR(t, a )dG(t). (4)
Information Disclosure 39
2.3 Analysis
As a starting point I will briefly discuss two games that are closely
related to the disclosure game. If .~ - 0, the game is equivalent
to the game in which S and R simultaneously choose actions (the
simultaneous-move game). It is straightforward to show that this game
has a unique Nash equilibrium, in which S chooses his dominant strat-
egy t and R selects a'(t).
Next, suppose that in the disclosure game, .~ - 1, that is, R can
perfectly observe S's message (the Stackelberg game). The following
assumption, which will hold throughout the chapter, assures that the
Stackelberg game has an equilibrium in pure strategies that yields S
a higher utility level than in the equilibrium of the simultaneous-move
game.
Assumption 3 There e~ists a t 1 t such that US(t, a'(t)) - c ~
US(t a'(t)).
In an equilibrium of the Stackelberg game, S selects an action
(called the Stackelberg action or strategy - although it is not neces-
sarily unique)
tst E arg max US(t, a'(t)). (5)t
Now return to the disclosure game, in which .~ E(0,1). Define
~(.~) - max{~US(t, a`(t)) ~- (1 - ~)US(t, a'(t))} - US(t, a'(t)). (6)
The value ~(a) represents S's maximal gain from choosing an action
and informing R, gross of the disclosure cost c, and given that R will
select a'(t) if he receives no message (R "assumes the worst"). By the
Envelope Theorem, ~(~) is strictly increasing. Also, ~(0) - 0, that is,
if there is so much noise that messages never arrive then independent
of the disclosure cost, S will not inform R. Moreover, f(~) 1 0 for all
a E (0,1).
The first result focuses on "no disclosure" equilibrium outcomes,
which coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the simultaneous-move
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game as defined above. If sending a message is sufficiently expensive,
or if the probability that a message will reach R is sufficiently low, then
S will select t without informing R. The intuition is straightforward: if
information transmission is prohibited by a high cost and a high level
of noise, then S keeps R uninformed and the agents act as if they have
to make their decisions simultaneously.
Proposition 1 Suppose that ~(~) C c. There exists a unique equilib-
rium. In this equilibrium, S chooses action t with probability 1 and sets
r'(t) - 0, and R chooses action a'(t).
Proof: Suppose that in equilibrium r'(t) - O,dt E supp F. Since
UR(t, a) is strictly concave in a, the receiver's expected payoff function
is also strictly concave in a for all beliefs that he may hold. Therefore,
aó is unique and R does not randomize. This fact and assumption 1(ii)
ensure that S selects action t with probability 1 for all aá. R rationally
infers S's action choice in equilibrium, that is, his beliefs satisfy G(t) -
1. Therefore, aó - a'(t).
S does not disclose, that is, r'(t) - 0 for all t E supp F, if and
only if US(t, ao) 1~US(t, a'(t)) ~(1 -~)US(t, ao) - c for all t E T.
Equivalently,
US(t, a'(t)) 1 max{aUs(t, a"(t)) -~ (1 -.~)Us(t, a'(t))} - c. (7)
Let aUs(t, a`(t)) ~(1 -~)US(t, a'(t)) be maximized by t. By assump-
tion 3, t ) t. Note that (7) is equivalent to c~~(~); see definition (6).
O
In what follows, I assume that disclosure of information is not a
priori precluded, that is, c G~(~). Note that since ~ E(0,1), this
inequality holds if the disclosure cost is sufficiently small.
The following lemma shows, among others, that S's ability to com-
mit is reduced compared to the Stackelberg game; he will never use a
pure strategy in equilibrium.
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Lemma 1 Suppose that in equidibrium there is a t E supp F snch that
t~ t. Then (i~ r'(t) - l, and (ii~ a`(t) ] aó. Moreover, S never
chooses a t 1 t with probabidity 1.
Proof: Let t~ t be in the support of F(.).
(i) The expected utility of S from selecting t is r`(t)[~US(t, a`(t))-~ (1-
~)US(t, aó) - c] -{- (1 - r`(t))US(t, ao) ~ US(t, ao) 1 US(t, ao). It follows
that r'(t)[~US(t, a'(t)) -~US(t, aó) - c] ~ 0, which implies
US(t, a'(t)) - Us(t, ao) ~ c~~. (8)
By inspection of (1), it is optimal for S to set r'(t) - 1.
(ii) Follows from US(t, a`(t)) - US(t, aó) ) 0 and assumption 1(ii).
Finally, if S selects some action t 1 t with probability 1 then in equilib-
rium R rationally infers S's action, whether or not he received a signal,
so that aó - a'(t). But then S can deviate by selecting action t and
sending no message. To see this, notice that US(t, aó) ~ US(t, aó) ~
~US(t, a`(t)) -~ (1-.~)US(t, aó) - c. (The second inequality follows from
(8).) This yields a contradiction. t]
Lemma 1 states that if S takes an action t 1 t, then he will certainly
inform R. Also, if R is informed that S selected some t 1 t, he exerts
more effort than if he remains uninformed. Finally, if S exerts more
than the minimum level of effort, he will keep R guessing about the
actual action that he takes by randomizing.
The next result clarifies what "cheating" means in the context of
the disclosure game, namely that shirking implies remaining silent. The
reason is that by selecting action t, S cannot increase his expected
benefits by informing R. This is due to the fact that an uninformed
receiver takes an action that is at least as favorable to S as the optimal
action of a receiver who is informed of t. Moreover, sending a message
1S COStly.14
14From the proof of the lemma it follows that if c- 0, then S is indifferent between
revealing t and remaining silent, so that any r'(t) E [0, 1] is possible. However, all
the results hold for c- 0 if one selects r"(t) - 0.
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Lemma 2 Suppose that in equilibrium t E svppF. Then (i~ r'(t) - 0,
and (ii~ a`(t) C aó. Moreover, S will not choose t with probability 1.
Proof: Suppose that t E supp F. Since a'(t) is strictly increas-
ing in t we have that a'(t) C aó (claim ( ii)). By assumption 1(i),
US(t, a`(t)) - US(t, ao) G 0, implying ~(US(t, a'(t)) - Us(t, aó)) - c C 0.
By inspection of (1), it follows that r`(t) - 0 (claim ( i)). Finally,
c G~(.~ implies that there exists a t E supp F such that r'(t) ~ 0. By
claim (i), t ~ t, and therefore F(t) C 1. O
The following result shows that in any outcome which is not a no-
disclosure equilibrium, moral hazard prevails. Remember that assump-
tion 3 assured that S optimally selects some action t 1 t in the Stack-
elberg game. In the disclosure game, however, S will try to "cheat" R
(in the sense of exerting no effort and not informing R) with positive
probability.
Proposition 2 Suppose that c C~(~). In any eqvilibrium, S chooses
action t with positive probability.
Proof: Suppose F(t) - 0. By assumption 2(ii) we have that a`(t)
is strictly increasing in t. Therefore, aó ~ a'(t). Let t be defined by
a'(t) - aó. Such a t exists by continuity of a'(.), and a'(t) G aó G a'(t).
Moreover, as aó ~ a'(t), we have t~ t. By lemma 1(ii), the support
of F(.) is contained in the interval (t, t]. Since aó maximizes
ft UR(t, a)dG(t) - ft UR(t, a)dG(t),t i
it follows from assumption 2(ii) that aó 1 a'(t), a contradiction. ~
To establish existence of "disclosure" equilibria, I will focus on equi-
librium outcomes in which S randomizes between (i) selecting action t
and remaining silent, and (ii) selecting some action t` ~ t and inform-
ing R. In such an equilibrium, S tries to exploit R's uncertainty when
he does not receive a message.
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For convencience, I assume the following:ls
Assumption 4 a"(t) is a concave function over the range where a"(t) E
(a, á).
Consequently, S's expected utility given the choice of some action t~ t
and R's equilibrium strategy (as given by (1) for r(t) - 1) is concave
in t.ls Accordingly, we will be able to show existence of an equilibrium
in a convenient way. Assumption 4 is implied by a variety of functions
UR(t, a). Examples of a general form are UR(t, a) - f(g(a) - h(t)),
such as UR(t, a) --(a - 2t)Z; and UR(t, a) - f(t, a) -}- h(a), such as
UR(t, a) -(1 - a)F(t, a) - a in example 3 in the previous section.
Proposition 3 Suppose that c C~(a). There exists a unique equilib-
rium. In this equilibrium,
(i~ S chooses t and r"(t) - 0 with probability 1- p" 1 0, and chooses
t' 1 t and r"(t") - 1 with probability p` 1 0;
(ii~ R chooses action a'(t) after learning S's action, otherwise he selects
some ao G a"(t').
Proof: 1. Let
t"(ao) E arg mT{aUs(t, a"(t)) f (1 -~)US(t, ao) - c}. (9)
Because US(.,.) is jointly concave in t and a (assumption 1), and a'(t)
is a concave function, we have that .~Us(t, a"(t)) ~(1 -~)US(t, ao) - c
is concave in t. This implies that the correspondence t'(.) is convex-
valued. By the Theorem of the Maximum, t`(.) is upper-hemicontinuous.
2. Let
p"(ao, t) E arg max {p[~US(t, a"(t)) f(1 -~)US(t, ao) - c] -{-
pE(o,l]
(1 - p)US(t, ao)}. (10)
1sThis formulation is more convenient than stating an assumption on the prim-
itives of the model. One can obtain assumption 4 as a result of restrictions on
UR(t, a).
1sThis in turn implies that the set of optimal actions for S in equilibrium is
concave-valued. Thus assumption 4 allows for a fixed-point argument to show exis-
tence of an equilibrium; see proposition 3.
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Note that p'(., .) is a convex-valued and upper-hemicontinuous corre-
spondence.
3. Let
aó(p,t) E arg maxaEA
p(1 - a) UR(t~a)}
(1 - p) f p(1 - ~)
1 - p
UR(t,a) 1 .(1 - p) f P(1 - ~)
Note that aó(., .) is a convex-valued and upper-hemicontinuous corre-
spondence.
Define the correspondence cp : A x T x [0,1] ~ A x T x[0,1] by
~P(ao,t,p) - ao(p~t) x t~(ao) x p4(ao,t).
Note that cp is convex-valued upper-hemicontinuous, and A x T x[0,1] is
compact and convex. Therefore, by Kakutani's Fixed-Point Theorem,
there exists a triple (ao, t', p') E A x T x [0, 1] such that (ao, t', p') E
cp(aó, t', p'). This fixed point of cp, and a`(t), constitute an equilibrium.
Finally, uniqueness is shown. By lemma 1, r`(t) - 1 for all t E{t ~
t E supp F, t 1 t}. Furthermore, r~`(t) - 0 by lemma 2. The function
h(t) -.~US(t, a'(t)) f(1 -.~)US(t, aó) - c is strictly concave in t if
US(t, a) is strictly concave in (t, a). Hence, {t ~ t E supp F, t~ t} has
exactly one element. ~
When ~(a) 1 c, the outcome of the disclosure game is an interme-
diate case of the outcomes of the simultaneous-move game (a - 0) and
the Stackelberg game (~ - 1), discussed at the opening of this section.
The presence of noise (an intermediate value of ~), leads to randomizing
by S, which can be interpreted as intermediate commitment (compared
to choosing the Stackelberg action with probability 1). Moreover, if S
commits himself, he chooses an intermediate action, that is, lower than
the Stackelberg action, but higher that the equilibrium action of the
simultaneous-move game.
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2.4 More Results and Discussion
.2.4.1 Further Results
The probability with which S exerts high effort in a disclosure equilib-
rium, p`, may depend on c and ~. Accordingly let p'(c, a) denote an
equilibrium value of p' given c and ~. Similarly, one can write t'(c, .~).
For the sake of argument, suppose that tst is unique.
Proposition 4 Consider a sequence ~n --~ 1. Then any associated
sequence t'(c, ~n) converges to tst, and any associated sequence p`(c, ~n)
converges to 1.
Proof: By (9), t' converges to tst as a tends to 1. Suppose there is
a sequence ~n -~ 1, such that p'(c, ~n) C p for all n, where p C 1.
Then for any n, S randomizes (and is therefore indifferent) between
selecting the lowest action without informing R, and selecting a high
action while revealing his action choice to R. Consider a particular ~,~,
for n large. By (11) and because p'(c, an) is bounded away from 1, aó
tends to a`(t) as ~n goes to 1. By assumption 3 and since c C~(.~),
for n large enough there is an action t(an) 1 t such that choosing this
action with probability 1 and informing R results in a higher payoff
for S than selecting t and remaining silent. Since p'(c, ~) is bounded
away from 1, R's posterior beliefs when he receives no message put a
probability tending to 1 to the event that S selected t, as ~n goes to 1.
But then S can do strictly better by selecting t(~n) with probability 1
and setting r'(t(~„)) - 1, a contradiction. O
Proposition 4 is intuitive if one recalls the Stackelberg game (see
the previous section). As the noise level goes to zero, the equilibrium
outcome of a disclosure equilibrium converges to the Stackelberg equi-
librium outcome, that is, S's ability to commit to high effort becomes
strengthened.
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Proposition 5 Let ~ E (0,1) be given, and consider a sequence cn -~
0. Then any associated sequence p"(c,,, a) does not converge to 1.
Proof: Suppose not, then there is a sequence c„ --~ 0 such that some
associated sequence p"(cn,a) converges to 1. For a given cn, S selects
some action t"(cn,.~) ~ t (defined by (9)) with probability p"(cn,~).
Note that t"(c,~, ~) is bounded away from t. To see this, suppose not.
Then, since c G~(a), S can gain ~(a) - c,~ ~ 0 from choosing some
action t (bounded away from t; see the proof of proposition 1) and in-
forming R. Since this gain remains strictly positive as cn -~ 0, we have
a contradiction. As p"(cn, a) goes to 1, R's posterior beliefs after not
receiving a message attach probability tending to 1 to action t"(cn, ~).
Therefore, aó as a function of cn tends to a"(t"(cn,.~)). Since Us(t,a)
is strictly decreasing in t, S can deviate by choosing t and remaining
silent, a contradíction. ~
The interpretation of proposition 5 is that even if the disclosure cost
goes to zero, S will not choose and reveal some high action with proba-
bility 1. Because of the presence of noise, there is always an opportunity
to "cheat" R by exerting no effort (with positive probability), and re-
maining silent. Therefore, the noise, and not the cost of informing R,
creates the moral hazard problem.
Does S or R benefit from the noise? Suppose that c G~(~) (other-
wise the noise clearly hurts both agents; see proposition 1).
Proposition 6 The presence of noise negatively affects S's expected
utility. It negatively affects R's expected utility if UR(t, a) is increasing
in t for ald a.
Proof: Let S's and R's expected benefits in a disclosure equilibrium
be denoted by Us and UR, respectively. Since S is indifferent between
the two options of his mixed strategy, and t" G tst, it follows that
Us - p"~~Us(t", a"(t")) f(1 -~)Us(t", aó) - c] -~ (1 - p")Us(t, aó) -
.~Us(t", a"(t"))-~ (1-.1)Us(t", aó)-c G Us(t", a"(t"))-c G Us(tst, a"(tst))-
Information Disclosure 47
c. Since t G t' G tst, UR(t, a) is increasing in t implies UR(t, aó) G
UR(t`, ao) G UR(t', a.(t.)) ~ UR(tst, a.(t.)) G UR(tse, a.(tsf)). It fol-
lows that UR - p'[~UR(t`, a`(t`))~-(1-~)UR(t`, aó)]~(1-p')UR(t, aó) G
UR(tst~ a.(tst)) ~
The assumption that R's utility is increasing in t is satisfied when
there are complementarities (as in the examples of section 2.2). By
proposition 6, both S's and R's expected utility levels are negatively
affected by the presence of noise. In example 1 for instance, the abil-
ity to commit to produce high quality benefits both the seller and the
buyer. Without noise, the monopolist selects quality such that the
gains from trade are maximal. In general, complementarities can be
exploited more efI'iciently without noise.
~.4.,2 Robustness
The result that S randomizes between on the one hand choosing high
effort and informing R, and on the other hand shirking and remaining
silent, is quite robust. It is not driven by the fact that messages either
are delivered or completely lost. The following features are crucial for
this result: (i) some signals can only be generated after choosing a
sufFiciently high action, and (ii) the signal R receives when S shirks
(e.g., no message at all) can also be received when S chooses a high
action. Put differently, S must have some ability to inform R of this
commitment, and certain signals leave R in the dark about S's action.
Since R will be uncertain after a low signal, S will shirk with positive
probability and generate a confusing signal (in the model, S remains
silent).17
17An example of a model with garbled communication that leads to randomizing
by S is the following. If S does not send a message, R receives a signal which
is not correlated to S's action, and if S does send a message, there is positive
correlation. E.g., without sending a message the signal is uniformly distributed on
[0, t J independently of S's true action, and with informing R of action t the signal
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Since high signals can only be sent after high actions, the signal
technology has a"moving" support. With a non-moving support, dif-
ferent results can be obtained. In Bagwell (1995, see also the introduc-
tion), when the sender takes an action, then the probability that the
receiver observes a signal specifying that action is less than 1. With
the complementary probability, the receiver observes a signal specify-
ing any element in the sender's set of actions other than the chosen
action. Thus, the receiver may receive as message any element in the
first-mover's action space, and he cannot conclude from his observation
that a particular action has not been chosen. In particular, there are no
signals that can only be generated after choosing high actions. Thus,
R's signal may always be a wrong signal. The intuition why commit-
ment cannot occur is straightforward. Suppose that in equilibrium, S
commits himself to a high action. Independent of the signal he gets,
in equilibrium R should choose the best response to S's equilibrium
action. But then S has an incentive to deviate, even if the amount of
noise is very small.
If S could not choose whether to send or not send a message, but
messages would be sent exogenously, then S would not randomize in
his action choice. To see this, suppose that r(t) - 1, b't. One can
interpret 1- ~ as the probability that there is leakage of the information
about S's action.lg Given R's best response, S selects a unique action
t' - arg maxt{~US(t, a'(t)) ~(1 -~)US(t, aó)}: there is a unique, pure
strategy equilibrium. Moreover, t C t' G tst, and the equilibrium
outcome converges to the Stackelberg outcome if the noise disappears.
is uniformly distributed on [0, t].




This chapter analyzed a sender-receiver game in which the sender can
provide hard information about the action that he has chosen. If the
cost of sending a message and the level of noise are sufficiently low,
there is a unique equilibrium in which the sender randomizes between
(i) making the lowest effort and remaining silent, and (ii) choosing a
higher effort level and informing the receiver. The sender exploits the
noise to cheat the receiver, who is unsure about the sender's action if
he does not receive a message.
An important directions for further research on disclosure of infor-
mation is to focus on legal rules. For instance, there exist laws that
mandate disclosure of information in stock markets. In other cases,
laws limit disclosure for reasons of privacy. A better understanding of
how legal rules affect transmission of information and strategic inter-
action is not only important for economists, but may also offer those
interested in law new ideas.19 Another extension can be explored by
assuming that the receiver has to invest in order to extract information.
Accordingly, not the sender but the receiver pays the transmission cost.
In this case it is the receiver who decides to inform himself or not.
19See Baird et al. (1994), ch. 3.
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Chapter 3
Entry Deterrence and
Signaling in Markets for
Search Goods
3.1 Introduction
Being the first firm to enter a market can be advantageous - for in-
stance, when consumers are uncertain about product quality, as in
markets for search goods or experience goods.l If only the pioneering
brand's quality is known by consumers after subsequent entry, there
is informational product differentiation: consumers know the incumb-
ent's quality but are uncertain about the entrant's. In such a setting,
this chapter explores how search costs and informational asymmetries
influence the possibilities for entry in markets for search goods.
Consider a market for search goods in which consumers know the
quality of the good sold by an incumbent but are uncertain about a po-
tential entrant. The incumbent and the entrant simultaneously choose
prices which are observed by consumers before they decide which firm
1Search goods can be inspected to allow a quality assessment before purchase,
whereas the quality of experience goods is only learned after a purchase. The
distinction between experience goods and search goods was made by Nelson (1970).
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to visit. A consumer who visits the entrant's store and finds out that
product quality is too low given the price that is charged may switch to
the incumbent before buying provided that the cost of searching is not
too high. Expectedly, if search costs are high then the risk of lock-in,
that is, of buying a low-quality good at a high price because visiting
the incumbent is too costly, may discourage consumers from visiting
the entrant.
There is a variety of examples of products that have quality as a
search-characteristic. Fruit vendors often allow consumers to inspect
the fruit before buying. Stores selling audio equipment provide demon-
strations for clients to help them decide. Automobile sellers allow con-
sumers to perform test drives so that an assessment of quality can be
made. Search costs arise, for instance, when visiting another seller takes
considerable time.
The chapter focuses on two questions. The first question - how do
search costs afFect the possibilities for entry - is posed in two different
informational environments. To begin, I consider the case in which
the incumbent does not know the entrant's quality (setting I). This
somewhat "standard" set-up is natural in several cases. For instance,
in a fruit market the incumbent may not know who is the supplier of an
entrant, so that the incumbent does not have any inside information.
The incumbent may, however, have information that consumers do
not have. Consider, for instance, markets for technically complicated
products, where firms have more expertise. Alternatively, consider pro-
fessionals who have knowledge about each other due to a common his-
tory such as a shared education. In the model, one can model such
events by assuming that the incumbent observes the entrant's quality
(setting II). This situation gives rise to signaling with common infor-
mation: the prices of both firms, rather than only the entrant's price
(as in setting I), serve as signals of the entrant's type to consumers.
By examining settings I and II, one can answer a second question:
is the incumbent better off if it knows the entrant's quality? A related
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question is: would an informed incumbent act differently, that is, will
this information be used? If this is the case, industry structure might be
affected. An analysis of this issue may lead to clues about inter-industry
differences when industries differ by their informational environments.
Setting I, the uninformed-incumbent case, leads to several insights.
One result is that the entrant can signal high quality by choosing a
sufl~iciently high price. The intuition is that if the entrant's price is so
high that a consumer who would find quality to be low would switch to
the incumbent, then this price will be a credible signal of high quality.2
Under low search costs, consumers can visit the incumbent if the en-
trant's quality turns out to be lower than expected. Therefore, for
a separating equilibrium, it makes no sense for a low-quality seller to
mimic a high type, and a firm of higher quality than the incumbent can
profitably enter. Moreover, for a separating equilibrium, if search costs
are sufficiently high then fear of lock-in induces consumers to avoid the
entrant; there is an entry barrier.
The search cost spans the separating equilibrium outcomes in an
interesting way.3 For low search costs, the equilibrium outcome of a
complete-information model of Bertrand competition is obtained; the
high-quality entrant captures the market. For high search costs, Bag-
well's (1990) entry deterrence result in markets for experience goods is
obtained (Bagwell's paper is discussed below and in section 3.3). Thus,
if search is sufriciently costly, then a search good has the characteristics
of an experience good.
Pooling equilibria exist only if search costs are sufl"iciently high.
In a pooling equilibrium the entrant charges an intermediate price (in
accordance with consumers' prior beliefs). Therefore, since a high price
signals high quality, if search costs are low then a high-quality entrant
could deviate by increasing its price.
ZThis is true even though demand is price-inelastic. Bagwell and Riordan (1991)
show that high prices may signal quality if demand is elastic and high quality is
more costly to produce.
3I am grateful to a referee of the I.J.I.O. for pointing out this issue.
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Setting II, the informed-incumbent case, generates additional in-
sights. If the incumbent's price is informative about the entrant's type,
then the entrant can rely on its rival's price to inform consumers, so
that it has a large degree of freedom in its price choice. In the light
of this observation, one can argue that the notion of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (and also sequential equilibrium) allows for unreasonable
equilibria. In order to rule these out, I apply (a customized version of)
Bagwell and Ramey's (1991) refinement of "unprejudiced" sequential
equilibrium. The criterion captures the idea that if a firm chooses an
out-of-equilibrium signal, while its rival's equilibrium signal is informa-
tive, consumers will rely on the equilibrium signal.
If the incumbent's price is uninformative about the entrant's qual-
ity, then, by and large, the same results as in setting I are obtained.
Intuitively, if consumers cannot infer the entrant's quality from the in-
cumbent's price, it does not matter whether the incumbent actually
knows the entrant's type.' Now suppose that the incumbent's price
does depend on the entrant's type. The entrant, knowing that the in-
cumbent can observe its type and that consumers realize this, has less
dif~iculty in convincing consumers of high quality. As a consequence,
entry is facilitated. This reasoning does not depend on the level of
search costs; an informative incumbent's price helps the entrant to cir-
cumvent lock-in effects and incentive-compatibility problems.
A comparison of settings I and II leads to the following result. The
incumbent is not able to exploit private information about the entrant
in a profitable way, that is, it cannot improve upon its situation if it ob-
serves the entrant's quality. The reason is that using information about
the entrant helps the entrant to overcome its informational disadvan-
tage. Thus, the results suggest that the distribution of information
between the incumbent and the entrant is unlikely to affect industry
structure.
4However, a difference with setting I is that there exist pooling equilibria for
a wider range of parameter values, due to the relaxed resttictions on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs.
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There is a closely related literature on entry and quality uncertainty.
Areeda and Turner (1975), Williamson (1977), and Demsetz (1982) ar-
gued that in markets for experience goods, promotional pricing (per-
haps below marginal cost) by an entrant may be necessary to induce
consumers to try its product. Accordingly, the entrant incurs "informa-
tion costs," that may be recouped when consumers purchase at a higher
price after having experienced the product. 5chmalensee (1982), Far-
rell (1986), and Bagwell (1990) formally examined the difl'iculty faced
by a potential entrant to persuade consumers that it sells a high-quality
product. The informational asymmetry may result in an entry barrier,
even if the entrant's expected quality is higher than the incumbent's
quality. My paper differs in two important ways. First, whereas the
literature cited above considers experience goods, I examine markets
for search goods.s As explained above, search costs crucially influence
the signaling possibilities. The second difference is that I also study
the case in which the entrant's type is common information.
The few papers on games with common information (that I am
aware of ) consider quite different issues. Matthews and Fertig (1990)
study wasteful advertising by an incumbent and an entrant, both in-
formed about the latter's quality, in a market for experience goods.s
Entry occurs automatically, and the firms play a duopoly game in which
beliefs affect demand levels. The entrant may have difficulty trying to
influence beliefs because the incumbent (the second-mover) can coun-
teract. Bagwell and Ramey (1991) investigate limit pricing by two in-
cumbents, both informed about an industry cost parameter. Milgrom
and Roberts (1986b) study competition among interested parties with
common information, who try to persuade a decisionmaker to make
a particular decision. These partíes can only report truthful informa-
SNotice the difference with Klemperer (1987) who explores entry deterrence in
the presence of switching costs. In his model, a consumer who previously bought
from the incumbent incurs a cost if he decides to purchase from the entrant.
óThe literature in which firms signal quality by wasteful advertising is based on
ideas in Nelson (1970); see Milgrom and Roberts (1986a).
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tion. The main result is that competition leads to the full-information
outcome.
The model of setting I is presented in section 3.2 and analyzed
in section 3.3. Section 3.4 adapts the model to deal with setting II.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model of Setting I
Consider a market with an incumbent (firm 1) and a potential entrant
(firm 2). Entry is costless. Quality levels are expressed as (monetary)
utility reservation values. The incumbent's quality is known to be low
and is denoted by ql - Qe. The entrant's quality is denoted by Q2 E
{Qei qh}, where qh ~ qp ~ 0. The entrant's quality is determined by
Nature, which selects quality qh with probability a E(0,1).7
The number of consumers is normalized to 1 with each consumer
buying at most one unit. A product of quality q, sold at price p, yields
utility q-p. The reservation utility level is 0. The unit cost of producing
low quality is cP ~ 0, whereas producing high quality costs ch ~ ct per
unit. Higher quality generates a higher surplus:
qh - Ch ) qe - CQ 1 0. (1)
Since the central task before the entrant is to persuade consumers
to visit its store, I will say that entry occurs if the entrant captures
a positive share of the market. Conversely, entry is deterred if the
incumbent can prevent the entrant from making sales. This terminology
makes sense because the cost of entry is zero, so that strictly speaking,
entry may always occur (see also Bagwell (1990)). In particular, for
7Accordingly, since entty is costless and firm 2's quality is never less than firm 1's
quality, the entrant faces only an informational disadvantage vis-à-vis the incumbent
(cf. Bagwell's (1990) "pro-entry" assumptions). A possible motivation for the
assumption that the entrant's product is at least as good as the incumbent's is that
the technology used by the incumbent is readily available. However, with probability
a, the entrant realizes a successful innovation which results in high quality.
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separating equilibria l will focus on entry by the high-quality firm and
for pooling equilibria on entry by both types.
Qualities and costs are fixed during the game. The firms compete
by simultaneously setting prices pl and p2 which cannot be changed.
Only the entrant observes its type. The expected profits of firm i are
denoted by II;. Social welfare, denoted by W, is defined as the sum of
producers' surplus and consumers' surplus.
Initially, a consumer receives information (pl, p2). In order to find
out q2, he has to visit the entrant's outlet. Consumers' beliefs after
having observed prices are denoted by p,(pl, p2), which is the probability
attached to the event that the entrant sells a high quality product.
At a visit to the entrant's outlet, a consumer observes Q2. At a
store, a consumer may decide not to buy, and if that happens, he may
decide to visit the other firm. In the latter case, he incurs a search cost:
future benefits are discounted by a factor b E[0,1].8
The sequence of events is as follows. First, Nature selects the quality
of the potential entrant and this is observed by the potential entrant.
Second, the two firms simultaneously set prices, which are observed
by the consumers. Third, consumers (who know the quality of the
incumbent, but are uncertain about the entrant's quality) decide which
firm to visit. Before purchasing, they may switch to the other firm.
The notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium of Fudenberg and Ti-
role (1991) is used to solve for pure strategy equilibia. Firm 2's strategy
is a function p2(q2). Equilibrium prices are denoted by pi and p2(.).9
A consumer's strategy will be informally described by his visiting and
BThis way of modeling search costs is derived from Bester (1993). A higher value
of b corresponds to lower search costs.
9Since setting price below marginal cost is a dominated strategy, I will assume
that consumers interpret a price below the unit cost of producing high quality as
a signal of low quality. Also, a firm that produces low quality has no incentive to
charge a price higher than the consumers' reservation value for low quality. The
range of pl, and the range of pz(q~) will be restricted to [c~, q~], and the range of
p2(qti) to [ch, qh]. Note that in a model of repeated purchases, these testrictions
would rule out dynamic price strategies such as introductory offers.
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purchasing behavior. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of firms'
price strategies pi and p2(q2), q2 E{qi,qh}, consumers' strategy as to
which firm to initially visit, and once at a firm whether to purchase, not
purchase, or visit the other seller, conditional on pl, p2, and consumer
beliefs tc(pi, p2), such that
(i) each firm's price strategy maximizes its profits given its rival's strat-
egy and consumers' behavior,
(ii) consumers' decisions maximize expected net benefits given their
beliefs, and
(iii) consumers' beliefs on the equilibrium path are consistent with
Bayes' rule and the firms' price strategies.
Since the incumbent cannot observe the type of a potential entrant,
its price cannot convey information about the entrant's quality to con-
sumers. Accordingly, if one considers deviations by the incumbent,
consumer beliefs will not vary wïth the incumbent's price:lo
Assumption 1 Given an equilibrium price p2(q2), consumers' bediefs
satisfy l~(pi~pz(92)) - l~(pi,pz(q2)) for all pi ~ pi.
3.3 Analysis of Setting I
~.3.1 General Remarks
In the first-best outcome (the incumbent and consumers observe the en-
trant's type), a high-quality entrant attracts consumers. This outcome
is attained for S- 1(a situation implying consumers acquire complete
loThe incumbent and consumers have exactly the same information, so that in
order to rule out implausible outcomes, one must require that the incumbent's price
pl cannot influence consumers' beliefs. This is the "no-signaling-what-you-don't-
know" condition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium: a player's deviation should not
signal information that he himself does not have (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
This condition is implied by the consistency requirement of the sequential equilib-
rium concept of Kreps and Wilson (1982).
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information before purchasing). Equilibrium prices in this outcome are
pi, p'2(ql) - cl, and p2(qh) - ce ~- qh - qp. Expected profits are II1 - 0
and II2 - a(ce -}- qh - Qe - ch). The first-best welfare level WFB equals
WFB-a(qh-Ch)~(1-a)(qe-ct).
To start the analysis, it is convenient to introduce a parameter
restriction and an assumption on consumers' beliefs. Suppose that
qh - qQ ~ qe - ce. Let pi ? ce be given. The best response of a high-
quality entrant is a price p2 - pi f qh - Qe. Since p2 ? cQ ~ qh - qe 1 4t,
price p2 signals high quality. Consumers are indifferent between the
two firms. However, they visit the entrant; otherwise he could slightly
decrease p2 (one can view the entrant's best response p2 as "just below"
pi f qh - Qe). Search costs or informational asymmetries do not play
a role under this parameter constellation: the price of a high-quality
entrant is always larger than the reservation value for low quality. To
focus on more interesting cases, I will assume that
4h-qeCqe-ce. (2)
Next, notice that the entrant knows that consumers can get utility
level ql - pi by purchasing from firm 1. Moreover, he knows that a
consumer who finds out that he sells low quality will switch to the
incumbent if prices are such that
qe - pa c s(qe - pi). (3)
Accordingly, any price p2 1 qe - b(Qe - pi ) is dominated for a low-
quality entrant, while this is not necessarily the case for a high-quality
firm. Therefore, given equilibrium price pi (rationally expected by
consumers and firm 2 in equilibrium), a price p2 that satisfies (3) should
convince consumers that firm 2 sells high quality. Formally, I will use
the following assumption:ll
11Assumption 2 is an equilibrium refinement strongly inclining to the Dominance
Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) and the "independence of never a weak best re-
sponse" (INWBR) criterion of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). See also Bester (1993),
section III, for a similar beliefs restriction.
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Assumption 2 Given an equilibrium price pi, consumers' beliefs sat-
isfy p,(pi, p2) - 1 for all p2 such that Qe - p2 C~(qt - pi).
3.3.,2 Separating Equilibria
In a separating equilibrium, the entrant's price is informative and hence
l~(pi,p2(qt)) - 0 and p(pi, p'2(qh)) - 1. Let bl be defined by
b,-1-qh-qe.
Qt - ct
Note that 0 C Sl c 1.
(4)
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1 and ,2, for any b, there exists a
unique separating equilibrium:
~i) If b~ bl then a high-quality firm enters; pi - p2(ql) - ce and
p2(Qh) - ce ~ Qk - 4e; ni - 0 and II2 - a(cp ~ qh - Qe - ch); the first-best
welfare level W- WFB is attained.
(ii) If b G bl then the incumbent deters entry of a high quality firm;
pi - pá(Qt) - ce and p2(4h) - ce ~- Qh - 4e, ni -~á - 0; since
W- Qe - ce, an inef~j'iciency exists.
Proof: In any separating equilibrium, pi - p2 (Qe) - cl (a price pi 1 ct
will be undercut by the low-quality entrant with a price p2 just below
pi, which in turn gives firm 1 an incentive to deviate).
Suppose that in a separating equilibrium a high-quality seller attracts
consumers. Two conditions must hold. First, the entrant offers a better
deal than the incumbent:
Qn - p2(Qn) ~ 4e - Pi- (5)
Second, if a consumer finds out that the entrant sells low quality,
he does not buy but visits the incumbent (the entrant's incentive-
compatibility constraint):
Qt - Pz(4h) C b(Qe - pi)~ (6)
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From (5) and (6) it follows that b~ bl.
Suppose that b~ bl. Can an outcome in which a high-quality firm
enters be supported as an equilibrium? Consider prices pi - ce and
pá(qn,) - ce f qh - 4e, and beliefs ~C(pi, pa) - 0 if pz C 4e - b(qe - pi)~
and p.(pi, p2) - 1 otherwise. These beliefs satisfy assumptions 1 and
2. Suppose that consumers visit the entrant if they observe prices pi
and p2(qh). These strategies and beliefs constitute an equilibrium. By
assumption 2 it cannot be that p'2(qh) G ce ~ qh - Qe (otherwise a low
type could mimic a high type).
Suppose that b G bl. If an equilibrium exists, then the incumbent
deters entry of a high-quality firm. Consequently, ql - pi ~ qh - p2(qh),
so that p2(qh) ~ ce -~ qh - 4e. Since firm 1 should have no incentive to
increase its price, p2(qh) - ce ~ qh - Qe. The same beliefs as in the case
b 1 bl support this outcome as an equilibrium. O
The main insight of proposition 1 is that a high-quality seller at-
tracts consumers if and only if search costs are sufficiently low.12 Intu-
itively, if search costs are low enough, the entrant knows that consumers
who find out that it sells low quality will switch to the incumbent, so
that a low-quality type has no incentive to mimic a high-quality seller.
In this case, consumers' surplus is maximal, and the first-best welfare
level is attained. The range of b in which the first-best outcome can
be supported as an equilibrium outcome, increases as the difference
between high and low quality increases.
If the lock-in effect is severe, the risk of lock-in discourages con-
sumers from visiting the entrant, so that there is an entry barrier,
leading to an inefl'icient situation. Consumer are indifferent between
the incumbent and the high-quality entrant. In equilibrium however,
they must visit the incumbent, since otherwise a low-quality seller could
profitably mimic a high-quality firm because of consumer lock-in.
12In proposition 1, market shares of the incumbent and low-quality entrant are




In a pooling equilibrium, p2 - p2(qe) - p`2(qh). By Bayes' rule, con-
sumers' beliefs satisfy p(pi, p2) - a. Since, independently of firm 1's
price, a price p2 G ch signals low quality and a price pz ~ Qe signals
high quality, it must be that ch G p'2 C q~. Necessarily, ch G Qe must
hold.
If the entrant captures the market, then the incumbent does not
make any profits. If firm 1 serves the market then it charges a price
pi - ce; otherwise a low-quality entrant could undercut pi and attract
consumers. Consequently, firm 1 earns zero profits in any pooling equi-
librium outcome.
By assumption 2, any price p2 that satisfies qe - p2 C b(qe - pi)
signals high quality. Therefore, in any pooling equilibrium
pz G qe - b(qe - p1)- (7)
An implication is that if the entrant's price is uninformative, consumers
who find out that ít sells low quality will not switch to the incumbent.
Thus if the entrant attracts consumers, they take into account that
they may end up buying a low-quality product at a fairly high price.
Moreover, the notion of "entry" in the proposition below refers to the
event that both types of entrant capture the market.
Proposition 2 Under assumptions 1 and ,2, pooling equilibria (with
and without entry~ exist if and only if ó G êl and a 1 (ch-ce)~(qh-Qe):
(i~ If entry occurs then pi E[ce, 4e -(Qh - Qe)~(1 - b)~ and pz E[ch, ce f
a(qn, - qe)] such that 4t - pi C a9h ~( 1 - a)qc - p2; IIi - 0 and
IIZ - pz -~ch - (1 - a)cl; the first-best welfare level WFB is attained.
~ii) If entry is deterred then pi - cl and p~ - ce ~ a(qh - qe); Bi -
II2 - 0; since W- Qe - cl, an inef,~ciency exists.
Proof: See the appendix.
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~.~3..~ Search Goods Versus E~perience Goods
There is an important difference with Bagwell (1990), who investigates
an experience good market in which consumers know that the incum-
bent sells low quality, and consumers and the incumbent are uncertain
about the entrant. In a dynamic model, a reputation for high quality
can be established by the entrant in the first of two periods. To signal
its quality, a high-quality firm should select a price in the first period
so low that it results in negative profits (in that period) only for the
high-quality type. Thus, low prices can signal high quality. There is an
entry barrier if the initial sacrifice of such a low price is prohibitively
high; a low price is a costly signal. My model demonstrates that in
markets for search goods, a sufl~iciently high price signals high quality.
An interesting link with Bagwell (1990) is the following. On the one
hand, if search costs are sufficiently low (S ) 81; see proposition 1), then
the equilibrium outcome (in terms of equilibrium prices and consumers'
behavior) is identical to the equilibrium outcome of the Bertrand model
with complete information. On the other hand, for high search costs
(S C Sl; see proposition 1), if one considers separating equilibria, the
equilibrium outcome of a static experience-goods model is obtained (see
Bagwell (1990), Prop. 1, p. 212). In this sense, a search good may have
the characteristics of an experience good.
3.4 Model and Analysis of Setting II
3..~.1 General Remarks
This section investigates the case in which the incumbent can observe
the entrant's quality, while consumers are still uncertain. Since the
incumbent's price strategy can depend on the entrant's quality, it is
denoted by pl(q2). The definition of an equilibrium given in section 3.2
has to be adapted to this change. It is common knowledge that the
66 Chapter 3
entrant and consumers know that the incumbent is informed.13
Assumption 1, no longer justifiable, is dropped. If the incumbent's
price strategy satisfies pi (Qe) - pi(qh), then the intuition and motiva-
tion behind assumption 2 still holds. A slightly modified version of this
assumption will be applied:
Assumption 3 Giverc equidibrium prices pi - pi (qc) - pi (qh), con-
sumers' beliefs satisfy tC(pi, p2) - 1 for all pz such that qc - p2 G
b(qc - pi)~
~.4.,2 Separating Equilibria
In a separating equilibrium, at least one of the firms' prices is infor-
mative about firm 2's type, that is, p; (Qe) ~ p; (qh) for at least one i.
Equilibrium beliefs are p(pi(qc), p"2(qc)) - 0 and ~(pi(qh), p2(qh)) - 1.
The fact that two firms try to signal common information may lead
to unreasonable equilibria. The following example demonstrates this.
Example: Free riding on the incumbent's signal
Consider prices p; (qc) ~ pi (qh), i- 1, 2(see figure 1). Let pi (qe) -
p2(qc) - ce. Suppose that qe - pi(qh) - Qh - p2(Qh) and consumers visit
the incumbent after observing price combination (pi(qh), p2(qh)). Let
consumer beliefs be such that firm 2 has no incentive to decrease its
price, that is,
f~(Pi(qh)~pz)qh f(1 - p(pi(qh),pa))qc - p2 C qc - pi(4h), pz c ps(qh).
For instance, p(pi (qh), p2) - 0 for all p2 G p2(qh); if the high-quality
entrant would reduce his price, consumers would believe that he sells
low quality. Also, pi(qh) G ch must hold, because otherwise the entrant
could profitably deviate with a price below the incumbent's price (with
13E.g., in the case of technically complicated goods, consumers may know that
firms have the ability to assess each others' goods, whereas consumers themselves
are at an informational disadvantage.
Entry in Markets for Search Goods 67
the purpose to mimic a low-quality seller). Accordingly, we have an
equilibrium. Firm 1's profits equal IIi - cx(pi(qh) - ct); higher than in
any equilibrium in the model of the previous section. Accordingly, one











Figure 1: A separating equilíbrium
However, the beliefs supporting the equilibrium in the example
above raise serious doubts. If firm 2 slightly decreases its price to p2 (see
figure 1), a consumer who observes (pi (qh), p2) can deduce the entrant's
quality from the incumbent's price. To see this, notice that the entrant
knows that the incumbent observes q2, and that consumers realize this.
Since pi (qc) ~ pi (qh), the incumbent's price remains informative about
the entrant's type if the entrant deviates. Consumers may therefore
reason that firm 1 would not have selected pi(qh) if firm 2's quality is
low. Consequently, prices (pi(qh),p2) should make consumers believe
that firm 2 sells high quality. Since qh - p2 ~ qe - pi(qh), the entrant
can "free ride" on the incumbent's signa1.14
14The concept of sequential equilibrium does not eliminate the equilibrium in
the example. Consider, for the sake of argument, discrete prices (the formal
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The example demonstrates that the equilibrium notion needs fur-
ther refinement. Bagwell and Ramey (1991) give a similar example (in
a limit-pricing model with multiple incumbents), which suggests that
"free riding on the rival's signal" is a general problem when there is
common information. They formulate a restriction on beliefs for sig-
naling games with common information ("unprejudiced" beliefs).15 For
convenience, I use a different but equivalent formulation of their crite-
rion. To do so, a definition is given:
Definition In an equilibrium with prices pi(q2) and p2(Q2), qz E{qe, qh},
price vector ( pl, p2) is said to be weakly consistent with q2 E{Qe, qh} if
there exists an i E {1, 2} such that p; - p~ (Q2).
In the rest of this chapter, beliefs in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
have to satisfy assumption 3 and the following criterion:
Assumption 4 Let eqnilibrium prices pi (q
be given.
) and ps(qz), qz E{qe, qh},
definition of sequential equilibrium only applies to games with finite strategy
spaces). Suppose that the set of possible prices for fitm i is {pi ( ql), p; (qp), p;},
for some p; E(p; (q~), p; (qh)). We will check whether the equilibrium strategies
p; (.) satisfy the consistency requirement of sequential equilibrium. If qz - q~, let
firm i tremble ( choose each price different from p; (q~)) with probability E~ 0.
If Qz - qh, let firm 1 tremble with ptobability E, and firm 2 with probability e3.
What should a consumer who observes prices ( pi (qh), pz) believe? Beliefs defined
by Bayes' rule from the set of completely mixed strategies are P`(pi(qh),pz) -
[a(1- 2e)e3]~[a(1 - 2e)E3 f( 1 - a)ez]. Now limE-.o p`(pi(4h),Pz) - 0, i.e., the con-
sistency requirement is satisfied. As argued in Bagwell and Ramey (1991), requiring
that all trembles have the same magnitude would eliminate the equilibrium.
1sBagwell and Ramey ( 1991) provide a somewhat different motivation for their
beliefs restriction. In my example, their argument would be that consumers observ-
ing (pi(qti), pz) should believe that the entrant's quality is high because then one
deviation instead of two occurred; consumers should not be "prejudiced" in believ-
ing that any deviation is more likely than any other. Their notion of unprejudiced
sequential equilibrium requires that a deviant price pair is rationalized with the
fewest deviations.
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(i) Consider prices pl, pz E[cei Qe]. If (pi, pz) is weakly consistent with
ql, but not with qh, then p(pl, pz) - 0.
(ii) Consider prices pl E[cp, Qe] and pz E [ch, qh]. If (pl, pz) is weakly
consistent with qh, but not wíth Qei then tC(pl, pz) - 1.
Assumption 4 explicitly takes into account the common information
aspect of the game. In the example above, (pi(qh),pz) is weakly consis-
tent with qh, but not with qp. Consequently, after observing equilibrium
price pi(qh) and deviation pz, consumers believe that the entrant sells
high quality. Since it is sufricient to pin down out-of-equilibrium beliefs
only for slight deviations, a weaker formulation of the refinement will
also satisfy.
The appendix derives necessary conditions on informative equilib-
rium prices (lemmas 1-3). I will briefly discuss some of them. First, if
the incumbent deters entry of a high-quality seller, then the incumben-
t's price must be uninformative, that is, pi(qe) - pi(qh). This result
generalizes the example above and is a consequence of assumption 4.
An informative price strategy by firm 1 that deters entry cannot occur
in equilibrium, since it allows a high-quality entrant to convince con-
sumers of high quality and attract consumers. An implication is that
an incumbent who wants to adopt a"tough" posture (in the sense of
making entry difficult) should employ a strategy that does not convey
information about the entrant. Second, if a high-quality seller captures
the market, then pi(Qe) 7 pi (qh); the incumbent sets an equally or more
aggressive price if it faces a high-quality rival.
Proposition 3 Under assumptions 3 and 4, for any b, there exist ex-
actly two separating equilibria:
(i) If b~ ól then there exists a separating equilibrium in which a high-
quality ftirm enters, and p; - pi(Qe) - pi(qh) - cp, p2(Qe) - cp, and
p2(Qh) - ~I f Qh - Q[i ni - 0 and II2 - a(cP f qh - qe - ch); the first-best
welfare level WFB is attained.
(ii) If b C bl then there exists a separating equilibrium in which the in-
cumbent deters entry of a high-quality firm, and pi - pi (qe) - pi (qh) -
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ce, p`s(Qe) - c~, and p'z(qh) - ce~4h-qe; ~i - Bá - 0; since W- 4e-ce,
an ine,fficiency exists.
(iii~ For any b there e~ists a separating equilibrium in which each type
of firm enters (i. e., consumers visit and buy from each type of firm ,2~;
in this equilibrium pi(qe) - ce f Qh - 4e, pi(qh) - ce~ ~z - pz(qe) -
p2(qh) - ce -f- 4n. - 4e; ni - 0 and IIZ - cp ~ qh - qp - ch; the first-best
welfare level WFB is attained.
Proof: ( i) For necessary conditions on the prices when a high-quality
firm enters, see lemmas 1 and 3 in the appendix. Given that pi -
pi(ql) - pi(qh), the proof of proposition 1(i) applies to show that b~ bl
is necessary and sufficient. Beliefs tC(pl, p2(Qe)) - 0 and tC(pl, p2(qh)) -
1, `d pl, satisfy the refinement criterion.
(ii) For necessary conditions on the prices when entry is deterred, see
lemmas 1 and 2. Since pi - pi(4P) - pi(qh)~ the proof of proposi-
tion 1 ( ii) applies to show that b G bl is necessary and sufiicient. As in
(i), beliefs satisfy assumptions 3 and 4.
(iii) See lemmas 1 and 3. One can support the equilibrium prices, for
any value of b, with beliefs p(pi(qt), pz) - 0 b'pzi p(pi(qh), pz) - 1 b'pzi
f~(pi ~ ~z) - 1 dpi C pi (qe); and p(pi ~ ps) - 0 tlpi ~ pi (qe). If consumers
do not visit firm 2 in equilibrium, then firm 2 can slightly decrease its
price and attract consumers, a contradiction. O
In parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition, the incumbent's price is unin-
formative. Accordingly, search costs play the same role as in the model
of the previous section. Part (iii) of proposition 3 shows that, contrary
to setting I, for any value of b there exists a separating equilibrium with
entry. In this equilibrium, the incumbent's price reveals the entrant's
type to consumers. The reason that search costs do not play a role is
that a low-quality entrant by itself cannot mimic a high-quality type,
since the incumbent's price would still inform consumers that the en-
trant sells low quality. The incumbent charges a relatively high price
to signal that the entrant sells low quality, and a relatively low price in
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the opposite case.ls Note that the first-best welfare level is attained in
this outcome.
~.~.~ Pooling Equilibria
Any pooling equilibrium of the model in the previous section is also
an equilibrium in this model (the only difference is that assumption 1
has been dropped). By and large, the intuition behind proposition 2
applies - see the discussion of condition (7) in the previous section. As
in proposition 2, "entry" means that each type of new firm captures the
market. Because of the larger degree of freedom in defining consumer
beliefs out of equilibrium, additional pooling equilibria may exist. In
particular, pooling equilibria exist for any a E(0,1).
Proposition 4 Under ass~amptions ~ and .~, pooling equilibria (with
and withoat entry~ exist if and only if 8 G bl:
(i~ If entry occurs then pi E[ce, qe -(qh - 4e)~(1 - b)] and p2 E[Ch, ce -~
qh - Qe] such that qp - pi C aqh -{- (1 - a)qe - p2 and (7J; IIi - 0 and
IIZ - p'2 - ach - ( 1 - a)cp; the first-best welfare level WFB is attained.
(ii~ If entry is deterred then pi - ce and p2 E[cn, ce ~ Qh - 4t] such
that p2 1 ce ~- a(qh - qp) and ~7); IIi - II2 - 0; since W- Qe - ce, an
inef~iciency exists.
Proof: See the appendix.
1sThere is an argument against this equilibrium. In the spirit of Grossman
and Perry's (1986) perfect sequential equilibrium, beliefs p(pl,pZ) - 1 for pl E
(pi(qh),pi(q~)) are not reasonable. Since firm 1 attracts no consumers in equilib-
rium, each "type" of incumbent has the same incentive to select a price pl G pi (qt).
Therefore after a deviation by firm 1, consumers should not draw any conclusion
about the entrant's quality: ~(p1i pZ) - a. Then firm 1 is able to attract consumers
by deviating.
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~.4.! The Role of the Incumbent's Information
By comparing settings I and II, one can assess whether the incum-
bent benefits from knowing the entrant's quality (and the entrant and
consumers knowing that the incumbent knows, and so forth). If one
considers separating equilibria, for any level of search costs there ex-
ists an additional equilibrium in setting II (see proposition 3(iii)). In
this equilibrium, consumers visit both types of the entrant. Since in set-
ting I, entry cannot occur if search costs are high (see proposition 1(ii)),
an informed incumbent may help the entrant to persuade consumers to
visit it. From a welfare point of view, common information may restore
efficiency for sufficiently high search costs (compare propositions 1(ii)
and 3 (iii)).
In setting II, there exist pooling equilibria with and without entry
for a wider array of parameter values. One cannot, however, draw clear-
cut conclusions concerning the possibilities of entry. Under common
information, however, it is possible that if entry occurs the entrant
charges a higher price than in any pooling equilibrium without common
information. As a consequence the incumbent's additional information
may increase the entrant's profits and decrease consumers' surplus.
The results of the analysis imply that the incumbent cannot benefit
from observing the entrant's quality. At first sight, this result may look
surprising. One would perhaps expect that it would be advantegous for
the incumbent to have this information.17 Intuitively, the entrant, who
knows that the incumbent is informed, and knows that consumers know
this, has an incentive to exploit informative strategies of the incumbent.
The role played by assumption 4 implies a caveat - namely, that without
the assumption, information about an entrant could be valuable to the
incumbent (as shown in the opening example of this section).
17For instance, Bagwell (1990) presumed (in a model with experience goods, see
the discussion in the previous section) that "[...~ the entrant would be worse oflif
its type were known to the incumbent" (footnote 4, p. 210).
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3.5 Conclusion
To conclude, I will briefly recapitulate some particular signaling possi-
bilities in the model. First, in markets for search goods, a high price
can signal high quality. The intuition is that a low-quality entrant is
discouraged from mimicking a high-quality type by consumers' credible
threat to visit the incumbent should they find out that quality is low.
Second, if the incumbent can observe the entrant's type, it is op-
timal not to take advantage of this opportunity. The entrant, who
knows that the incumbent can observe its type and that consumers re-
alize this, faces less difficulty in convincing consumers of high quality if
the incumbent's strategy contains information. In particular, if the in-
cumbent's price is informative then the entrant can circumvent lock-in
effects and entry is possible for any level of search costs.
An interesting extension of the model is to consider the choice of
location as a quality signal. Nelson (1970) already argued that stores
selling search goods have an incentive to cluster. Recall that a price
such that a consumer who would observe low quality in the entrant's
store would visit the incumbent signals high quality. Thus, if search
costs are low, consumers are more easily convinced of high quality. One
can endogenize search costs by having the entrant choose its location.
An interesting question is why sellers often locate near to each other,
despite increased competition; an example is a fruit and vegetables
market.
Another direction for further research is to allow the incumbent to
spy on an entrant to observe its quality. This information may, however,
be of value to the incumbent. The reason is that if the entrant is not
sure whether it has been spied upon, it cannot rely on the incumbent's
strategy to signal its type.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 2:
In any pooling equilibrium, condition (7) must hold (see section 3.3).
Also, a high-quality entrant must not be able to offer a more favorable
deal than the incumbent by charging a price that convinces consumers
of high quality, that is, qh - p2 c qe - pi for all p2 1 Qe - b(qe - p~).
Equivalently,
. ~ Qh - Qe (8)
pi -4e- 1-b ~
There exists a price pi ~ ce satisfying (8) if and only if b G bl.
(i) The entrant attracts consumers only if qe - pi C aqh -}- (1- a)Qe - p2.
If p~ ) ce, then firm 1 has no incentive to decrease its price if Qe - pl C
aqh~(1-a)Qe-p'2 forallpl E(ceipi). Equivalently, p'2 C ce-~a(qh-qc).
The latter condition must also hold if pi - ce. Since any price p2 C ch
signals low quality, p2 ~ ch. Combining these two constraints, it follows
that a 1 (ch - ce),(qh - Qe). There exists a pi ~ ce that satisfies (8)
if and only if b G bl. Since p2 G ce ~ a(qh - qe) c ce f 4h - Qt and
pi ~ cP, a sufficient condition for (7) is ce ~ qh - Qe C Qe - b(Qe - ce). The
latter condition is equivalent to b G b~. The equilibrium outcome can
be supported by beliefs p(pi, p2) C a for all p2 E(ch, qe - b(Qe - ce))-
(ii) It must be that pi - ce (see section 3.3). The incumbent cannot
attract consumers by a price increase only if qt-pi - aqh~(1-a)qe-p2,
so that p"2 - ce -~ a(qh - qr). Since p2 ~ ch, it follows that a~
(ch - ce)~(Qh - Qe)- Inequality (8) holds if and only if b G bl. As in
(i), b G bl implies (7). The equilibrium outcome can be supported by
beliefs tC(pi, p2) G a for all p2 E(ch, p2) U(p2, qe - b(Qe - ce)). ~
Lemma 1 (Necessary condition for separating equilibria~
QI - pl(Qh) - Qh - P2(Qh).
Proof: If Qe - pi(qh) ~ qh - p2(qh), then firm 1 can increase its price, a
contradiction. Therefore, suppose Qe - pi(9h) c Qh - pi(Qh)- If pi(Qe) ~
pi(qh), then there exists a price p2 ~ p2(qh) such that Qe - pi(qh) G
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qh-pz and p2 ~ p'2(Qe), that is, (pi(qh),p2) is weakly consistent with qh,
but not with qt. According to the refinement criterion, p.(pi(qh),pz) -
1. Therefore, firm 2 can increase its price and attract consumers, a
contradiction. Consequently, pi - pi (Qe) - pi (Qh). Since consumers
visit the entrant in case of high quality, a low-quality entrant must not
be able to mimic a high type, that is, qe - p2(qh) G S(qe - pi) must
hold. But then any price p2 ~ p'2(qh) satisfies Qe - p2 G b(qe - pi). By
assumption 3, a high-quality entrant has an incentive to increase its
price, a contradiction. 0
Lemma 2 (Necessary conditions for separating equilibria~
Suppose that consumers observe (pi(qh), p2(qh)). If they visit firm 1
then
(z~ pi - pi(Qe) - pi(9h), and
(zz~ pi - ce, P2(Qe) - ce and pa(Qn) - ce ~- Qh - Qe.
Proof: (i) Suppose that pi(Qe) ~ pi(qh). By lemma 1 and (1), p2(qh) -
pi(qh) -~ qh - qe ~ ch. There exists a price p2 C p2(qh) such that
(pi(qh), p2) is weakly consistent with qh, but not with Qe. Therefore,
p(pi(qh), p2) - 1 and firm 2 can attract consumers by decreasing its
price - a contradiction.
(ii) If pi ~ cei then in case of Q2 - Qei the entrant captures the market
at a price pz(Qe) just below pi. There exists a price p1 E(ce, p2(Qe)) such
that (pl, p2(qe)) is weakly consistent with Qe, but not with qh. Hence
tc(pl, p2(qe)) - 0, and firm 1 can increase its profits by undercutting
firm 2 after observing that qz - qe, a contradiction. Therefore, pi - ce.
Moreover, p2(Qe) - cei since otherwise firm 1 would have an incentive
to increase pi(Qe). From lemma 1 it follows that p'2(qh) - ce ~ 4h - Qe.
O
Lemma 3 (Necessary conditions for separating equilibria~
Suppose that consumers observe (pi(qh), p'z(qh)). If they visit firm 2
then
(á~ either pi (Qe) - ce and p2(Qt) - ce; or pi ( Qe) - ce ~ Qh - qe and
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Pz(qe) - ce -1- 4h - 4e, and
(ZZ~ pi(4h) - ce and p2(4h) - ce -}- qh - qe-
Proof: (In reverse order) (ii) Notice that pi(qh) - ct, otherwise firm 1
could attract consumers by decreasing its price. By lemma 1, p2(qh) -
ce f 4h - qt.
(i) First, suppose that p2(ql) ~ p2(qh). If qe - pi(ql) ~ qe - p2(Qe)
then, by the refinement criterion, firm 1 can increase its price. If
4e - pi(qe) C 4e - p2(qe), then firm 2 can increase its price. There-
fore, qe - pi(qe) - qe - p2(qe). From similar arguments it follows that
pi(qe) - ce and PZ(qe) - ce-
Second, suppose that p2(Qe) - p2(qh). Therefore, pi(qe) 1 pi(qh). If
4e - pi(qe) ~ qe - p2(qt) then the incumbent has an incentive to pre-
tend that he observed a low-quality entrant by selecting pi (qP) if the
entrant's actual quality is high. If qe - p~ (qe) c qe - Pz(qe), then firm 2
can increase its price. It follows that qt - pi(Qe) - Qe - pz(qe) (and
consumers visit the entrant). Accordingly pi(qe) - ce -F. qh - qe. 0
Proof of proposition 4:
In any pooling equilibrium, (7) and (8) must hold. Firm 1 should not
have an incentive to deviate with some price pl ) ce. Let p,(pl, p2) - 1
for such a deviation, so that it is sufl'icient to require Qe - pl G qh - p2
for all pl 1 ce. Equivalently, p2 C ce ~ qh - qe. Entry occurs only if
4e - pi C aQh -~ (1 - a)Qe - p2. Entry is deterred only if qe - pi ~
aqh ~(1 - a)Qe - p~. Also, if entry is deterred then pi - ce. The
equilibrium outcomes can be supported by beliefs p(pi, p2) similar to
those in the proof of proposition 2. ~
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The principal-agent literature studies optimal reward structures for an
agent who dislikes exerting effort (see Hart and Holmstrdm (1987) for
a survey). Typically in this literature, the principal is uncertain about
either the agent's productivity or the level of effort exerted by the agent.
The principal's problem then is to maximize profits by designing an
optimal "carrot," that is, a pecuniary incentive scheme that induces the
agent to work as hard as possible, given the informational constraints.
In this chapter, I explore a principal-agent relationship in which the
agent derives private benefits from exerting effort. Private benefits may
include job satisfaction (the agent enjoys working), the acquisition of
professional experience, and so on.l The principal can appeal to the
agent's private benefits by giving him a say in the job he has to do.
Among a number of candidate projects, one project that the agent
will have to implement has to be selected. The agent's preferences
among the projects are ex ante unknown, and he has to incur a private
1Some more examples are: a sense of accomplishment and achievement, career
concerns, and perks on the job.
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cost (e.g. effort or time) to find out his personal gains. The agent
will work harder on projects that yield him higher private benefits.
The principal can either impose a project, or delegate responsibility to
choose one to the agent. In particular, the principal can determine a
subset of the possible projects so that the agent has discretion to pick
a project in this choice set.2 When the principal has decided how much
discretion the agent gets, the agent decides to get informed or not about
his private benefits, and then recommends a project to the principal.
The agent is allowed to implement his proposal if it was included in his
choice set.3
Where will the principal draw the line around responsibility? By
imposing a project, the principal is certain that his preferred project
will be implemented. A consequence is, however, a lack of initiative by
the agent. Indeed, since it is unlikely that the project will yield signifi-
cant private benefits for the agent, he has no incentive to get informed.
The result is that the agent will not work very hard. Giving the agent
more discretion results in initiative: the agent will get informed and
recommend his preferred project. The agent's proposal may not be
the principal's preferred project, but the agent will work hard if he is
allowed to implement his recommendation.
So although the superior has formal authority to select a project,
it may be in his interest to implement one that generates interest from
his subordinate. Consequently, the agent may to some extent have real
authority (see also Tirole (1994)).
An important observation in the model is the following. To have an
ZIn the model, the principal can choose a more general mechanism; the optimal
mechanism corresponds ( roughly) to a choice set for the agent.
3The following quote illustrates a central question: "The issue [. . .] is where to
draw the line around responsibilities and [. ..] freedom. I agree that it's impor-
tant to delegate responsibility and empower people throughout the organization,
but you also have to communicate clearly what the boundaries are around their
jobs." ( N. Poole, Executive Vice President of L.L. Bean of Freeport, in Continental
Bank ( 1993), p. 50.)
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incentive to collect information, the agent may need a level of discre-
tion that is larger than the principal would give him if getting informed
would be costless. In this case the agent's proposal need not be optimal
ex post (from the principal's point of view), although the agent's choice
set is optimal ex ante. In a world in which a court could enforce con-
tracts that specify the agent's discretion, there would be no problem.
However, if one thinks of hierarchies in organizations, such contracts
seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Informally, the principal
only promises to accept any proposal in the agent's choice set.
Commitment problems may disappear if the principal can build
a reputation for not breaking promises.4 A question addressed in
this chapter is how the principal can credibly commit himself when
he cannot establish such a reputation. As was already noticed by
Schelling (1960), a solution may be to write a contract with a third
party. In my model, profit-sharing with a third party via a renegotiation-
proof contract can give the principal incentives not to abuse his author-
ity. Such a profit-sharing agreement can be interpreted as a financial
contract. For instance, an investor buys the right to receive a share of
the profits (dividends). Alternatively, the principal's superior (e.g. the
firm's CEO) implements an incentive scheme for the principal.
The principal and the third party may refrain from renegotiating
because there is an informational asymmetry.5 At the tíme of rene-
gotiation, only the principal knows the agent's proposal. The optimal
contract is such that the third party cannot infer the proposal at this
9Consider a repeated-game setting. If some ex post sub-optimal project is pro-
posed by the agent, the principal faces a tradeoff between (i) imposing a superior
project and decreasing the agent's future incentives to recommend projects, and
(ii) following up the recommendation and increasing future incentives to recom-
mend projects. See Tirole (1988, ch. 6), for a survey of the theory of repeated
interaction. On reputation, trust, and corporate culture, see Kreps (1990).
SSee also Dewatripont (1988), who studies a model in which an incumbent uses
a labor contract to deter entry. Such a contract may be renegotiation-proof, and
therefore imply a credible commitment, under an informational asymmetry between
the incumbent and his workers.
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stage. Hence, he is not sure whether there is an allocative gain when
renegotiating; the principal might be trying to realize a gain at the third
party's disadvantage. Therefore, he may refuse an offer to renegotiate.
In the literature on organization and management, it is well-known
that intrinsic rewards (e.g. job satisfaction) may be very important.s
For instance, if a researcher is fascinated by a problem, he will automat-
ically work hard, and it is then practically impossible to induce him to
work harder by relating his pay to, say, the number of papers he writes.
Actually, there is a debate going on in the management literature in
which performance-related pay is under heavy fire.7 Besides that pay-
ment schemes may be costly to implement, it is put forward that they
may demotivate people.s The intention of this chapter is not to par-
ticipate in this debate, but instead to complement the principal-agent
literature by investigating how a superior can motivate his subordinate
by appealing to his private benefits.
Aghion and Tirole (1994) study the endogenous separation of formal
authority (the right to choose a project) and real authority (the effective
choice of a project).9 A principal and an agent each incur a cost to
get informed about their (possibly unaligned) preferences over some
projects. The principal can give the agent real authority by not having
incentives to get informed himself, so that the agent becomes more
eager to get informed, while the principal's formal authority decreases.
sAs argued by Dessler (1986), "Few rewards are as powerful as the sense of
accomplishment and achievement that come from doing a job that one genuinely
wants to do [...]" (p. 254).
~See e.g. Kohn (1993), and the references to empirical evidence therein. One
of the basic objections is that "[...] workers are much more influenced by [...]
the intrinsic interest of their work than by crass material rewards" (The Economist
(1994), p. 69).
sA possible reason, supported by empirical evidence, is that monitoring (which
may be needed to implement a payment scheme) reduces effort because it is per-
ceived as an indication of distrust (Frey (1993)).
9Simon (1951) addressed why an agent may be willing to give a principal author-
ity (the right to select actions that affect the agent) over his behavior by entering
an employment relationship.
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An alternative way to motivate the agent to learn the projects' payoffs
is to "make him his own boss," that is, split up the firm. In my model,
the principal's concern is how much responsibility he should delegate to
the agent, instead of whether he should get informed himself, or split
up the firm. Also, in my model, empowering the agent alleviates two
moral hazard problems: it motivates the agent to get informed in order
to recommend a project, and to work hard.
Also (but less closely) related are Armstrong (1995) and Holm-
str5m (1984). Each of those papers considers a principal who can
delegate decision-making to an agent with expert information. Their
main result is that the agent gets more discretion when he has more
information or when his (expected) preferences are more aligned with
the principal's.
Athey et al. (1994) analyze the allocation of decisions among two
agents (e.g. a foreman and a manager), in an organization that faces
uncertainty (e.g. concerning demand conditions and defective output
of machines). In different states of nature, the agents differ in their
decision-making effectiveness (e.g. due to talent, or because the quality
of a decision decreases as an agent gets more responsibility). Initially, a
subset of the possible states has to be chosen. Next, a state is realized
by nature and a decision must be made. If the state is in that set, then
the foreman makes the decision; otherwise, the manager decides. Be-
sides that their paper focuses on quite different issues, a main difference
with my paper is that Athey et al. do not consider agency problems.
Jensen (1986) argued that debt repayments or positive dividends
may reduce managers' overuse of resources when a firm generates free
cash flow. Ravid and Sudit (1994) derive related findings when a man-
ager derives direct utility from his exercise of power, which is associated
with the quantity of resources at his disposal. In my model, since he
has formal authority a manager can always impose which project his
subordinate has to implement; the manager has power over his subor-
dinate's labor. Although the exercise of power itself does not yield any
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utility, the manager sometimes wants to abuse the power he has; profit-
sharing may prevent him from doing so. In contrast, Ravid and Sudit
consider (under conflicts of interest between managers and sharehold-
ers) financial contracts that resolve inefFiciencies due to power-seeking.
The result that commitment can be obtained by contracting with
a third party illustrates Williamson's (1985) idea that low-powered in-
centives may alleviate agency problems. Whereas Williamson argues
that high-powered incentives may lead to asset utilization losses and
accounting manipulations, my model gives an alternative motive for
using low-powered incentive schemes (which result from profit-sharing
with an investor), namely the issue of the superior's credibility.
The model is presented in the following section, as well as some
examples. Under the assumption that the principal can commit him-
self, section 4.3 derives the optimal level of discretion for the agent.
I show that time-inconsistency may, but need not, pose problems if
the principal cannot commit. Section 4.4 investigates how a contract
with a third party may solve the credibility problem. Section 4.5 con-
cludes. An appendix demonstrates why using pecuniary rewards may
have little effect.
4.2 The Organization
Consider a hierarchy (or organization) that consists of a principal called
P, and an agent called A. The hierarchy can implement one out of
n~ 2 projects. The principal's role is to either pick a project or
delegate the choice of a project to the agent. Once a project has been
selected, the agent executes (or implements) it.
The principal's benefits of project k, also be called profits, are de-
noted by IIk(e), where e 1 0 is the agent's effort in executing the
project. The effort of the agent may be observable, and even verifiable.
However, it will not be included in a contract (see below).
Assumption 1 IIk(e) (i~ is decreasircg in k, for all e; (ii~ is strictly
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increasing in e, for all k; and (iiiJ satisfies IIk(e) 1 0, for all k and
e~0.
By assumption 1, for a given effort level the principal prefers project 1.
Also, all the projects are profitable.
The agent derives benefits U(bk, e) ? 0 from project k if he exerts
effort e, where bk denotes his private benefits of project k. Private ben-
efits may represent intrinsic rewards such as job satisfaction, challenge,
and a sense of accomplishment and achievement, but one can also think
of perks on the job, the acquisition of professional experience, career
concerns, and so on.
Assumption 2 U(b, e) (i~ is strictly increasing in b, for all e; (ii~ is
strictly concave in e, for all b; and (iii) satisfies á2U(b, e)~(óbáe) 1 0.
By assumption 2(iii), private benefits and effort are complementary,
that is, the agent's optimal effort level is increasing in the level of his
private benefits.
Nature selects the agent's private benefits bl, ..., b~ according to a
distribution Pr(b; - b and b~ - b, dj ~ i) - a;, where ~; a; - 1 and
b) b~ 0. Thus there is one most-preferred project for the agent;
he is indifferent among the other projects. Suppose furthermore that
al 1 a~ for all j, that is, there is not too much divergence of P's
ranking of the projects and A's ex ante preferences.lo
The realization of A's private benefits can only be observed by A.
However, he has to incur a private cost F) 0(e.g. time and effort)
to do so. Whether A gets informed is unverifiable. An example is a
scientist, whose job satisfaction depends on the originality of his work.
When choosing among research topics, he can get informed by going
through recent literature to see which topic is the most promising one.ll
loThese assumptions facilitate the exposition and analysis; they are not crucial
for the insights.
llAlternatively, F inay be the cost of scanning the labor market for career op-
portunities: once the agent has incurred F, he immediately sees which project he
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To simplify the analysis, it will be assumed that the agent receives
a constant salary equal to his reservation wage, which is normalized to
zero. One can justify this assumption in different ways. Firstly, money
may be a bad motivator. For instance, the agent is infinitely risk averse
to income. Secondly, a fixed wage may be imposed. For example, the
hierarchy is part of a larger organization in which top management finds
it too costly to condition salaries on all possible contingencies that occur
at lower levels in the organization. Alternatively, fixed wages may be
due to labor union influence. A consequence of this assumption is that
the agent's effort level will not be included in a contract. As argued
in an appendix, abstracting from pecuniary incentive schemes does not
affect generality when the agent is relatively more responsive to private
benefits than to money.l2
P's delegation decision is described by a mechanism (xl, ..., xn),
where x; E [0,1] for all i- 1, . .., n. The mechanism has the following
interpretation. If A recommends some project k, then he is allowed
to implement this project with probability xk, and has to implement
project 1 with probability 1- xk.13 So
xk - Pr(project k is implemented ~ A proposed project k).
The mechanism (1, 0, ..., 0) corresponds to P imposing project 1,
which is his preferred project. Under the mechanism (1, ...,1), A has
complete responsibility; any project that he recommends will be imple-
mented.
Some simplifying notation is introduced. Let A's optimal effort
for a project that yields high private benefits be denoted by é-
prefers. The fact that F is independent of the number of projects simplifies the
analysis without loss of generality.
IZIf the agent responded to monetary incentives, the principal could increase the
agent's incentives (i) to observe his private benefits and recommend a project, and
(ii) to exert effort (see also Aghion and Tirole (1994)).
130ne could define xk; - Pr(project i is implemented ~ A proposed k). A mech-
anism would then be a matrix (xl, ..., x„), where xk -(xkl, ..., 2k„)'. One can
check that the optimal mechanism would satisfy xk; - 0 for all i~ 1, k.
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arg maxe U(b, e). Similarly, denote his optimal effort for a bad project
by e- arg maxe U(b, e), and his optimal effort when he is uninformed
by eo - arg maxe{c~;U(b, e) -}- (1 - a;)U(b,e)}. Furthermore, denote
u- U(b, é), u- U(b, e), and uo -~;U(b, eo) ~(1 - a;)U(b, eo). Note
that by assumption 2, é~ eo 1 e and u 1 uo ~ u for all i.
To make the analysis interesting, I make the following assumption:
Assumption 3 alil ~(1 - al)u - uo c F C u- u;.
By assumption 3, the cost that the agent incurs when he learns
his private benefits is neither too low, nor too high. This assumption
has two important implications. Firstly, the agent does not care about
learning the value of bl if project 1 is imposed. Secondly, the agent will
always get informed if he has complete discretion.
The timing of the game is as follows:
t- 0: Nature selects A's private benefits, unobserved by P and A. P
chooses x; E [0,1~, i - 1, . . . , n, and communicates (xl, . . . , ~n)
to A.
t- 1: A decides whether to learn his private benefits (at cost F).
t- 2: A recommends a project k to P.
t- 3: Project k is selected with probability xk, and project 1 is selected
with probability 1- xk. Subsequently, A picks an effort level e to
execute the selected project.
Examples:
Consider benefit functions IIk(e) - p(e)Bk, and U(b, e) - p(e)b-e. The
values of the projects to P satisfy Bl 1... ~ Bn 1 0. Futhermore,
p(-) is increasing and concave, p(0) - 0 and lirr~y~ p(e) - 1. Three
interpretations are:
1. Production: The agent, who derives private benefits from work-
ing, takes care of production. The principal sells the product.
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Bk is the willingness to pay for a product of type k by a poten-
tial customer, given that it completely meets her wishes. In this
context p(e) denotes product quality. Accordingly, producing a
"perfect" product (p(e) - 1) is extremely costly for the agent,
and the client is willing to pay p(e)Bk for a product of quality
p(e).
2. Marketing: The agent performs marketing activities for an ex-
isting product, and derives private benefits from being active in
a particular market. Bk denotes the size of market k(in each
market, consumers are willing to pay a price 1 for the product).
Here p(e) is the fraction of the market that is reached as a result
of exerting marketing effort e.
3. Research é~ Developrnent: The agent is the researcher, and de-
rives private benefits from realizing a particular innovation. An
innovation of type k has patent value Bk. Given an effort level e,
an innovation k is realized with probability p(e).
4.3 Optimal Delegation
The equilibrium of the game is calculated by backward induction. Sup-
pose that project k is selected at t- 3. Two cases can be distinguished:
(i) A knows the value of bk. If bk - b then A exerts effort é. If bk - b
then A exerts effort e.
(ii) A does not know the value of bk. He exerts effort ek.
At t- 2, A recommends a project. If he did not observe his private
benefits, he will act in P's interest (because al ~ cx~ for all j) and
recommend project 1.14 If A knows his private benefits, then he recom-
14Equivalently, one could give A the possibility to make no recommendation, after
which P will optimally pick project 1.
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mends project k if and only if bk - b. Thus the incentive compatibil-
ity constraints are trivially satisfied. Given a mechanism (xl, ...,~n),
project k is accepted by P with probability ~k. If rejected, project 1 is
chosen.
Setting xl - 1(note that this does not impose any restrictions), A
will learn his private benefits at t- 1 if and only if
n




~ ak2k(TL -~) i F~ 7L~ - 1~.
k-1
n
max ~ ak[~kIIk(é) ~ (1 - ~k)R1(e)~ (2)xl ,...,xn
k-1
The principal's delegation problem at t- 0 can be split into two
problems. The first one is the optimal choice of (xl, ...,~n), denoted




s.t. ~ crkxk(u - u) ~ F-F uo -~,
k-1
0 C~; G 1, i- 1,...,n.
The second problem is the optimal choice of (~1i ..., xn), denoted






~ ak~k(2l - 2l) ~ F - }- ~~ - 2L,
k-1
0 C~; G 1, i- 1,...,n.
(3)
The implicit form of the solution of problem (2), as well as the
explicit solution of (3), are given in the following lemma. Roughly
speaking, the principal chooses a choice set for the agent; a proposal
will be implemented if and only if it is in this choice set.
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Lemma 1 (i~ Problem (2) is solved by a mechanism (xi, ..., xn) -
(1, . . . ,1, x'e, 0, . . . , 0), for some x'P E [0,1] and P E {2, . . . , n} such that
(1~ holds with equality if IIP(é) C II1(e).
(ii~ Problem (~i~ is solved by mechanism (xo, . . . , xn) - (1, 0, . . . , 0).
Proof: (i) In problem (2), P will select xi - 1, because IIl(é) ~ II1(e).
Moreover, since IIk(é) - II1(e) is decreasing in k, there exists an m E
{ 1, . . . , n} such that
II;(é) ~ II1(e) for all i- 1, ..., m,
and
II;(é)CIII(e)foralli-rn~-1,...,n.
Accordingly, P sets xi - 1 for all i- 1, ..., m. There are two possibil-
ities.
1. Inequality ( 1) is satisfied if x; - 0 for all i- m~ 1, ..., n.
2. Inequality ( 1) is not satisfied if x; - 0 for all i - m~ 1, . .., n. By
assumption 3, there exists an Q E {m f 1, . .., n} such that ( 1) holds
if x; - 1, i- m f 1, ..., P and x; - 0, i-~~ 1, ..., n. However,
since setting x; ~ 0 is ex post costly for P if A recommends a project
i E{m ~ 1,...,2}, P will set xé E (0,1] such that (1) is binding, that
is,
x, F f uo - u-~;-i a;(u - u)
(4)e - cre(u - u)
(ii) Follows directly from assumption 3. ~
The intuition behind lemma 1(i) is as follows. If A, informed about
his private benefits, recommends a project k with IIk(é) ~ II1(e), then
the proposal will be accepted by P. In this case P cares more about
A's effort than about his own preferences when comparing project k
with project 1. However, in order to give A an incentive to observe his
private benefits it may be necessary that P also accepts some "bad"
projects, that is, projects for which IIk(é) C II1(e). Of course, P will
accept as few bad projects as possible; when it is necessary to include
some of these projects in A's choice set, (1) will hold with equality.
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Lemma 1(ii) follows directly from assumption 3. Problem (3) is
trivially solved by giving A no discretion; the agent's choice set contains
only project l.
Proposition 1 (i~ If II'nf )~o then P chooses a mechanism
(1, ...,1, xé, 0, . .., 0), where P~ 2 is given in lemma 1(i~; A will learn
his private benefits and propose his preferred project.
~ii~ If jjinf ~~o then P selects mechanism (1, 0, ..., 0); P imposes his
preferred project and A will not learn his private benefits.
Proof: Giving the agent discretion is optimal if and only if Ilinf ,~o
that is, it is (expectedly) profitable. Therefore, applying lemma 1,
x;, i- 1, . .., n if IIinf ~~o
xo, i- 1,...,n otherwise. ~
The intuition behind proposition 1 is straightforward. Little discre-
tion in project choice results in a lack of initiative: A has no incentive
to learn his private benefits. P's most preferred project is implemented,
but A exerts an intermediate level of effort. Accordingly, authoritive
management demotivates the subordinate, but keeps the superior in
control. Much discretion in project choice results in initiative: A will
learn his private benefits and recommend his preferred project. The
selected project may be suboptimal for P, but A exerts a maximum
level of effort if he is allowed to implement his proposal. Thus, "hands-
off" management, that is, empowering the subordinate, triggers interest
and initiative, but decreases the superior's real authority. The optimal
mechanism balances these two effects.
In general, the principal will delegate responsibility to the agent
if high effort on some of the principal's less-preferred projects yields
higher profits than intermediate effort on his most-preferred project.
Accordingly, it becomes more likely that the agent will get discretion if
profits of various projects become more responsive to the level of effort
exerted by the agent.
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For an expositional purpose, one can define the agent's level of dis-
cretion as
Xrt - n (21 ~ . . . ~ 2n). (5)
Notice that X E [n, l]. A higher level of X corresponds to more respon-
sibility for the agent. In particular, X- n correponds to no discretion,
and X- 1 to total freedom.
What role does the agent's cost of getting informed play? If con-
straint (1) is not binding, which is typically the case when the cost of
getting informed (F) is low, then a small increase in F does not influ-
ence the optimal discretion level X'. Now suppose that F is relatively
high, so that (1) is binding. By inspection of (4) it follows that when
F slightly increases, X' will increase as well. However, this is only true
as long as IIinf does not drop below IIo. If this happens, that is, if there
is a large increase in F, then the agent loses all his responsibility. Let
the threshold level of F be denoted by F. Figure 1 demonstrates the






Figure 1: Optimal discretion and the cost of getting informed
Example:
Let IIk(e) - p(e)Bk, and U(b, e) - p(e)b - e, where Bl ~ ...~ Bn ) 0,
p(-) is increasing and concave, and satisfies p(0) - 0 and lime-,~ p(e) -
1. The number of projects is 3. Suppose that F- (al -{-a2)u-~a3u-uo
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and p(é)B3 C p(e)Bl. Calculations yield that (xl, x'2, x3) -(1,1, 0) and
~inf - alp(é)Bl ~- aZp(é)Bz ~ a3p(e)Bl. Furthermore, (xo, x2, x3) -
(1, 0, 0) and IIo - p(eo)Bl. If alp(é)Bi~azp(é)B2~asp(e)Bl ~ p(eo)Bl
then the optimal delegation scheme is (xi, x~, x3) -(1,1, 0). Accord-
ingly, the agent finds it worthwile to learn the private benefits of the
different projects, so that he can recommend his preferred project.
So far in the analysis, it was implicitly assumed that the principal
can commit himself to a mechanism. To see why this assumption is
sometimes needed, consider the example above and suppose P is not
able to commit himself. Let p(é)B2 C p(e)Bl, that is, if the agent
recommends project 2, the principal ex post prefers project 1. The
mechanism (xi, x2, x3) -(1, 1, 0), however, suggests that the agent's
recommendation for project 2 will be followed up by the principal; there
is a time-inconsistency problem. This observation naturally leads to the
following result, which is immediate after inspection of problem (2):
Proposition 2 If P cannot commit himself to follow up the A's rec-
ommendation, then only mechanisms (xi, ..., xn) that satisfy xk ~ 0 C~
IIk(é) 1 II1(e), for all k, are credible. Accordingly, credible commitment
may be necessary for delegation of responsibility.
It is obvious that lack of commitment may hurt the principal. In
the example above, the only credible mechanism if the principal cannot
commit himself is (xi, x2, x3) -(1, 0, 0). Accordingly, expected profits
are II1(eo) ~~inf Since more discretion increases the likelihood that
the agent can realize high private benefits, lack of commitment may
also hurt the agent.
As figure 1 shows, when the agent's cost of getting informed, F,
increases, the agent needs more discretion to have an incentive to take
initiative. Therefore commitment problems are in general more severe
when F is higher.
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4.4 Credible Commitment
In this section I assume that the principal cannot commit himself to
carry out a promise that is suboptimal ex post. If a court could enforce
the principal's mechanism, there would be no problem: given some
proposal k that satisfies xk ~ 0, the agent would never agree on ex
post setting xk - 0, that is, imposing a different project. Thus, the
principal may have a credibility problem if a court cannot prevent the
principal from abusing his authority, which is for instance the case if
project implementation is not verifiable by outsiders. If one thinks of
hierarchies in organizations, such contractual incompleteness seems to
be rather common. The purpose of this section is to find a solution to
this credibility problem if the principal has no possibility to build up a
reputation for not breaking promises.
Throughout this section it will be assumed that Hinf ) Ho~ and
that there exists at least one project k such that ~k ) 0 and IIk(é) C
II1(e). By proposition 2, there is a time-inconsistency problem: if A
recommends such a project k, P has an incentive to break his promise
by imposing project 1. To avoid unnecessary complications, the case
in which n- 3, k- 2, and (~i, ~2, ~3) -(1, 1, 0) (the example in
section 4.3), will be used as a case in point.
Suppose there is a third party, called S. The central question is
whether the optimal mechanism when commitment is possible (as de-
rived in the previous section) can be implemented if S and P can write
a contract on profit-sharing. The contract with S should give the prin-
cipal incentives to stick to the ex ante optimal mechanism after any
proposal by the agent.
The organization's profits are assumed to be contractable. S is
risk-neutral, and has a utility reservation level 0. He is not able to
verify which project is implemented (e.g. he cannot observe or verify
implementation), so that the choice of a project is noncontractable.
S's payoffs of the contract are denoted by D(II) for any possible
profit level II E V-{II;(e)}é-é',ë''n. S transfers upfront an amount
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p~ 0 to P; a contract consists of a profit-sharing rule and a fixed
transfer.ls P and S are protected by limited liability, so we have
O C D(II) C II-f- p, b' II E V. (6)
The contract signed by P and S can be interpreted as a security or
financial contract. In such a setting, S is an investor who purchases a
profit-sharing contract at price p(for instance, a share is issued at price
p and future dividend levels D(II) are predetermined). Alternatively,
S is P's superior (the firm's CEO); P's salary consists of a fixed part
or a fixed budget p, and a bonus or punishment II- D(II).
A's project recommendation is private information for P; think of a
situation in which S and people on the workfloor do not communicate
with each other. Consequently, there is only communication between
A and P, and between P and S. In the financial-contract setting, it is
natural to assume that investors only have contact with top manage-
ment. A possible explanation is that the costs for workers and investors
to get in touch with one another are too high (see also footnote 20). In
the incentive-scheme setting, the organization's CEO may simply have
no time to talk with people on the workfloor because of work overload.
Since P cares about net profits, the following incentive-compatibility
constraint must be satisfied in order to align his ex ante and ex post
incentives:
E2(é) - D(~2(é)) ? Ei(e) - D(E1(e)). (?)
Intuitively, if P could commit to burn profits, he could reverse the
inequality II1(e) ~ IIZ(é) by burning at least II1(e) - II2(é) if profits
II1(e) are realized. Signing ex ante a contract on profit-sharing, such
that (7) holds, has the same effect.
The contract with S will be required to be renegotiation-proof.
When A has recommended a project to P, S makes P a take-or-leave-it
1sFor instance, p is put on a bank account without access until profits are realized.
I assume that P has no resources to put into escrow.
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offer (the renegotiation stage).16 Thus S has full bargaining power at
this stage, but P can always insist on sticking to the initial, binding
contract.
The contract will be called renegotiation-proof if and only it is in-
terim efficient. A contract's payoffs are interim efficient (relative to
prior beliefs) if (i) they are incentive compatible, and (ii) there ex-
ists no other incentive compatible allocation that Pareto dominates it,
and yields S at least as much expected utility (see Maskin and Ti-
role (1992)).
S's renegotiation offer consists of a menu of new contract payoffs
{dz(II)}riEV , i - 1, . . . , n,
intended to replace the menu of payoffs {D(II)}, where i denotes P's
announcement of A's recommendation. By the Revelation Principle,
restricting S's offer to a direct-revelation mechanism is without loss of
generality.17
We have the following timing:
t- 0: P offers S a contract, observed by A.18 Nature selects A's private
benefits. P communicates (xi, ..., x;~) to A.
t- 1: A decides whether to learn his private benefits.
t- 2: A recommends a project to P.
t- 3: S proposes P to renegotiate.
t- 4: P accepts or rejects S's offer, and executes the corresponding
mechanism. A picks an effort level to implement the selected
1sAccordingly, signaling problems and multiplicity of equilibria are avoided be-
cause S's proposal does not reveal information. If P would make S an offer, S would
still not be able to observe A's recommendation; this asymmetry of information is
crucial for renegotiation-proofness.
17See for instance Myerson (1979).
laI assume that P has the bargaining power at this stage, because P attracts a
third party to solve his credibility problem.
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project. Profits are realized and the contract between P and S is
executed.
The following lemma identifies the set of renegotiation-proof allo-
cations.
Lemma 2 The contract óetween P and S ís renegotiation-proof if and
only if
D(~1(e)) - D(~z(é)) ? a2 3a3 (~i(e) - ~z(é)) - (8)
Proof: I will say that the principal has type k if project k was recom-
mended by the agent. The only relevant incentive-compatilibity con-
straint for the initial contract's payoffs ísls
~2(é) - D(~2(é)) ? ~1(e) - D(~1(e)). (9)
Since there is no allocative gain ex post and no incentive problem if the
agent recommends project 1, any proposal by S satisfies d1(II1(é)) -
D(II1(é)). Moreover, the proposal is incentive compatible if and only if
d - d2(II1(e)) - d3(II1(e)). (lU)
To see this, suppose that (10) does not hold. It is immediate that type
j- argmax;-Z,3d;(II1(e)) would mimic the other type.
It must be that (9) holds with strict inequality. If this were not the
case, then S could propose d- D(IIZ(é)) ~ II1(e) - IIZ(é) and gain in
expectation a2(II1(e) - IIZ(é)). Since II1(e) - d- II2(é) - D(IIZ(é)),
the offer would be accepted by P.
Suppose that type 2 accepts S's offer, that is, II1(e) - d~ IIZ(é) -
D(IIZ(é)). Since (9) holds with strict inequality, type 3 also accepts.
So necessarily, by proposing to renegotiate, S runs the risk that he
is dealing with type 3 instead of type 2. There does not exist an
incentive-compatible allocation such that S is strictly better off in
lsOther incentive-compatibility constraints can trivially be satisfied; see the proof
of proposition 3.
98 Chapter 4
expectation compared to the initial allocation if and only if for all
d c D(II2(é))~II1(e)-IIZ(é), we have that a1D(II1(é))~-a2D(IIZ(é))~
a3D(IIl(e)) 1 aldl(IIl(é))~aZd~a3d. The latter requirement ís equiv-
alent to (8). o
The idea of the proof of lemma 2 is to show the following. Suppose S
proposes to renegotiate. If P accepts S's offer when A has recommended
project 2, which is the only case in which there are mutual gains from
renegotiation for P and S, then necessarily P also accepts S's offer
when A has recommended project 3. The reason is that S cannot make
an offer such that P accepts only if project 2 was recommended.20 This
means that renegotiating is risky for S, in the sense that the fact that
P accepts his offer is not informative about whether the "size of the
pie" can be increased. Renegotation-proofness amounts to designing
the initial contract such that the expected loss of renegotiation for 5
outweighs the expected gain; S is not willing to accept the gamble.
One can interpret (8) directly by rewriting it as
a3~T(Rz(é)) - T(R1(e))~ ~ a2[IIi(e) - II2(é)~~ (11)
where T(II) - II-D(II) for all II E V, that is, T(.) denotes profits after
paying S. Inequality (11) says that the "expected bribe" to be offered
to the principal by S(in order to make him accept the renegotiation
offer) exceeds the expected gains that can be divided after the agent's
proposal to implement project 2 is not followed up.
20Direct communication between A and S would not help the latter. If A could
commit himself not to talk with S, he would certainly do so, because renegotiation
is bad for A. However, suppose A cannot commit, and S tries to verify P's an-
nouncement by asking A about his preferred project. The only way for S to make
A reveal his preferences is to promise to implement A's preferred project with pos-
itive probability (instead of adopting mechanism (1, 0, 0)). But then, once A has
revealed, S no longer has an incentive to carry out such a randomization. Indeed,
assuming that S is able to commit himself to carry out suboptimal promises, and
not able to commit not to renegotiate, would at least be very questionable.
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Observation of inequality (8) sheds some light on the role of the prior
distribution of A's private benefits. The lower bound for D(IIl(e)) -
D(IIZ(é)), as follows from renegotiation-proofness, is increasing in aZ.
Thus the interim-efficiency constraint becomes more stringent if the
probability that there are gains from renegotiating increases. Addi-
tionally, the interim-efficiency constraint becomes less stringent if a3
increases, that is, the expected cost of renegotiation becomes larger.
Now the problem of optimal contract design can be formulated.
In the following program, which is P's problem at time t- 0, the
last three constraints are incentive-compatibility constraints. Notice
that (8) implies that if A proposes project 2, P has no incentive to
impose project 1. Therefore, incentive-compatibility constraint (7) is
automatically satisfied.
a
max p~ ~ ak[IIk(é) - D(nk(é))] ~ a3[II1(e) - D(D1(e))]P~ D(II), b' IIE V k-1
s.t. a1D(Di(é)) ~ a2D(D2(é)) ~ asD(Di(e)) ~ p,
D(Di(e)) - D(Dz(é)) ~ a ~3a (Di(e) - Da(e)) ~
OGD(II)cII-~p, dIIEV,
p~0,
ill(é) - D(Il~(é)) ? rI - D(rI), rI - li2(e), IT3(e),
Dz(é) - D(Da(é)) ? Ds(e) - D(D3(e)),
II1(e) - D(IIi(e)) ? II- D(II), II- II2(e), II3(é).
Does there exist a solution to this problem such that S's participa-
tion constraint (the first constraint in the program) is binding? Since
any returns for S come from realized profits, P's expected profits are
equal to Ilinf if and only if S's expected net returns are zero.
Proposition 3 There exists a renegotiation-proof contract such that
(xi, ~2, ~3) -(1, 1, 0) is implemented, and P's expected payoffs are equal
to jjinf
Proof: Let D'(IIi(é)) - II1(é), D'(IIZ(é)) - 0, and D'(II1(e)) -
((a2 -~ a3)~a3)[II1(e) - II2(é)]. Choose p' such that S's participation
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constraint is binding, i.e., p` - alIIl(é) ~- (a2 ~ a3)(H1(e) - IIZ(é)). It
is straightforward to check that the renegotiation-proofness constraint
as given in lemma 2, and the other constraints of the program, are
satisfied. P's profits equal alII1(é) ~ a2II2(é) ~- a3II1(e) - ninf Fi-
nally, D'(II) - II-~p` for II E{II2(e), II3(é), II3(e)} satisfies the limited
liability constraints and also the remaining incentive compatibility con-
straints. O
By proposition 3, P can credibly commit himself to the optimal
mechanism that induces A to get informed. A renegotiation-proof con-
tract with a third party convinces the agent that he can trust his su-
perior's promise. Moreover, since the expected return stream of the
contract is equal to its price, the principal is not worse off compared to
the case in which commitment was assumed to be possible, that is, his
credibility problem can be solved costlessly.
In inequality (11) one can observe that the principal's net profit
function T(II), is non-monotonic. Therefore, one has to assume that
the principal has no possibility to "throw away" profits III (e) - IIZ(é).
A justification is that wasting money may be easily detected and pun-
ished. However, when profit-wasting is difficult to discern, the non-
monotonicity of T(II) may be less appealing. In a perhaps more realis-
tic setting, one can imagine that the principal cares about the agent's
job satisfaction (the "smile on the agent's face"). Congruence may
then be achieved by a low-powered incentive scheme, such as T(II) - c
for all II. Accordingly, low-powered incentives may be preferred over
high-powered incentives in order to align incentives in firms.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I investigate a principal-agent relationship in which the
principal gives the agent an incentive to exert effort by considering
the latter's private benefits (e.g. job satisfaction). The principal can
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do so by giving the agent responsibility to select a project among a
predetermined number of projects. If the agent has enough discretion,
he finds it worthwile to learn his private benefits of the possible projects,
and recommend his preferred one. Delegation of responsibility may
benefit the principal because the agent will work hard if he is allowed
to implement his preferred project.
The principal can solve commitment problems, if any, to follow up
the agent's recommendation by attracting a third party, such as an
outside investor. Profit-sharing with this party allows the principal,
who cares about net profits, to align his incentives before and after
the agent's project proposal. The contract can be designed such that
its price is equal to the expected return stream, so that commitment
problems can be costlessly solved.
The principal-agent model presented in this chapter is quite simple,
and can be used as a building block for models to investigate various
issues. For instance, in De Bijl (1995) the model is applied to study the
strategic nature of organizational structure in an oligopolistic market.
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Appendix
This appendix developes intuition for the assumption that the agent
may hardly respond to pecuniary incentives. For the sake of argument,
suppose there is only one possible project (say project 1), and the
agent derives utility w if he receives a wage w~ 0. The cost of getting
informed is so high that the agent has no incentive to learn his private
benefits.
With a salary equal to his reservation wage, the agent's optimal
effort level is eo, resulting in private benefits uo and profits II1(eo) (for
notation see section 2). If profit or effort level is contractable, the
agent can be induced to exert effort e 1 eo by compensating him with
a payment scheme
w(~) - uo -[a1U(b, e) ~(1 - al)U(b, e)], if II- II,(e),
0, otherwise.
Therefore, the principal's problem is to choose an effort level e for
the agent that maximizes
II1(e) - [uo - (alU(b, e) ~ (1 - al)U(b, e))].
Assuming an interior solution, the effort level that is optimal from
the principal's point of view, say ê, satisfies the first-order condition
óIIl(ê) - -alóU(b,ê) - (1 - ai)aU(b~e), (12)áe - áe áe
and can be implemented with a salary w(II) - uo - a1U(b, ê) -(1 -
al)U(b,ê) if II- II1(ê) and w(II) - 0 otherwise.
Suppose that the principal pays a salary equal to the agent's reser-
vation wage. If al is small, the agent's effort level will be low, that is, eo
will be relatively close to e. Moreover, if II1(e) is relatively flat around
eo, then the principal can offer the agent only limited compensation
for exerting more effort than eo. To see this, observe the first-order
condition (12). If óIIl(ê)~óe tends to 0, we obtain the first-order con-
dition that determines the agent's optimal effort level when he cares
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only about his private benefits, eo. Thus, giving the agent a salary on
top of his reservation wage hardly increases profits at the optimum.
Moreover, ê will only slightly exceed eo.
Now suppose that private benefits are very important to the agent,
so that a high private-benefits project induces relatively high effort
compared to eo, e and ê. In particular, if the agent would know that
bl - b, then resulting profits would satisfy
~1(e) ~ ~1(e) - w(~i(e)).
Typically, there may exist a range of projects l, ..., m such that IIi(é) ~
II1(e`) - w(II1(ê)), for all i- 1, ..., m, and inducing a higher effort
level than é by a wage scheme is hindered by limited means (the profit
function is even flatter around é). Accordingly, appealing to the agent's
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Top managers of firms do not only make "strategic" decisions, for in-
stance on product choice and price setting, but also decide on organiza-
tional issues like delegating responsibility to subordinates. Think, for
instance, of a product manager who is responsible for his firm's market
strategy, and has to decide which product variety to sell in some market
segment. A layer below him in the hierarchy, there is a middle manager,
such as the head of the development and production department.
In this chapter, I study the strategic impact of organizational struc-
ture, or more specific, of giving the middle manager a say in the choice
of a product variety that his department has to develop and produce.l
1 The Economist (1995) discusses empirical support for the claim that firms "[. ..]
which give middle managers a say in forming strategy perform better" and pro-
vides examples of delegation of responsibility. For instance, "Honda developed its
Civic car by giving a group of young middle managers broad guidelines (make it
youth-friendly and fuel-efficient) and letting them get on with the job." Also, "Mo-
torola's middle managers have had a say in designing its Iridium satellite project"
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A duopoly model of competing hierarchies demonstrates some possible
linkages between internal organization and market strategy.
Consider, as an example of the model, an oligopolistic market for
a soft drink, say cola, in which consumers have different preferences
for different varieties (such as regular cola, cherry cola, diet cola, and
caffeine-free cola). For each variety, consumers are willing to pay more
for higher quality. Suppose price competition is fierce: for given qual-
ities, a firm gains more if it positions its brand in a market niche (by
differentiating its product), than if it sells a drink aimed at an "average"
taste.2
Each firm consists of a product manager and his subordinate (or
middle manager), who represents the development and production de-
partment.3 The product manager has to choose which cola type to sell,
and at which price. The subordinate performs development and pro-
duction activities; quality is determined by his effort level. Whereas a
product manager cares about sales or profits, his subordinate is moti-
vated by private benefits. For instance, because of career concerns he
finds the acquisition of professional experience important, or alterna-
tively, he is challenged by technical innovativeness of products. Devel-
oping and producing a certain type of cola requires specific technical
knowledge (e.g. about chemicals and production processes), so that his
enthusiasm for different types of colas will vary.
A product manager does not know how his subordinate's prefer-
ences. The subordinate, however, has to invest costly time and effort
to find out his potential personal gains. A manager can either impose
which variety has to be produced (e.g. impose diet cola), or give his
(p. 70). Obviously, there may be a combination of reasons (e.g. incentives, infor-
mation, flexibility, work overload) for decentralizing strategic decisions.
ZCasual empirical evidence suggests that product differentiation is an important
source of profits in soft drink markets. Coca-Cola, for instance, has recently intro-
duced, among other varieties, ginseng-based and milk-based drinks in Japan, and
sugar-free colorless cola in America (The Economist (1993)).
30bviously, there may also be conflicts of interest between the middle manager
and the engineers of his department, raising a host of additional interesting issues.
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subordinate a say in the choice of variety (e.g. let him choose between
diet cola and caffeine-free cola, but not regular and cherry cola). If
the subordinate has sufl'icient discretion, he will want to acquire infor-
mation about the possible drink types, so that he can recommend his
preferred variety. If he is allowed to develop and produce his preferred
variety, he will exert maximal effort, and high quality will result.
For expositional purposes, I assume that the possible product lo-
cations vary (on an interval) from the market niche that the manager
would like to aim at, to a location representing consumers' average
taste. This assumption, will create a tension between the superior's
wishes (who experiences that price competition is fierce) and his subor-
dinate's wishes (who does not directly experience market competition).
In the model, a product manager faces the following tradeoff. If he
gives his subordinate more discretion, it becomes more likely that he
will get informed in order to make a proposal which, if accepted, will
lead to a high quality drink (a premium brand). The subordinate's pro-
posal, however, may imply little differentiation from other cola varieties,
and therefore result in fierce price competition. Less discretion enables
the manager better to position a drink in a market niche, so that local
monopoly profits can be enjoyed. The subordinate's incentives to take
initiative and exert effort, however, decrease, so that expected quality
will be lower.
In the model, the possible cola varieties correspond to locations
on an interval representing consumers' different tastes. It is therefore
convenient to make a comparison with the Hotelling model. In the
standard Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs, the de-
mand effect (firms want to be "where the demand is" ), outweighs the
strategic effect (firms want to be local monopolists) (see D'Aspremont
et al. (1979)). Consequently, firms differentiate their products as much
as possible in order to soften price competition. In my model, an incen-
tive effect also counteracts the strategic effect. If this effect becomes
stronger, managers will delegate more responsibility to their subordi-
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nates, and products will be less differentiated. In particular, a higher
impact of quality on profits favors more discretion in equilibrium.
Delegation decisions relate to organizational structure and market
strategy. Thus, studying the strategic nature of delegation yields sev-
eral implications in the field of management strategy.4 The optimal
level of discretion, as a function of the discretion level in the rival
firm, may be increasing ("strategic complements" ) as well as decreasing
("strategic substitutes" ), depending on the revenue functions. Delega-
tion of responsibility makes a firm "tough" in the sense that it reduces
the profits of the rival firm; more discretion results in a higher probabil-
ity of high quality, and a less horizontally differentiated product. More-
over, from the viewpoint of an incumbent facing a potential entrant, an
optimal entry accomodation strategy is to give the subordinate little
discretion (in the terminology of the taxonomy of management strate-
gies of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984): adopt a"puppy dog" strategy).
The reason is that delegating less responsibility results in a more differ-
entiated product, which softens price competition if entry occurs. By
the same intuition, the optimal entry deterrence strategy is to empower
the agent (to become a"top dog").
An interesting observation is that in the model, an authoritarian
leadership style (the subordinate gets little discretion) corresponds to
a soft stance on the product market, and "hands-off" management cor-
responds to an aggressive market stance. Without claiming generality,
this result points out that leadership styles may be perceived quite
differently inside and outside a firm.
In typical models of industrial organization, firms are viewed as
"black boxes." Although this approach has led to important insights,
it has major shortcomings. As Spulber (1992) argues: "For economic
models to have practical value to managers, they need to address the
choice of both competitive actions and organizational design" (p. 536,
4Management strategy studies how a manager optimally designs the firm's or-
ganization and market strategy, taking any public constraints into account (see
Spulber (1994)).
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emphasis in original). By combining organization theory and industrial
organization, this chapter makes a preliminary attempt at shortening
the gap between economic theory and management strategy.
The main literature on competition and organizational incentives
studies situations in which managers play a market game on behalf of
owners (see for instance Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987),
Sklivas (1987), and Katz (1991)). The question in that literature is
whether contracts between owners and managers can serve as precom-
mitments. Having an agent play the market game may, for instance,
result in lower quantities or higher prices. The fundamental difference
with that literatures is that I abstract from agency problems between
owners and managers, and instead look at delegation inside firms. Del-
egation of responsibility serves an organizational purpose - namely, it
motivates a subordinate to take initiative and exert effort (although
commitment may play a role). Also, an important difference is that
in my model, the principals compete on the market, by selling goods
produced by their agents.
In Horn et al. (1994), contracts between owners and managers give
a manager incentives to reduce the cost of production. A common fea-
ture of their paper and mine is that organizational design takes place
before market decisions are taken. Their analysis suggests a negative
relation between incentives to reduce costs and the competitiveness of
product market interaction. In my model, which focuses on quite dif-
ferent issues, stronger incentives (more responsibility for a subordinate)
result in more severe price competition.
The organizational model is based on De Bijl (1995). In that paper,
which in turn was inspired by Aghion and Tirole (1994), I investigate
a principal-agent relationship in which the principal appeals to the
agent's private benefits from exerting effort, such as job satisfaction,
by giving him a say in the selection of the project the agent has to
implement. Although the principal has the formal authority to select a
project, it is in his interest to pick one that generates interest from the
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agent. Thus, although the superior has formal authority (the decision
right), the subordinate may to some extent have real authority (see also
Tirole (1994)).
The model is presented in the next section. The analysis and a
discussion of its implications is in section 5.3. Finally, section 5.4 con-
cludes.
5.2 The Model
The model consists of three building blocks: a Hotelling-type product
market, the organization of a firm, and competition between vertical
structures. These will be taken up in turn.
5.,2.1 Product Market Co~npetition
There are two firms, called 1 and 2. Firm 1 can choose a horizontal
product specification (or product location) ~1 E[-1, 0], and firm 2 a
product specification ~2 E[0,1].5 The vertical product quality of firm i
is denoted by r;.
Consumers are uniformly distributed along the interval [-1,1]. The
willingness to pay of a consumer "located" at z for firm i's product is
decreasing in the distance between z and ~;, and increasing in r;. A
consumer has an inelastic demand for one unit; she purchases the good
that gives her the highest net surplus.
Once product characteristics are fixed (see below), the firms com-
pete on the product market by simultaneously setting prices. Marginal
costs are equal and normalized to zero. Before the price competition
stage, the firms observe each others' product characteristics. To keep
the analysis tractable, price competition is not modeled explicitly. I
will assume that given product locations xl and x2, and qualities rl
SThis assumption rules out coordination problems among firms, in order to focus
the analysis on more crucial issues.
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and r2, there exists a unique equilibrium in the price subgame. Also,
qualities are sufficiently high so that the market is always covered.
Given the unique equilibrium outcome in the price subgame, firm i's
revenue (or profit) function is denoted by R;(xl, x2i rl, r2) ~ 0, which
is twice continuously differentiable in xl and x2 (i - 1, 2).
Assumption 1 (Revenue functions~
(i) R;(xl, x2; rl, rz) is strictly increasing in r;, and strictly decreasing
in r„ for all xl, x2i i- 1, 2.
(ii) R;(xl, x2; rl, r2) is strictly decreasing in xl, and strictly increasing
in x2i for all rl, r2, i- 1, 2.
The interpretation of assumption 1 is direct. A firm's profit level
is increasing in its own vertical product quality, and decreasing in its
rival's quality. Furthermore, given quality levels, the firms would like to
differentiate as much as possible to soften price competition. So implic-
itly, on the interval (-1,1~ the strategic effect (firms want to be local
monopolists) dominates the demand effect (firms want to be "where
the demand is" ).s Thus, the model applies to markets in which it is
profitable for firms to position brands in market niches. Moreover, the
assumption will allow for easy comparison with the maximum differenti-
ation result of the Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs.
5.,2.~ Organization of a Firnc
The way a firm is organized is adapted from De Bijl (1995). Firm i
consists of a principal P; (the manager) and an agent A; ( the man-
ager's subordinate), i- 1, 2. The role of a principal in a firm is either
sCf. the Hotelling location model with quadratic transportation costs, some
finite reservation value for consumers, and possibly different vertical product qual-
ities. The willingness to pay of a consumer located at z for good i in that model
is r; - p; - d(z - x;)Z, where p; is the price of the good, and d a measure of the
transportation cost. For rl - rzi product locations in equilibrium are xi --1 and
xZ - 1(see D'Aspremont et al. (1979)).
114 Chapter 5
to impose a horizontal product specification or to delegate the product
location to his agent. Given product location, the subordinate takes
care of development and production, and vertical product quality is de-
termined by his effort level. Once location and quality are determined,
the manager chooses a price in order to maximize expected profits.
An agent is motivated to exert effort by private benefits, which
are related to horizontal product characteristics. Private benefits may
include job satisfaction, a sense of achievement and accomplishment,
perks on the job, the acquisition of professional experience, career con-
cerns, and so on. For simplicity, the agent does not respond to pecu-
niary incentives. For instance, the agent is infinitely risk averse with
respect to income. Accordingly, each agent receives a constant salary
equal to his reservation wage, which is normalized to zero.7
A1's private benefits are determined by Nature as follows. Exactly
one point in [-1,0] yields the agent benefits b; all the other product
locations yield b G b (where b~ 0). The location of the high private-
benefit point is uniformly distributed on [-1, 0].8 The private benefits
of A2 are determined in a similar fashion on the interval [0,1], and are
independent of A1's private benefits. Let
0-b-b.
If A; is not allowed to produce the high private-benefits good then
he will exert low effort, which results in low vertical quality r; -~~ 0.
Conversely, producing a good which yield high private benefits results
in high product quality r; - h) 2.9 Note that by abstracting from
~In De Bijl (1995) I show that abstracting from payments does not harm gener-
ality if an agent is relatively more responsive to private benefits than to money.
BThe discontinuity in the distribution simplifies the exposition; it is not crucial
for the insights.
90ne can explicitly model an agent's behavior. Suppose an agent has a utility
function U(b, e), where 6 denote private benefits and e his effort level. Assume
U(b, e) is increasing in 6 for all e, strictly concave in e for all 6, and satisfies
82U(b, e)~(868e) ~ 0. It follows that the agent's optimal effort level e" (b) is in-
creasing in 6.
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pecuniary incentives, punishments based on low effort are ruled out.
The realization of A;'s private benefits can only be observed by A;,
but he has to incur a private cost F 1 0(for instance, time and effort)
to do so. The principal cannot verify whether his agent gets informed.
Pl's delegation decision is expressed by a function pl :[-l, 0] -~
[0,1], such that if A1 recommends product location ~1i he is allowed
to produce the good located at xl with probability pl(xl), but has to
produce the good at -1 with probability 1- pl(xl). Similarly, P2's
delegation scheme is described by a function p2 :[0,1] ~[0,1] (A2 has
to produce good 1 with probability 1- p2(x2) given proposal x2). So
p;(~;) - Pr(A; is allowed to produce good x; ~ A; proposed x;).
Whether an agent will learn his private benefits depends on the
discretion he has. A1 gets informed if and only if'o
0
J 1~'(xl)b
~(1 - p~(~1))b]d~, - F~ b,
or equivalently,
0
J-1 p'(~')d~l ~ 0' (1)
One can write down a similar inequality for A2.
To make the analysis interesting, the following assumption is made:
Assumption 2 F G 0, implying that if an agent has complete respon-
sibility concerning product location (p;(~;) - 1 for all x;) then he will
get informed.
An uninformed agent is indifferent between the possible locations.
For simplicity, he will then propose the principal's preferred location.
I assume that a principal can commit himself to a delegation scheme;
the focus is on delegation as a means to motivate a subordinate.11 A
loTo be precise, 6 and 6 represent the private benefits obtained by the agent given
his optimal effort level; e.g., using notation introduced in footnote 9, 6 represents
U(6, e'(b)).
11It will be shown that p;(x;) E{0, 1} for all x;, so that there is no need to assume
that principals can commit themselves to carry out randomizations.
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justification is that a manager cares about his reputation to keep a
promise. Since selling a high-quality good located at ~; may yield
higher profits than selling a more differentiated low-quality good for all
~; that satisfy p;(~;) ~ 0, delegation schemes may be optimal ex post;
the assumption is not crucial. This is typically the case if high quality
has a relatively large impact on revenues, compared to differentiation.
5.,2.~i Competing Organizational Structures
The principals compete with each other; they face each other on the
product market. There is no interaction between the agents, and they
cannot communicate with each other. The course of events is as follows:
t- 0: Nature selects the agents' private benefits, unobserved at this
stage.
t- 1: The principals simultaneously choose delegation schemes, unob-
servable outside each firm. Each principal communicates the del-
egation scheme to his agent, who then decides whether to learn
his private benefits. The latter decision is private information for
an agent. The agents then simultaneously recommend product
locations to their principals. Product locations are simultane-
ously selected according to the delegation schemes. An agent's
proposal and the selected location are unobservable outside each
firm at this stage.
t- 2: Each agent picks a production effort level, resulting in certain
vertical product qualities.
t- 3: Product locations and qualities are observed. The principals si-
multaneously set prices and the goods are sold on the market.
It is important to notice that once production has taken place, del-
egation schemes no longer matter; only product locations and qualities
influence the prices that are charged in the market.
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In the analysis that follows, subgame perfect equilibria in pure
strategies are derived. Since the price stage is not modeled explicitly,
essentially the principals compete by simultaneously selecting delega-
tion schemes. The analysis focuses on symmetric equilibria.
5.3 Analysis
5.3.1 Equilibria
The first proposition allows us to represent delegation schemes by well-
defined "discretion levels." In particular, in any equilibrium p2 (x;) - 1
for all x; in some interval containing firm i's maximally differentiated
product location, and p; (x;) - 0 otherwise.12 A discretion level for
firm i's agent, denoted by X„ is accordingly defined as the length of
the interval on which p;(xi) - 1. A higher level of X; corresponds to
more responsibility for agent A;. In particular, if X; - 0 then firm i's
manager imposes his agent to produce the maximally differentiated
product. If X; - 1, agent A; has full responsibility.
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium, there exist discretion levels X; E
[0,1], i- 1, 2, sach that A1 's recommendation xl is followed up if and
only if xl G-1 ~ Xi, and A2's recommendation x2 is followed up if
and only if x2 1 1- X2 .
Proof: See the appendix.
Intuitively, given the level of responsibility the rival firm's agent
has, each principal faces the following tradeoff. Giving his agent lit-
tle discretion results in a lack of initiative: the agent has no incentive
to learn his private benefits and make a recommendation. The maxi-
mally differentiated product will be produced, but quality will be low.
12A similar result is obtained in De Bijl (1995), with a discrete number of projects
and in the absence of a rival firm.
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Much discretion results in initiative: the agent will get informed and
recommend his preferred product location. The product will be less
differentiated, but quality will be high if the proposal is followed up.
Using (1), a direct consequence of proposition 1 is that A; gets
informed if and only if he has enough discretion.
Corollary 1 Agent A; gets informed if and ondy if X; ~ ó.
Some additional notation is introduced. Let p; :[0, 1] x[0,1] --~ R
denote P;'s expected revenue as a function of (Xl, XZ), given that both
agents get informed, i- 1, 2. Accordingly,
ltx, i
Pt(Xi,Xs) - ~i `J~-x~R~(xi, x2;
h, h)dx2 ~(1 - Xs)R;(~i~ 1; h,e)~ dxl
~
~ (1 - Xl) ~f R;(-1, x2i e, h)dx2 ~ (1 - X2)R;(-1,1; ~, ~)~ .
` i-x2
Firm i's expected profits, a function ~; :[0,1] x[0,1] -~ R, can now
be defined as follows.
p;(Xl, XZ) if Xl ? ó and X2 ~ ó,
p;(Xl, 0) if Xl ~ ó and X2 G ó,
~t(Xi~Xa) - -
p;(O, X2 ) if Xl G ó and X2 ~ ó,
p;(0, 0) otherwise.
With expected profits written as functions of levels of discretion,
we are ready to derive the main results. The following lemma will be
invoked repeatedly.
Lemma 1 (i) p;(X1iX2) is strictly decreasing in X„ for all X;, i, j-
1,2,i~j,
(ii~ p;(Xl, XZ) is strictly concave in X;, for all X„ i~ j, and
(iii~ 8p1(0, Xz)~8X1 1 0, for all X2i and áp2(Xl, 0)~óX2 ~ 0, for all
X, .
Proof: Differentiate p;(Xl, XZ) partially (twice to prove part (ii)) and
apply assumption 1. ~
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If we suppose that agents can costlessly observe their private ben-
efits, so that ~r;(Xl, X2) - p;(Xl, X2), i- 1, 2, then lemma 1 has
straightforward interpretations. According to part (i), a principal wants
the agent of the rival firm to have as little discretion as possible. Notice
the similarity with the assumption that a firm wants the rival firm to
locate as far away as possible. The effect of little discretion for the rival
firm's agent is, however, twofold: first, it softens price competition, and
second, it results in a low probability that the rival product will be of
high quality. Using terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole.(1984), dele-
gation of responsibility makes a firm "tough," in the sense of reducing
the rival firm's profits.
A straightforward implication of lemma 1(iii) is the following:
Corollary 2 If F- 0 then in any equilibrium each principal gives his
agent some responsibility, i.e., Xi ~ 0 and X2 1 0.
The next proposition gives necessary and sufficient conditions for
existence of an equilibrium in which both agents have full discretion.
Informally, proposition 2 states that both agents have full discretion in
an equilibrium when selling a high-quality product is more profitable
than selling a maximally differentiated product. Expected product lo-
cations are - 2 and 2. Since the agents have complete freedom to pick
product location, both products will be of high quality.
Proposition 2 There exists an eqvilibrinm in which each principal
gives his agent complete responsibility, i.e., Xi - X2 - 1, if and only if
~1 Ri(~~ ~a; h , h)d~a ? ~1 Ri(-1, ~2; ~, h )d~z. (2)
Proof: By lemma 1 we have pl(Xl, 1) is strictly concave in Xl, and
also cipl(Xl, l)~óXl ~x,-o ~ 0. Therefore, Xi - 1 is a best response
to X2 - 1 if and only if
ci~r~(Xi, l) ) ~
áXl x,-~
120 Chapter 5
equivalent to inequality (2). The result follows by symmetry. ~
Inequality ( 2) can be interpreted directly in terms of product char-
acteristics: given that the rival firm's agent has full discretion (which
implies high vertical product quality), a principal prefers to sell a high-
quality product located at the center ( that is, at 0) to a low-quality
product that is maximally differentiated.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that in addition to the demand effect,
there is an incentive effect that opposes the strategic effect. A man-
ager may want to empower his subordinate to select product location
because it will result in high product quality. Under condition (2), and
also under the conditions for equilibria with intermediate discretion
that are given in proposition 4 below, the incentive effect is sufficiently
strong so that we do no longer observe the maximal differentiation re-
sult of the Hotelling model.
By corollary 2, an equilibrium in which each principal imposes his
agent to produce the maximally differentiated product exists only if
F 1 0.
Proposition 3 Suppose that F~ 0. There exists an equilibriunz in
which each principal gives his agent no responsibility, i.e., Xi - X2 -
0, if and only if
ó 1
f-- R,(~l,1;h,2)d~l ~ ó R,(-l,1;e,2).
i
(3)
Proof: Let F~ 0. By lemma 1, pl(X1,0) is strictly concave in Xl,
and ápl(Xl, 0)~áXl ~X,-o 1 0. Therefore, Xi - 0 is a best response to
X2 - 0 if and only if ~rl(ó,0) G~rl(0,0), equivalent to inequality (3).
The result follows by symmetry. 0
A necessary condition for (3) is
R,(0,1; h,e) ~ R,(-1,1;Q,2). (4)
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To see this, notice that by lemma 1, inequality (3) (equivalent to
pl ( ó, 0) G pl (0, 0)) implies
Ri(-l,l;e,e) - Pi(0,0) ) max pl(X1i0) 1
X1E[o 1] -
0
P~(1,0) - f 1 R~(~~,1, h,~)d~~ ) R,(0,1; h,e).
Inequality (4) can be interpreted more directly than condition (3).
It says that a principal prefers to sell a low-quality, maximally differ-
entiated product to a high-quality, minimally differentiated product,
given that the rival firm produces a low-quality product that is maxi-
mally differentiated. Thus, high quality does not have a large impact
on profits, compared to product differentiation.
As proposition 3 demonstrates, the model is able to generate the
well-known maximum differentiation result of the Hotelling model with
quadratic transportation costs. This occurs when the incentive effect is
relatively weak, so that the strategic effect dominates both the demand
effect and the incentive effect.
There may also exist equilibria in which agents have an intermediate
level of discretion, enough to motivate them to get informed.
Proposition 4 There exists an equilibrium in which each principal
gives his agent limited responsibility, i.e., Xi - X2 E[ó, l), if and
only if there exists an Xi E[ó, 1) such that
i
Jl-x;
[Rl(-1 ~ Xi , xz, h~ h) - Ri(-1~ ~z~ ~, h)]~s
-(1 - Xi)[Ri(-1, 1;P,e) - Rl(-Xi ~- l, l; h,~)] ilXi E(ó~ l)~
(5)
G(1 - Xi )[Ri(-1, 1; ~, 2) - Rl(-Xi f 1, 1; h, ~)] if Xi - ó,
Fand pi(Xi,X~) ~ Pl(O~Xá) if Xi - ó.
Proof: ( i) Suppose that X2 E( ó,1). By lemma 1, pl (Xl, XZ ) is
strictly concave in Xl, and 8p1(Xl, X2 )~áXl ~X,-o~ 0. Therefore,
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equivalent to the equality in (5). The result follows by symmetry.
(ii) Suppose that Xi - ó. By lemma 1, Xi - ó is a best response to
X2 - ó if and only if
8p1(Xl' o) I G 0
axl X,-ó
(equivalent to the inequality in (5)) and ~rl(ó, ó) 1~rl(0, ó). The re-
sult follows by symmetry. ~
Condition (5) in proposition 4 states that Xi is a best response to
X2 - Xi . For X2 E( ó, l), we have a standard first-order condition.
For X2 - ó, the discontinuity of firm 1's profit function implies that
we must require that a marginal increase in A1's discretion (at Xi - ó)
does not increase firm 1's expected profits. This explains the inequality
in (5).
It is straightforward to derive existence conditions for asymmetric
equilibria, but this involves tedious notation without getting additional
insights. For simplicity, suppose that F- ~. Then there exists an
equilibrium in which one principal gives his agent responsibility and
the other does not, that is, either Xi - 1 and X2 - 0 or Xi - 0 and
X2 - 1, if and only if
pl(1,0) ? pl(0,0) and p2(1,1) G p2(1,0). (6)
These inequalities are standard Nash equilibrium conditions. The sec-
ond condition in (6) can also be written as pl(1,1) G pl(0,1). Since
pl(1,1) G pl(1,0) and pl(0,1) G pl(0,0), asymmetric equilibria may
indeed exist.
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5.~i.2 Strategic Complements or Substitates?
Applying notions developed by Bulow et al. (1985) and Fudenberg and
Tirole ( 1984), I will analyze whether an increase of the level of discretion
in a rival firm induces a manager to delegate more or less responsibility
to his subordinate. In the former case, reaction functions are upward
sloping, and discretion levels are said to be strategic complements. In
the latter case, reaction functions are downward sloping, and discretion
levels are strategic substitutes.l3
Given a unique equilibrium outcome of the price subgame, we can
focus on competition in delegation schemes, represented by the levels
of discretion Xl and X2. Firm i's best response (or reaction function)
to X~ (j ~ i) is defined as
X; (X~) - arg max ~;(X1iX2).
X,E[0,1]






Figure 1: Reaction functions and equilibria
laSee also Tirole (1988).
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Example: (see figure 1)
For an intermediate value of F, suppose that inequalities (3) and (5)
hold. By propositions 3 and 4, there are two symmetric equilibra,
namely (0, 0) and (X', X') for some X' E [ó, l). For an expositional
purpose, reaction functions are assumed to be increasing in the regions
where agents acquire information.
Suppose now that F- 0, so that we need not worry about discon-
tinuities in the reaction functions. Define for all Xl,
ai(Xi) - Ri(-1 f xi, l; h,2) - Ri(-1, 1;Q,2),
and for all Xl and Xz,
Q,(X~, Xz) - R,(-1 f X,,1 - Xzi h, h) - Rl(-1,1 - Xz; Q, h).
The value of al(Xl) is firm 1's gain from selling a high-quality prod-
uct located at -1 ~ Xl compared to selling a maximally differentiated,
low-quality product, given that firm 2 produces a low-quality product
located at the extreme. The value of Ql(Xl, Xz) represents a similar
gain given that firm 2 sells a high-quality product located at 1- Xz.
Proposition 5 Suppose F- 0.
(i~ If al(Xl ) 1~1(Xl, Xz) for allXl, Xzi levels of discretion are strate-
gic complements.
(ii) If ol(Xl) C,Ol(Xl, Xz) for all Xl, Xz, levels of discretion are strate-
gic substitutes.
Proof: DifFerentiate the first-order condition á~r;(X; (X~),X~)~áX; -
0 with respect to X~ (assuming an interior solution), and apply part (ii)
of lemma 1. It follows that the sign of dX; (X~)~dX~ (which determines
the slope of reaction function X; (X~)) is equal to the sign of
az~~(X~, Xz)
- Rl(-1 -} Xl, l; h, ~) - Rl(-1 ~ Xl, l- Xzi h, h) faxlax2
R,(-1,1-x2ie,h)-Rl(-l,l;e,e). (7)
Strategic Delegation 125
By rewriting (7) as á27f1(XI,XZ)~(aX1aXz) - al(Xl) - Nl(X1,X2),
the result follows. ~
The interpretation is direct. Suppose revenues of selling a high-qua-
lity product compared to maximally differentiating its product (which
would imply low quality) are higher if its rival sells a low-quality prod-
uct located at the extreme, than if its rival sells a high-quality product
(not necessarily located at the extreme). Then P~'s best response to
more discretion for agent A; is to give his agent A~ more discretion as
well. There is a similar interpretation of the sufFicient condition for
strategic substitutes.
5.~.~i Top Dog or P~cppy Dog?
Suppose that only one firm, say firm 1, is active in the market, and that
firm 2 is a potential entrant. One can distinguish two cases: the incum-
bent's manager wants to deter entry, or he wants to accomodate entry
(for instance because entry deterrence is not profitable). In each case,
the incumbent's manager has to formulate an appropriate strategy. In
case of accomodation for instance, he will want to choose a strategy
that softens post-entry price competition. In what follows, I assume
that firm 2's manager decides on entry (and if he enters, on how much
responsibility he will delegate) after having observed in which market
niche firm 1's product is located, and which quality firm 1 is selling.
The taxonomy of management strategies proposed by Fudenberg
and Tirole (1984) is used to characterize empowerment as a strategy to
accomodate or deter entry. Consider the level of discretion of an agent
as the strategic "investment" variable. A difference with Fudenberg
and Tirole's set-up is that in my model, the product characteristics
resulting from "investment" is observable, whereas in their analysis,
investment itself can be observed. This difference, however, does not
matter. The reason is that although delegation schemes are unobserv-
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able, each manager can observe the other's product location and quality
before competing on the product market. What is essential is that once
production has taken place, delegation schemes no longer matter; only
the product characteristics are then relevant.
In the product market subgame, prices are strategic complements
for given product characteristics.14 Moreover, by lemma 1(i), delega-
tion of responsibility makes a firm tough in the sense of reducing the
rival firm's profits.
Suppose that, for a fixed level of discretion for Az, the principal of
firm 1 delegates more responsibility to Al. The total effect, which is
Pl's incentive to delegate responsibility, is given by 8~r1(Xl, X2)~áXl.
This effect can be decomposed into two effects. First, a direct (or
profit maximizing) effect of giving A1 more responsibility is that for
given prices, firm 1's expected market share and product quality, and
therefore profits, increase. Second, there is a strategic effect, resulting
from firm 2's price reaction. If A1 gets more discretion, the probability
that firm 1's product will be located closer to the center increases.
Therefore, in expectations the products will be less differentiated, so
that price competition becomes more intense. In particular, it will
be expected firm 2 will react by lowering its price, thereby decreasing
firm 1's market share and profits.
Given that firm 1 wants to accomodate entry, the fact that del-
egation makes a firm tough implies that Pl should "underinvest" in
delegation.ls In the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole, Pl should
adopt a"puppy dog ploy," that is, it should be nice and small in order
to avoid to trigger an aggressive response from firm 2. The optimal
entry deterrence strategy for firm 1 is to "overinvest" in delegation,
that is, adopt a"top dog" strategy in order to be a tough rival. Such
a strategy will reduce profits of an entrant.
14See Tirole (1988), chapter 7, for a discussion.
1sMore precisely, Xl will be lower than the open-loop solution, which is defined as
the optimal value of Xl if P2 cannot observe the product characteristics of firm 1's
product before setting a price.
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5.~.,~ Di,~erent Perceptions of Management Style
The discussion above points at an interesting link between a manager's
stance inside a firm and his posture on the product market. In partic-
ular, in the model there are different perceptions of a single leadership
style.
Being nice to the rival firm corresponds to adopting a tougher pos-
ture vis-à-vis his subordinate, because there is underinvestment in del-
egation of responsibility. More general, the model demonstrates that
motivating the subordinate to take initiative by delegating responsi-
bility corresponds to a more aggressive stance on the product market.
Accordingly, a product manager may give his subordinates a lot of
freedom ("hands-off" management); not because he is such a nice and
friendly person, but because he is a tough competitor. Vice versa, an
authoritarian manager (i.e., a manager who gives his subordinate little
or no discretion) is a soft rival in the product market. Summarizing:
a tougher posture of a manager inside a firm (i.e., with regard to his
snbordinate~ corresponds to a softer posture on the product market (i.e.,
with regard to the rival firm), and vice versa.
Without claiming generality of this dichotomy, the result tells us
that it is important to recognize the strategic consequences of different
leadership styles. Moreover, statements like "Mr. X is a tough man-
ager" may have little meaning if one does not specify with regard to
whom.
5.4 Conclusion
In the model, a product manager makes the realization of high quality
more likely by giving his subordinate a say in the variety that has to
be developed and produced. Substantial discretion to select a variety
motivates him to get informed and make a proposal. In turn, following
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up the recommendation induces him to exert high effort, because he
will work harder on developing and producing goods that yield him
higher personal gains. Since high effort results in high product quality,
a product manager may find it beneficial to give his agent a say in
product location (the incentive effect). The associated cost is that
less product differentiation becomes more likely. The incentive effect
helps the demand effect ("aim at the average taste" ) to counteract the
strategic effect ("aim at a niche"), so that less product differentiation
than in the Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs can
occur.
In the model there is a tension between positioning a brand in a
market niche and producing a premium brand. By assuming that the
subordinate can propose locations that are even more differentiated
than the manager's preferred niche, the maximum differentiation result
of the Hotelling model may be enforced.
In reality, there may be a combination of reasons of why top man-
agers delegate responsibility to middle managers - not only incentive
issues, but for instance also work overload, flexibility (versus commit-
ment) to adapt to changing market characteristics, or the collection
of information about the market. The strategic nature of those and
other issues related to organizational structure seems to be a fruitful
and important area for further research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
First, the following claim will be proved:






for i- 1, 2, ~1 E[-1, 0], and x2 E [0, 1].
Proof of Claim 1: Let delegation schemes p; (.), i - 1, 2, be given.
(i) Suppose that A2 is uninformed, so that P2 will select product lo-
cation 1. If Pl's best response is to impose product location -1, then
the proposition trivially holds. Therefore, suppose that Pl optimally
selects pl(.) such that (1) holds. Accordingly, A1 will get informed.
Since Rl(~I,1;h,B) is decreasing in ~1, there exists a y E(-1,0] such
that
Ri(xi, l; h,Q) - Rl(-1, 1;~,Q) 1 0 t~ xl C y.
Two cases can be distinguished. First,
~1 pi (~i )d~i ~ Ó
Pl's expected returns are equal to
0
~ 1~i(~r)Ri(~i, 1; h,Q) }(1 - Pi(~i))Ri(-1, 1; ~, Q)]d~i -
Y
J-1 pi(~i)[Ri(~i, 1; h, 2) - Ri(-1,1; e, ~)]d~i-~
0
f Pi(~i)[Ri(~i, l; h,Q) - Rl(-1,1;2,2)]dxl -}- Rl(-1,1;~,Q) G
y -
(by monotonicity of Rl)
(8)
J-~ [R~(~~,1; h,Q) - R~(-1,1;e,Q)]dx~ f R~(-l, l;e,e) -
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Rl(~,,1; h, P)dxl - yRl(-1,1; P, P).
~y~
It follows that Pl can (weakly) increase his expected profits by selecting
for yl - y,
1 if xl C yl,
0 otherwise.
Second, it may be the case that
If
~ I
pi(~1)dxl C Q. (9)
f,
1 d~l ? 0, (10)
then, by monotonicity of Rl, Pl can increase his expected profits by
selecting for yl - y,
1 if ~I c yl,
0 otherwise.




Note that by (9), y is well defined. Pl's expected returns are equal to
0
J-1 ~i(~i)Ri(~i,
1; h~P) }(1 - Pi(~i))Ri(-1, 1;P~P)]d~i -
J-1 pi(~i)~Ri(~i, 1; h,e) - Rl(-1,1;P,P)]dxi~
L
f Pi(xl)~Ri(xl, 1; ~,e) - Ri(-1, 1;Q~P)]d~i~
Y
0
f Pi(~i)~Ri(~i, 1; h,P) - Rl(-1~ 1;Q,P)]d~i f Rl(-1,1;P,P) G
y -
(by monotonicity of Rl)
~i~Ri(~~,1; h , P) - Rl(-1,1; P,P)]d~if
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fyPi(~i)[Ri(~i, l; ~,e) - Ri(-1,1;P,~)Jd~i ~ Rl(-1,1;Q,Q) C
y
(by monotonicity of RI )
~,1 [R~(~i, l; ~,e) - Ri(-1,1;Q,e)Jd~i -~ Ri(-1,1;~,~) -
f y1J R,(xl,l;h,2)d~l-y,R,(-l,l;e,~),~




It follows that Pl can (weakly) increase his expected profits by selecting
1 if ~1 G yl,
0 otherwise.
(ii) The proof of the case in which A2 learns his private benefits is sim-
ilar to case ( i), and is omitted. O
Claim 1 allows us to define the level of discretion of agent A1 as the
measure of interval [-1, yl], that is, Xl - yl ~ 1, and similarly, A2's
level of discretion as the measure of [y2i1], that is, X2 - 1- y2. This
completes the proof. O
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After-sales repair services and replacement parts are of major economic
importance in many industries. Consider, for instance, the car indus-
try: "A typical dealership earns most money from servicing and parts;
only 15~0 of its profits come from new car sales.i1 Moreover, prices of
repair services and replacement parts often tend to be relatively high;
Voortman ( 1993) contains an extensive list of examples. For instance,
in the United States, constructing a car by purchasing all the necessary
parts from retailers, ignoring assembly costs, costs three to eight times
the price of a fully assembled car.2
In this chapter I study pricing behavior of a monopolist who sells a
durable good, and also sells repair services or replacement parts if the
good breaks down at a later point in time. The notion of an "after-
market" plays a key role in the analysis.3 According to Shapiro and
1 The Economist (1994), p. 72.
2See Voortman (1993) and the references therein.
3The term "aftermarket" was presumably coined by the United States Supreme
Court in the antitrust case Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Ser-
vices, Inc. et al., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992); see Voortman (1993) and Shapiro and
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Teece (1994), an aftermarket is defined by sales of products and ser-
vices (e.g. replacement parts and repair services), used together with a
primary product (equipment), that take place at a point in time after
the purchase of the primary product. Thus, aftermarkets arise if some
relevant variables that concern future transactions are not pinned down
in a contract at the time of purchase of equipment. Here, I will assume
that contracts that specify future prices of repairs or parts cannot be
written.
The relevance of the incomplete-contract assumption is stressed in
a report by the European Consumer Law Group (1988), who study
the "legal situation concerning after-sales services - falling ontside the
product guarantees" (p. 1; emphasis added). Moreover, the report
argues that even if maintenance contracts are written, they may prove
to be worthless for consumers (p. 15).
Taylor (1995) provides casual evidence that in the information tech-
nology industry, firms experience inefficiencies due to high aftermarket
prices. "The drive to reduce costs [. ..] has been taken up, too, by
manufacturers, suppliers and specialist vendors keen to distance them-
selves from a possible user backlash" (p. 1). For this reason, equipment
sellers such as Compaq Computer and IBM try to design their systems
to cut maintenance costs, whereas other firms contract out technical
support.
I focus on three questions. First, which equipment price and repair
price will the monopolist charge? In the spirit of arguments made
by Williamson (1985), problems of opportunism may arise when the
seller has a locked-in consumer in need of a repair. Second, how do
these prices compare to the optimal prices if one allows for long-term
contracts? Finally, since it turns out that there is a discrepancy between
equilibrium prices in these two cases, are there ways for the monopolist
to increase or restore efTiciency? To answer the latter question, I focus
on dual sourcing (inviting a competitor in the aftermarket) and leasing.
Teece (1994) for detailed discussions.
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In the model there are overlapping generations of risk-averse con-
sumers: young consumers have the possibility to use information about
current repair prices to form expectations about future repair prices.
In each period, a young consumer enters the market to buy equipment.
With some probability, equipment is of inferior quality.4 In that case,
the good breaks dows after the use of one period. If this happens, he
must have it repaired by (or purchase a replacement part from) the
seller to use it again when he is old. I assume that a young consumer
expects a future repair price equal to the repair price he observes when
he enters the market to buy equipment.s This reputation mechanism
allows the seller to instantaneously establish a reputation for not ex-
ploiting consumers in need of a repair.
The seller faces a tradeoff between decreasing the aftermarket price,
which increases the willingness to pay of young consumers, and exploit-
ing old consumers in need of a repair. A main result is, surprisingly,
that in spite of the fact that the seller faces no obstacles whatsoever in
establishing a reputation for not exploiting old consumers, he charges a
relatively high repair price, possibly equal to consumers' willingness to
pay for a repair service. This result is in sharp contrast with the equi-
librium outcome if long-term contracts are possible. In that case, the
seller would fully insure consumers by committing to carry out repair
services at a zero fee. Also, the seller may cross-subsidize equipment
purchases by selling at a price below cost. In the long-term contract
case, the seller would cross-subsidize repair services.
If future repair prices cannot be written in a contract, dual sourcing
by inviting an aftermarket competitor is a means to drive down the
aftermarket price. In a given period, however, giving up profits from
repair services and replacement parts is attractive only if the monopolist
can invite a competitor from the next period onwards. The reason
is that in that period, the possibility of exploiting old consumers by
4This is an exogeneous event. Ex ante, neither the seller nor consumers can
identify inferior goods.
SExpectations are required to be fulfilled in equilibrium.
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charging a high aftermarket price makes dual sourcing unattractive.
However, if the seller can credibly announce that from the next period
onwards, the aftermarket will be competitive, then young consumers
are willing to pay a high price for equipment, and the seller has a last
opportunity to charge a high aftermarket price.
Finally, leasing equipment to consumers yields first-best efficiency.
The reason is that by leasing, durability of the good and risk of break-
down only matter for the monopolist; consumers do not bear any risk.
Therefore, also leasing may help the seller to overcome his commitment
problem. Moreover, the seller strictly prefers leasing to dual sourcing.
Voortman (1993) and Shapiro and Teece (1994) discuss in detail
many issues that may arise in aftermarkets, but develop no formal
theory. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first one to
formally address aftermarkets - although preliminary, because I focus
on a monopoly.
The literature on repair services in a complete contracting frame-
work (see for instance Heal (1977) and Chen and Ross (1994)) does not
address aftermarket issues. An important insight of that literature is
that optimal warranties provide full insurance for risk-averse consumers
- this outcome provides a useful benchmark for aftermarket situations.
Also related is the literature on consumer lock-in and switching
costs, studying markets in which buyers make relationship-specific in-
vestments when complete contracts cannot be written. Firms, who
cannot distinguish between old and new consumers, compete to at-
tract consumers whom they can exploit later, that is, a firm sells a
single good at a single price (see e.g. Klemperer (1990) and Farrell and
Shapiro (1988)). Farrell and Shapiro (1989) assume that sellers can
discriminate between new and locked-in consumers, and study the rela-
tionships between noncontractable quality, unobservability of switching
costs, and contract length. The main difference with these articles is
that in an aftermarket situation, a firm sells different goods (equipment
and aftermarket good), each at another price.
Aftermarkets 139
Shepard (1987) shows that it may be optimal for a monopolist to
license a new technology to competitors. Since licensing induces qual-
ity competition, it results in a credible quality commitment, and may
therefore increase demand. By focusing on dual sourcing instead of
licensíng, Farrell and Gallini (1988) derive results similar to those of
Shepard. In my paper, the general idea that dual sourcing is a means
to credibly commit ís applied to pricing problems in aftermarkets.
My results suggest a rationale for leasing which is different from the
one suggested by Coase (1972), who raised the following problem. If a
durable-goods monopolist charges a price above the competitive level,
consumers who are willing to buy at this price rationally expect a price
decrease shortly after their purchases, and therefore wait to buy. Coase
argued that leasing, which has the effect of turning the monopolist
into a seller of nondurable goods, may solve this commitment problem
caused by intertemportal price discrimination. In my model, leasing
helps the monopolist to overcome a commitment problem due to the
possibility to exploit buyers of equipment in the future.
The model is presented in the next section. The results are derived
and presented in section 6.3, and section 6.4 concludes the chapter. In
an appendix, I demonstrate that the reputation mechanism is not the
driving force behind the insights.
6.2 The Model
In each period t- 0,1, 2, ..., a consumer enters the market and lives
for 2 periods. In each period, a consumer has an inelastic demand for
one unit of a durable good that is produced by a monopolist.s
With probability ~ E(0,1), the monopolist's production technol-
ogy delivers an inferior product. An inferior good breaks down (or,
depending on the context, some crucial part of the good breaks down)
sIn Voortman (1993), the monopolist is also called Original Equipment Manu-
facturer (OEM).
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after the use of one period. If a product is not inferior it lasts for two
periods. The seller and consumers can only identify goods as inferior
when they break down.
In case of a breakdown, a consumer can use it again in a second
period only if it is repaired ( or if he buys a replacement part). Repair
services or replacement parts ( "aftermarket goods" ) are provided by
the seller. Consumers in need of a repair, however, have the option to
repurchase the good instead of buying the aftermarket good.'
In period t, the monopolist charges a price pt ~ 0 for the good,
and a price st ~ 0 for the aftermarket good. These prices are chosen
before the seller knows whether he will have to carry out any repair
services. A consumer who enters the equipment market at time t ob-
serves prices pt and st. Information about maintenance costs may be
available in publications such as Consumer Reports. Let st~l denote
the aftermarket price that is expected by a consumer entering at time t.
Accordingly, the overlapping-generations structure of the model enables
young consumers to use information about current repair prices to form
expectations about future repair prices.
Consumers and the monopolist discount future benefits with a factor
b E(0,1). The monopolist is risk-neutral and maximizes his expected
profits. Consumers maximize expected utility. Each consumer has
a strictly increasing utility function U(-) that is twice differentiable.
Consumers are risk-averse, that is, U(-) is strictly concave. Suppose
U(x)~Oforallx)O,U(0)-0,andU(x)COfora11xC0. When
the good does not break down, the utility of a consumer who buys
it at time t equals U(r - pt f br), where r ) 0 is a given constant.
When it does break down, the utility of a consumer who purchases the
aftermarket good equals U(r - pt f b(r - sttl)).
The unit cost of producing the good is co, whereas repairing the
good costs c~ 0. The parameters satisfy c C ca, that is, repairing
~The seller can distinguish old from young consumers only if an old consumer
makes himself known by buying a repair service or a replacement part.
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is less costly than producing a new product, or, producing a spare
part is less costly than producing a complete product. Throughout the
chapter, co and c are assumed to be sufl'iciently small, and r is assumed
to be sufllciently large, in order to guarantee that there exist prices such
that the monopolist is willing to produce and consumers are willing to
buy. In period t, profits from selling equipment are equal to pt - co.
Given that consumers in need of a repair will buy the aftermarket good,
expected aftermarket profits are equal to ~(st - c).
An important assumption of the model is that long-term contracts,
specifying a future aftermarket price at the time of purchase of the
good, cannot be written.8 9 As Shapiro and Teece (1994, p. 141) argue:
"Consumers rarely arrange for all of their parts and service when they
purchase a machine [. ..]". The focus of the analysis is the way in which
the equipment market and the aftermarket are interlinked as a result
of this contractual incompleteness, and how the resulting inefficiency
can be overcome.
Remark: The model tries to capture that consumers purchasing
equipment believe that the monopolist will be in the market for an
additional period. The infinite time horizon is an appropriate way
to capture this feature; in a finite-horizon model, consumers would
perceive a well-defined last period. In any subgame perfect equilibrium
when there is a finite horizon, the seller would charge s- r in the final
period; equipment and aftermarket prices in the predecessing periods
would then follow from an unraveling argument.
sTo have a benchmark, the case of long-term contracts will also be analyzed.
9As argued in the introduction, this assumption is quite realistic. It is beyond
the scope of this chapter to addtess why contracts ate incomplete. Possibly, because
of moral hazard problems concerning maintenance at the side of consumers, sellers
do not offer a guarantee for at least some part of the good. See, e.g., Cooper and
Ross (1985) for an analysis of warranties and two-sided moral hazard.
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6.3 Analysis
A subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies will be charac-
terized by prices p" and s', as well as purchase decisions of consumers,
and consumers' expectations about future repair prices. In equilibrium,
expectations will be required to be fulfilled.
At the time of purchasing the original equipment, consumers do not
know the seller's future aftermarket prices. In order to make a purchase
decision, however, a buyer must form an expectation of tomorrow's
maintenance costs. To enable the seller to influence consumers' beliefs
in a plausible way, so that he can directly influence his reputation for
good behavior in the aftermarket, I make the following assumption:
Assumption 1(Reputation mechanism) Consunxers' expectations
satisfy st}1 - st for all t- 1, 2, ....
By assumption 1, a consumer who enters the equipment market ex-
pects a future price for repair services equal to the price that he observes
today. As a consequence, the monopolist's reputation for charging low
repair prices in the future is determined by his current pricing behav-
ior. Thus, assumption 1 explicitly models how the seller can directly
influence his reputation.lo Moreover, the monopolist has the ability to
instantaneously establish a reputation for not exploiting consumers in
the aftermarket. Notice that in a stationary equilibrium, these beliefs
are automatically fulfilled.
The first result, presented in lemma 1, is that equilibrium prices will
be such that if a good breaks down, a consumer will have it repaired,
instead of buying a new good. Thus, although the seller cannot dis-
tinguish old from young consumers, consumers in need of a repair will
make themselves known by purchasing the aftermarket good.
loIn the appendix I show that the unique equilibrium outcome generated by the
reputation mechanism is also obtained if one assumes more general beliefs and
applies a plausible forward-induction argument.
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Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, pt ~ r and st C r for ald t, that is,
a consumer in need of a repair buys the aftermarket good instead of
repurchasing equipment.
Proof: Suppose that the claim does not hold. Suppose that, in some
period, pt C r. If st G pt then ~U(r - pt } b(r - sf~l)) ~(1 -.~)U(r -
pt -} Sr) ~ 0. Consequently, the seller can increase profits by increasing
pt. If st ~ pt then a consumer who needs a repair in period t will buy
new equipment. Since c C co, the seller can increase profits by choosing
st just below pt. Therefore, it must be that pt 1 r for all t. If st ) r
then consumers in need of a repair will neither repurchase, nor buy the
aftermarket good. Therefore, the seller can increase profits by choosing
st E(c, r], a contradiction. It follows that st C r. ~
By lemma 1, and because equilibrium prices are assumed to be
stationary, the monopolist's problem in any subgame starting in t-









se, Pe 1 0.
(1)
Lemma 1 allows us to introduce a useful definition. Let the function
~(st~.l ) be defined as the equipment price pt -~(st~l ) that makes a con-
sumer who enters the market at time t indifferent between purchasing
and not purchasing, for a given expected aftermarket price st~l E[o, r].
Equivalently,
av(r - ~(St}~) -~ s(r - st.~~)) ~ (I - a)v(r - ~(St.~~) ~ sr) - o. (2)
11In problem (1), it would be equivalent to maximize the sum of discounted per-
period profits from t onwards.
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In order to solve problem (1), it is useful to know more about l;(.).
Lemma 2 states some results that will be needed below. In particular,
~(s) is a decreasing function, that is, high maintenance costs reduce a
consumer's willingness to pay for equipment.12
Lemma 2 For all s 1 0, ~(s) satisfies
(i~ -S C~'(s) C -~b (with strict ineqnality if s ~ 0~, and
(ii) ~"(s) G 0.
Proof: (i) Differentiating (2) and rewriting yields
U'(r - ~(s) ~ b(r - s))~'(s) - -b,~
~U'(r - ~(s) f S(r - s)) ~- (1 - ~)U'(r - ~(s) f Sr)
(3)
Define A - r- l;(s) f S(r - s), and B - r -~(s) f br. Then A- B
if s- 0, and A G B otherwise. Notice U'(A) ~ 0 and U'(B) ~ 0.
Since U(-) is concave, U'(A) - U'(B) if s- 0, and U'(A) 1 U'(B)
otherwise. First, since U'(A) ~~U'(A) ~(1 - a)U'(B), it follows that
l:'(s) C-Sa, with strict inequality if s~ 0. Second, since ~U'(A) G
aU'(A) f(1- a)U'(B), we have ~'(s) ~-ë.
(ii) Difierentiating (3) yields that the sign of l;"(s) is equal to the sign
of
-~a {U"(A)(-~'(s) - s)(aU'(A) -~ (1- a)U'(B)] -
U'(A)[av"(A)(-~'(s) - b) ~ (~ - a)U"(B)(-~'(S))l },
which can be written as
-~a ~U"(A)(-~'(s) - b)(I - a)U'(B) - U'(A)(~ - a)~"(B)(-~'(S))].
Since U(.) is concave and strictly increasing, and -S C~'(s) G 0, it
follows that ~"(s) C 0. ~
Before giving the solution to problem (1), a definition is given.
Given that a C S, let s be defined by
l;'(s) - -.~. (4)
1zThe assumptions on U(.) imply that ~(.) is twice differentiable.
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The first proposition states a central result:
Proposition 1 Suppose that assumption 1 holds. There ezists a unique
equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
(i~ if ~ G S then p` -~(s') and s' - min{s, r} ~ 0,
(ii~ if ~ 1 S then p` -~(s') and s' - r~ 0.
The equilibrium outcome is inef~j"ccient.
Proof: Consider any period t 1 1. The monopolist will fully ex-
tract any consumer's surplus, so that pt -~(st). In problem (1), the
constraint pt ~ r automatically holds. To see this, notice that by
definition (2), a young consumer is never willing to pay more than
~(r) for the equipment. If he buys at price ~(r), his expected utility
is 0 - ~U(r - ~(r)) -~ (1 - ~)U(r - ~(r) -f- ór), which implies that
r-~(r) G 0. Since st G r(lemma 1) and ~(-) is decreasing (lemma 2),
it follows that pt -~(st) ~~(r) ~ r.
Substituting p-~(s) into per-period profits in problem (1) yields that
profits in period t equal IIt(s) -~(s) - co ~~(s - c). By lemma 2(ii),
IIt(s) is concave. Suppose first that ~ G~. Then, profits are max-
imized by s' - min{s, r}, where s satisfies the first-order condition
IIf(s) - ~'(s) -~ .~ - 0. Second, if .~ ~ b then IIt(s) - ~'(s) ~ .~ 1 0
for all s, so that profits are maximized by s' - r. In both cases, the
equipment price satisfies p' -~(s`) (and also pó -~(s')). Consumers'
beliefs in equilibrium are st - s` for all t. The consumer who enters
the market in period 0 rationally expects a future repair price s', and
is willing to pay ~(s'). Therefore, the equilibrium price in period 0 is
also p`.
In the case ~ G b, it remains to be shown that s' ~ 0 if s G r. Suppose
that s G r and s' - 0, so that A- B(where A and B are defined
in the proof of lemma 1). Using (3), the first-order condition is then
equivalent to U'(A)(b~ -~) - U'(B)(1 - a). The latter equation implies
U'(A) 1 U'(B), which contradicts A- B.
An inefficiency arises because consumers, who are risk-averse, bear risk.
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Finally, total profits from period t on are non-negative if and only if
(~(s') - co ~- ~(s` - c))~(1 - b) ~ 0, which is satisfied because marginal
costs are assumed to be sufl'iciently small. ~
Even though consumers' expectations as given by assumption 1 al-
low the seller to instantaneously build up a reputation for not exploiting
consumers who need parts and service, by proposition 1 he charges a
relatively high aftermarket price. The equilibrium prices reflect the sell-
er's tradeoff between "insuring" young, risk-averse consumers against
the risk of breakdown, and exploiting old consumers in the aftermarket.
Notice that it is possible that p` -~(s` ) G co; in this case, the seller
cross-subsidizes equipment purchases. Since high prices are charged
on the aftermarket, however, the monopolist is willing to suffer losses
on the equipment market. Hence it is possible that the seller has no
market power in the equipment market, and charges a high markup in
the aftermarket.
What is the effect of a marginal increase in a on the equilibrium
prices? Suppose that ~ G b and s` - s G r, where s is defined by (4).




Accordingly, the optimal aftermarket price is increasing in the proba-
bility of breakdown. As a consequence,
d~ - ~~(s~) dá G ~'
that is, the equipment price is decreasing in the probability of break-
down.
Williamson ( 1985) emphasized that in relationships in which parties
make irreversible investments, contractual incompleteness may lead to
underinvestment. In my model, a young consumer invests in a specific
asset, that is, he purchases equipment, and the seller chooses ex post
the price of the aftermarket good, which is noncontractable ex ante.
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Since it is possible that s` - r, the reputation mechanism specified in
assumption 1 may be ineffective in alleviating the "hold-up" problem
of exploiting consumers in need of a repair.
To view proposition 1 in perspective, it is useful to consider the case
in which long-term contracts can be written.
Proposition 2 Suppose that long-term contracts are possible. There
exists a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, p- r(1 ~ b) and s - 0.
The equilibrium outcome is ef,~icient.
Proof: Using long-term contracts, in every period t the monopo-
list chooses p and s such that p -~(s), and s maximizes IIt(s) -
~(s) - co t b.~(s - c). By lemma 2, IIt(.) is a concave function. Its
derivative satisfies IIt(s) -~'(s) -~ ~~ - 0 if s- 0 and IIt(s) C 0 oth-
erwise. Therefore, the monopolist will choose s as small as possible, so
that s- 0. Moreover, from (2) it follows that p-~(s) - r(1-F b). The
equilibrium outcome is efficient because the seller, who is risk-neutral,
bears all the risk. ~
According to proposition 2, the seller would want to be able to
commit himself to an aftermarket price as low as possible.13 Since
consumers are risk-averse, it would be efficient to offer consumers a
complete insurance against equipment breakdown by performing repair
services at no charge. Consumers then would pay for such an insurance
via a higher equipment price.
It is interesting to notice that if long-term contracts can be written,
the monopolist cross-subsidizes repair services if c~ 0. This observa-
tion is in sharp contrast with the incomplete-contract case, in which
the seller may cross-subsidize equipment purchases.
Example:
In this example, the results will be related to consumers' risk aver-
13See, for instance, Heal (1977) and Chen and Ross (1994) for similar results in
different settings.
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sion. Suppose that U(x) --e-a~ ~ 1, where a 1 0. The Arrow-
Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion (defined as -U"(x)~U'(~)) is
constant and equal to a. Assume that the parameters satisfy a C ó
and r 1 ln[(1 - a)~(ó -~)]~(aó). Using (2), one can calculate that
~(s) - r(1 f ó) - In(~eaós ~ 1- a)~a. Applying proposition 1, it
follows that s" - ln[(1 -~)~(ó - a)]~(aó), which can be used to cal-
culate p" -~(s") - r(1 ~ ó) - ln[ó(1 -~)~(ó - a)]~a. By defining
K(a) - ln[ó(1 -~)~(ó -~)]~a, one can write p" - p- If(a). The
Williamsonian "underinvestment" K(a) can be interpreted as the de-
crease in willingness to pay compared to the first-best price p- r(1 ~ó)
(see proposition 2), when a consumer faces a risk of breakdown and
subsequent"hold-up." The function K(a) is decreasing so that the more
risk-averse consumers are, the more young consumers are willing to pay.
Repair price s` is decreasing in a; if consumers become more risk-averse,
the monopolist becomes more eager to (implicitly) insure consumers.
When a young consumer buys equipment, the seller would want
to be able to commit himself to carry out repairs for free in the next
period. Therefore, he may consider ways to drive down the aftermarket
price, such as inviting an aftermarket competitor, or contracting out
aftermarket goods to competing firms.
Suppose that there is an independent service organization (ISO),
who can carry out repair services under identical conditions as the mo-
nopolist, but does not sell equipment. Initially, the seller's technology is
proprietary, so that the ISO can enter the aftermarket only if the seller
agrees. Suppose that in each period, the monopolist has the ability to
grant the right to compete in the aftermarket from any future period
onwards, possibly until infinity. The monopolist can inform consumers
about dual sourcing without cost.
Abstracting from collusion, price competition results in an after-
market price s- c under dual sourcing. The optimal equipment price
under dual sourcing is then p-~(c).
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Proposition 3 Suppose that the monopodist can invite a competitor in
the aftermarket. There exists a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
the monopolist creates a competitive aftermarket from period 1 onwards.
If c 1 0, the equilibrium outcome is inef~icient.
Proof: For completeness it will be shown that in each period, the
monopolist has an incentive to create a competitive aftermarket only
from the next period onwards, so that in equilibrium, a competitor will
be invited in period 0 to enter in period 1. Suppose in some period t-
1, 2, ..., the monopolist grants the right to compete in the aftermarket
from the next period onwards. Then consumers who enter in period t
are willing to pay ~(c) for the good. Notice that in this case the seller
can choose (only in period t) st - r. Therefore, dual sourcing from
period t~ 1 onwards is optimal if and only if
~ r - c ~ ~(c)
- co , ~(s') - co ~- ~(s` - c)
( ) 1-b - 1-S ' (5)
where equilibrium prices without dual sourcing, ( ~(s'), s'), are given in
proposition 1. By the Mean Value Theorem, there exists an s E(c, s')
such that ~'(s") - [~(s`) - ~(c)~~(s` - c). Therefore, (5) holds if and
only if there exists an s E(c, s') such that
~'(s)(s' - c) c ~(r - c)(1 - b) - .~(s' - c). (6)
Notice that ~'(s)(s' - c) C~(s' - c)(1 - 8) -~(s` - c) is equivalent
with ~'(s) C-b~, which is true by lemma 2. Therefore, ~'(s)(s' - c) G
.~(s' - c)(1 - b) - ~(s` - c) G ~(r - c)(1 - b) - ~(s` - c), so that (6) is
satisfied.
Similarly, one can show that in period 0, it is optimal to invite a com-
petitor from period 1 onwards if and only if there exists an s E(c, s")
such that ~'(s) c-b.~, which follows from lemma 2. Finally, in period 1
it is optimal to invite a competitor from period 1 onwards if and only
if (f (c) - ca)~(1 - b) 1(~(s') - co -~ a(s' - c))~(1 - b), which holds
if and only if there exists an s E(c, s') such that ~'(s) C-~. Using
that ~'(.) is decreasing (lemma 2) and ~'(s') ~-.~ (see the proof of
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proposition 1), one can show that such an s does not exist. o
The interpretation of proposition 3 is as follows. Take the situa-
tion in which there is no competitor in the aftermarket as given. The
monopolist then faces a tradeoff between creating a competitive after-
market or not. In any period, however, the possibility of exploiting old
consumers by charging a high aftermarket price makes dual sourcing
in that period unattractive. Now suppose that in a given period, the
seller can credibly announce that from the next period onwards, the af-
termarket will be competitive. Then young consumers, and also future
young consumers, are willing to pay a high price for equipment, and the
seller still has a(last) opportunity to charge a high aftermarket price.
Accordingly, only if the seller invites a competitor from the next period
onwards dual sourcing is more profitable than sticking to a monopolistic
aftermarket. Similarly, at date 0 there is not yet an established after-
market, and the mon~polist has an incentive to announce that from
date 1 onwards, there will be a second source in the aftermarket.
As an extension of the model, and as another means to reduce the
ineffiiciency caused by contractual incompleteness, it is interesting to
consider the case in which the monopolist has the option to lease equip-
ment to consumers, a contractual arrangement that was not allowed for
in the model so far. Suppose that leasing occurs for single periods, so
that lease contracts can be written even when long-term contracts are
impossible.
If the good breaks down after being used for one period, the seller
repairs it and leases it again. Thus the seller incurs any repair costs.
After two periods, the good can no longer be used. Let the per-period
rent be denoted by ~t. Now one can show that leasing is more profitable
than selling.
Proposition 4 Suppose that leasing equipment to consumers is pos-
sible. There eaists a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the mo-
nopolist leases equipment at per-period rent ~' - r. The equilibrium
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outcome is e,~cient.
Proof: Under leasing, the seller maximizes IIt (Qe) - Pt-cfl~b(et~l -~c)
subject to the constraints U(r - 2t -~ b(r - et~l)) ~ 0 and 0 C et G r. In
a stationary equilibrium, the monopolist extracts all consumer surplus
if and only if U(r - P f b(r - 2)) - 0, so that Q' - r. Recall that first-
best profits under selling are equal to IIt(0) - r(1 ~ b) - co ~ b~(0 - c)
(proposition 2). Since IIt (r) - IIt(0), leasing results in the same profits
as in the case of full warranties. O
Proposition 4 provides a rationale for leasing goods that can break
down before the end of their potential life-cycle. By leasing equipment,
the seller circumvents his commitment problem by acting as a seller of
nondurable goods. Young consumers rent the good for one period, and
whether or not the good breaks down after use, return it. The seller
then repairs the good if necessary, and old consumers rent the good
again. The optimal rent is equal to consumers' per-period reservation
price for the good. Since the seller incurs any repair costs, consumers
face no risk and the equilibrium outcome is efficient. Note that in order
to obtain the efFicient outcome by leasing, the seller does not have to
be able to discriminate between young and old consumers.
If one compares dual sourcing and leasing, two differences are note-
worthy. First, a corollary of propositions 3 and 4 is that, except if
the marginal cost of repairing is zero, leasing is more profitable than
dual sourcing. Second, whereas by dual sourcing the monopolist tries
to mimic the first-best contract by decreasing the aftermarket price,
leasing leads to a high aftermarket price.
6.4 Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter showed that a monopolist who sells a
durable good that can break down, charges an inefficiently high repair
price if long-term contracts (specifying future repair prices at the time
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of purchase) cannot be written. Inviting a competitor in the aftérmar-
ket (dual sourcing) increases efTiciency because it results in competitive
repair prices. By leasing the good instead of selling, durability of the
good and risk of breakdown no longer matter for consumers; the mo-
nopolist bears all the risk so that efficiency is restored.
The results on dual sourcing show that more competition does not
always result in less market power. Under dual sourcing, there is fierce
competition only in the aftermarket, and the monopolist may fully ex-
tract consumers' surplus in the equipment market. Therefore, although
dual sourcing increases efficiency, it does not decrease the seller's mar-
ket power. A necessary condition to prevent the seller from extracting
consumers' surplus is that there is competition in both the equipment
market and the aftermarket.
Some issues that are outside the scope of this chapter seem to be
worthwhile to explore. An important question is whether competition
among several "original equipment manufacturers" decreases the firms'
market power, given that repairs can only be carried out by original
sellers. Another interesting extension of the model would be to have
the monopolist choose the probability of breakdown by having it exert
effort that determines the quality of the good. If effort and quality are
unobservable to consumers, equipment and repair prices could serve as
signals. Also, one could compare the seller's incentives to reduce the
probability of breakdown under different contractual and institutional
arrangements, such as warranties, dual sourcing and leasing.
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Appendix
This appendix demonstrates that the reputation mechanism specified in
assumption 1 is not the driving force behind the results. Summarizing
this appendix, it is shown below that
1 any equilibrium outcome generated by the reputation mechanism
can also be obtained by assuming more general beliefs,
2 equilibrium outcomes supported by more general beliefs inhibit,
by and large, a discrepancy with the first-best outcome just as in
the analysis, and
3 the unique equilibrium outcome selected by the reputation mech-
anism is also obtained if one applies a forward-induction argument
to equilibrium outcomes supported by more general beliefs.14
Suppose that assumption 1 is not imposed. Consider a stationary
equilibrium with prices (p', s`) such that p' -~(s'), supported by the
following beliefs:
s` if (pt, st) - (,ro', s'),
thr o erwise. (7)
These beliefs are chosen such that after a deviation by the monopolist
at time t, the willingness to pay ~(st~ l) of a consumer who enters the
market is reduced as much as possible, that is, down to ~(r).
Obviously, the seller would be punished more severely if consumers
would refuse to buy equipment after a deviation. However, if a con-
sumer expects to gain from buying after a deviation, such a punish-
ment is irrational, and does therefore not pose a credible threat. If
one restricts attention to punishments that are individually rational
for consumers, beliefs (7) punish the seller as much as possible after a
deviation.
190n forward induction, see Van Damme (1989).
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Distinguish two cases.
(a) ~'(r) ~-~. Suppose that s" C r. By lemma 2, per-period profits
IIt(s') - ~(s`) - co ~ a(s' - c) G ~(r) - co ~- ~(r - c). Consequently,
the seller has an incentive to deviate with (p, s) -(~(r), r). Therefore,
there is a unique equilibrium outcome that is supported by beliefs (7);
in this equilibrium, (p', s') -(~(r), r). Accordingly, the reputation
mechanism and beliefs (7) lead to the same equilibrium outcome.
(b) ~'(r) G-.1. Define s- max{0, s'}, where s' G r is defined by
~(s') - co ~ ~(s' - c) - ~(r) - co ~ ~(r - c). Now any pair (p', s`) with
p' -~(s`) and s' E[s, r~ can be supported by beliefs (7) in an equi-
librium. The reputation mechanism, however, would lead to a unique
equilibrium outcome (~(s), s), where s E (s, r) maximizes per-period
profits IIt(s); see definition (4). Typically s' ) 0(although one can
construct s` - 0 if ~'(r) c~ and s- 0). Therefore, also in this case
equilibrium outcomes supported by beliefs (7) exhibit, by and large, a
discrepancy with profits in the first-best outcome s- 0(see proposi-
tion 2).
By applying a forward induction argument, one can show that in
case ( b), beliefs (7) and assumption 1 lead to the same, unique equi-
librium outcome. To see this, suppose that ~'(r) G-a, and consider
an equilibrium outcome (p`, s`) -(~(s'), s`) supported by beliefs (7),
such that s' ~ s. Suppose that in some period t- 1, 2, ..., the seller
deviates by choosing (pt, st) -(~(s), s). If instead of believing st~l - r,
consumers would believe that si~l - s, then by definition of s, the sell-
er's profits would be increased to a maximum. Accordingly, one might
argue that consumers should interpret the deviation as a signal of the
monopolist's intention to choose repair price s in the future.
Only the equilibrium outcome in which (p', s') -(~(s), s), which
is the monopolist's most preferred outcome, is robust to this forward
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induction argument. Notice that this is the same equilibrium outcome
as obtained under assumption 1. Therefore, by applying a forward-
induction argument, the reputation mechanism and beliefs (7) lead to
the same, unique equilibrium outcome.
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Summary in Dutch
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit vijf essays in de theorie van industriële
organisatie en strategisch management. De analyses in de papers zijn
gebaseerd op speltheoretische modellen.
Hoofdstuk 1, de inleiding, geeft een korte beschrijving van spelthe-
orie, industriële organisatie en strategisch management, en presenteert
elk van de essays aan de hand van een voorbeeld.
Hoofdstuk 2, "Moral Hazard and Noisy Inforrnation Disclosure,"
bestudeert het strategisch vrijgeven van informatie in een spel waarin
speler 1(de "verzender") een boodschap kan verzenden naar speler 2
(de "ontvanger"). De informatie in zo'n boodschap betreft welke ac-
tie speler 1 kiest. Speler 2 kan de actie van speler 1 niet waarnemen.
Een "actie" is bijvoorbeeld (de mate van) hard werken. Een veronder-
stelling in het model is dat ontvangen boodschappen direct verifiëerbaar
zijn, zodat speler 1 als hij een boodschap verzendt niet zal liegen. Een
andere veronderstelling betreft de aanwezigheid van ruis of communi-
catiestoornis: als speler 1 een boodschap verzendt is het mogelijk dat
deze boodschap niet aankomt. Een voorbeeld is post die kwijtraakt.
Nadat speler 1 een actie heeft gekozen en al dan niet een boodschap
heeft verzonden, kiest speler 2 een actie op basis van de informatie die
hij op dat moment heeft. Dat kan zijn: speler 2 weet niets (speler 1 ver-
zond geen boodschap of door de ruis ging een boodschap verloren), of
speler 2 weet welke actie speler 1 koos (speler 1 verzond een boodschap,
en die kwam aan).
Het spel heeft een uniek evenwicht. Wanneer er voldoende ruis is
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(of de kosten van informatie verzenden zijn voldoende hoog) dan kiest
speler 1 een lage actie en verzendt geen boodschap. Wanneer er weinig
ruis is (en de kosten van informatie verzenden zijn voldoende laag)
dan gebruikt speler 1 een gemengde strategie waarin hij met positieve
kans een hoge actie kiest en speler 2 daarvan op de hoogte stelt via
het verzenden van een boodschap, en met de complementaire kans een
lage actie kiest en geen boodschap verzendt. Wanneer de kans dat
een boodschap arriveert naar 1 convergeert, dan convergeert deze even-
wichtsuitkomst naar de zogenaamde Stackelberg-uitkomst.
Hoofdstuk 3, "Entry Deterrence and Signading in Markets for
Search Goods," bestudeert toetreding van bedrijven in markten voor
produkten of diensten met kwaliteitsonzekerheid. Een belangrijke veron-
derstelling is dat consumenten kwaliteit pas kunnen waarnemen wan-
neer ze (een winkel van) een bedrijf bezoeken en daar het produkt
uitproberen alvorens tot eventuele aankoop over te gaan. In de markt
bevindt zich reeds één gevestigd bedrijf, waarvan consumenten weten
dat de kwaliteit laag is. Er is één mogelijke toetreder, waarvan de
kwaliteit onzeker is voor consumenten. Deze twee bedrijven concur-
reren door gelijktijdig prijzen te kiezen voor hun produkten. Op ba-
sis van de waargenomen prijzen besluiten consumenten welk bedrijf ze
zullen bezoeken. Indien een consument de toetreder bezoekt, kan hij
kwaliteit waarnemen, en dan óf tot aankoop overgaan, óf kopen bij
het gevestigd bedrijf, óf nergens kopen. Per veronderstelling brengt de
tweede optie, overstappen naar het gevestigd bedrijf om daar te kopen,
"bezoekkosten" met zich mee. Wanneer deze kosten laag zijn, dan kan
de toetreder die hoge kwaliteit levert door het kiezen van een hoge prijs
consumenten overtuigen dat hij inderdaad hoge kwaliteit levert. De
reden is dat een consument die lage kwaliteit aantreft vanwege de hoge
prijs bereid is om bij het gevestigd bedrijf te kopen in plaats van bij de
toetreder.
In evenwicht is, grofweg gesproken, toetreding door een bedrijf dat
hoge kwaliteit levert winstgevend wanneer bezoekkosten voldoende laag
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zijn. Een ander resultaat betreft gemeenschappelijke informatie on-
der de bedrijven. Wanneer het gevestigd bedrijf op de hoogte is van
de kwaliteit van de toetreder en zijn prijs laat afhangen van deze in-
formatie, dan is toetreding mogelijk onafhankelijk van de hoogte van
de bezoekkosten. De reden is dat wanneer de prijs van het gevestigd
bedrijf informatie verschaft over de toetreder aan consumenten, het
gemakkelijker is voor de toetreder om consumenten te overtuigen van
zijn kwaliteit.
Hoofdstuk 4, "Delegation of Responsibidity in Organizations," be-
studeert een hiërarchische relatie tussen een manager en een onderge-
schikte. Een cruciale veronderstelling is dat de ondergeschikte harder
zal werken naarmate hij meer private benefits kan realiseren. In de
eerste plaats kan men hierbij denken aan plezier in het werk. Andere
mogelijkheden zijn: het opdoen van ervaring, prestatiedrang, carrière-
motieven, enzovoorts. De manager kan dan zijn ondergeschikte mo-
tiveren om hard te werken door hem meer vrijheid te geven, zodat
de ondergeschikte tot op zekere hoogte zelf kan bepalen wat hij doet.
Gegeven een situatie waarin gekozen moet worden uit een aantal pro-
jecten waarvan de ondergeschikte er één dient uit te voeren, kan de
manager bepalen uit hoeveel van deze projecten de ondergeschikte zelf
mag kiezen. De ondergeschikte kan dan uit deze deelverzameling een
keuze maken op basis van zijn eigen voorkeur.
In het model maakt de manager de volgende afweging. Meer keuze-
vrijheid voor de ondergeschikte heeft als resultaat dat deze een grotere
prikkel heeft om de projecten serieus te bekijken en vervolgens een
voorstel te doen. Indien de manager dit voorstel accepteert dan zal
de ondergeschikte hard werken - immers, de ondergeschikte zal een
voorstel doen voor het project dat hij het liefst uitvoert. De keerzijde
van het delegeren van verantwoordelijkheid is dat de manager minder
invloed heeft op de projectkeuze.
De manager dient geloofwaardig te zijn wanneer hij zijn onderge-
schikte laat kiezen; indien de ondergeschikte verwacht dat zijn voorstel
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geweigerd zal worden door de manager ondanks het feit dat de man-
ager belooft dat dit project binnen de keuzevrijheid valt, dan zal de
ondergeschikte niet gemotiveerd zijn om zijn keuzevrijheid te benut-
ten. Eventuele problemen van geloofwaardigheid zijn op te lossen door
de financiële structuur van het bedrijf aan te passen, bijvoorbeeld via
het afsluiten van een financiëel contract met een derde partij.
Hoofdstuk 5, "Strategic Delegation of Responsibility in Co~rnpeting
Firncs," bestudeert de impact van het delegeren van verantwoordelijk-
heid aan een ondergeschikte op de strategische marktpositie van een
bedrijf. In het model zijn er twee met elkaar concurrerende bedrij-
ven, elk bestaande uit een produkt manager en een middle manager.
De bedrijven moeten bepalen welke produktvariant ze willen ontwikke-
len en verkopen. Een produkt dat meer lijkt op het produkt van de
concurrent leidt tot intensievere concurrentie en daardoor tot lagere
winst. Een produkt in een zogenaamde "market niche" leidt daarente-
gen tot hogere winst. De produkt manager kan zijn ondergeschikte
(die verantwoordelijk is voor ontwikkeling en produktie~ opleggen wat
de specificaties van een produkt moeten zijn, of zijn ondergeschikte tot
op zekere hoogte zelf laten kiezen. Zoals in hoofdstuk 4 is de cruciale
veronderstelling dat een middle manager harder zal werken naarmate
hij meer private benefits kan realiseren.
In het model maakt een produkt manager de volgende afweging.
Meer vrijheid voor zijn ondergeschikte vergroot de kans dat die een
keuze kan maken die hem motiveert om hard te werken, zodat het pro-
dukt van hogere kwaliteit zal zijn. Meer vrijheid draagt echter het risico
met zich mee dat de ondergeschikte kiest voor een produktspecificatie
die leidt tot een produkt dat verder verwijderd is van de "market niche"
die de manager in gedachten had. Dit leidt tot intensievere concurren-
tie en daardoor lagere winst. In het model worden Nash evenwichten
afgeleidt in het spel waarin de produkt managers beslissen hoeveel ver-
antwoordelijkheid ze delegeren aan hun ondergeschikten.
Verder worden enkele implicaties voor strategisch management be-
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sproken. Keuzevrijheden voor ondergeschikten kunnen zowel strate-
gische complementen als substituten zijn. Het delegeren van verant-
woordelijkheid kan deel uitmaken van strategieën om toetreding af te
schrikken, maar ook om toe te laten. De managementstijl van een pro-
dukt manager kan enerzijds door zijn ondergeschikte en anderzijds door
concurrerende bedrijven volledig anders ervaren worden.
Hoofdstuk 6, "Aftermarkets: The Monopody Case," bestudeert een
monopolistisch bedrijf dat een duurzaam goed produceert en verkoopt,
en repareert als er een defect optreedt. De cruciale veronderstelling
is dat lange-termijn onderhoudscontracten niet opgesteld kunnen wor-
den, zodat het bedrijf in iedere periode opnieuw kan bepalen hoeveel
consumenten betalen voor een reparatie.
Uit het model volgt dat het bedrijf hoge reparatieprijzen kiest. Dit
wordt veroorzaakt door het bestaan van oude klanten die mogelijk
reparaties nodig hebben. Wanneer consumenten risico-avers zijn, is dit
een ineíficiënte situatie. Immers, indien er wèl onderhoudscontracten
opgesteld konden worden, zou het bedrijf aanbieden om reparaties gratis
uit te voeren. De reden dat deze strategie meer winst oplevert is dat
consumenten die risico-avers zijn, bereid zijn meer te betalen voor het
produkt wanneer ze bij aankoop er zeker van zijn dat ze in de toekomst
geen dure reparaties hoeven uit te laten voeren. Lage reparatieprijzen
kunnen beschouwd worden als een impliciete verzekering voor het door
consumenten gelopen risico dat een produkt defect raakt.
Om te ontsnappen aan de inefficiëntie die onstaat wanneer onder-
houdscontracten onmogelijk zijn kan de monopolist concurrentie in de
reparatiemarkt uitnodigen. Wanneer onderhoudsbedrijven op prijs con-
curreren dan zal de reparatieprijs dalen, zodat consumenten minder
risico lopen. Een andere manier om de inefl~iciëntie te elimineren is
om het produkt te leasen in plaats van te verkopen. Wanneer lease-
perioden kort zijn, dan kan een consument een defect produkt vervan-
gen door een werkend produkt wanneer een lease-periode afloopt.
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STELLINGEN
bij het proefschrift
Essays in Industrial Organization and Management Strategy
Paul W.J. de Bijl
1
De keuze van Philips om met Digital Compact Cassette (DCC) compatibiliteit
met de analoge Compact Cassette technologie te waarborgen, en de keuze van
Sony om de concurrerende, niet-compatibele Mini Disc technologie te introdu-
ceren, vormen een Nash evenwicht waarin de bedrijven zich richten op verschil-
lende marktsegmenten. (Zie De Bijl, P.W.J., en Goyal, S. (1995), "Technolog-
ical Change in Markets with Network Externalities," International Journal of
Industrial Organization, Vol. 13, pag. 307-325.)
2
De mate waarin een persoon of organisatie een inspanning levert die direct
een andere partij ten goede komt neemt toe wanneer de kans dat die partij de
geleverde inspanning (of verifieerbare informatie daarover) waarneemt groter
wordt. (Zie hoofdstuk 2.)
3
De belangrijkste motivatie-factor in werk is plezier. (Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 ne-
men deze stelling, waarbij "plezier" ruimer opgevat wordt als private benefits,
als uitgangspunt.)
4
De kans dat medewerkers van een bedrijf zich maximaal inzetten wordt groter
naarmate zij meer invloed hebben op de strategiebepaling van de organisatie.
(Zie hoofdstuk 4.)
5
Wanneer men een managementstijl omschrijft met de mate van "aardigheid"
versus "hardheid" van een manager, kunnen de belevingen van managementstijl
door enerzijds ondergeschikten en anderzijds concurrerende ondernemingen
tegengesteld zijn. (Zie hoofdstuk 5.)
6
Deregulering en marktwerking zijn te rechtvaardigen vanuit het oogpunt dat
elk individu een zekere verantwoordelijkheid draagt voor zijn of haar welzijn.
(Zie Financial Ti.rrces, "Adam Smith and the virtue of capitalism," 16 jan.
1995, pag. 12. )
7
De treinvertragingen veroorzaakt door de uitbreidingswerkzaamheden aan het
spoorwegnetwerk kunnen dermate veel klanten wegjagen dat de uitbreidingen
resulteren in overcapaciteit.
8
De discussie omtrent vrije nieuwsgaring bij voetbal kan vermeden worden
door voetbalwedstrijden te beschouwen als commerciële TV-produkties met
(a) voetballers als improviserende acteurs en (b) betalende kijkers.
9
Wanneer men in de etalage van een opticien niets ziet dat naar wens is, dan is
men aan het goede adres.
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This thesis contains five essays in the theory of industrial
organization and management strategy. An introduction makes the
main ideas accessible to non-specialists by presenting the essays as
fictitious cases. The first essay investigates strategic disclosure of
verifiable information. The disclosed information concerns a hidden
action, and the transmission of information takes place in a noisy
environment. The second essay explores how search costs and
informational asymmetries influence the possibilities for entry in
markets for search goods. The model that is used analyzes signaling
with common information. The third essay presents a principal-agent
model in which the agent enjoys working. The principal, instead of
designing a pecuniary incentive scheme, can appeal to the agent's
private benefits by giving him a say in the job the agent has to do.
The fourth essay applies this idea in order to study the strategic
impact of organizational structure. Possible linkages between internal
organization and market strategy are highlighted. The last essay
focuses on the prices selected by a monopolist who sells a durable
good and repairs it in the case of breakdown. The monopolist can
circumvent inefficiencies by inviting a competitor in the repair market
or by leasing the good instead of selling it.
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